DOWNSIDE LEGACY AT TWO DEGREES OF PRESIDENT CLINTON
SECTION: BEHIND THE TREASON ALLEGATIONS
SUBSECTION: RED FLAGS OF TREASON – General Part 2
Washington Post 4/9/99 Al Kamen "...The Air Force is duly going about its business, dropping bombs on Yugoslavia, but it's looking increasingly unlikely that Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen's pick for Air Force secretary, Charles B. Curtis, is going to be nominated any time soon. Curtis, a highly regarded Washington lawyer, Boston University law school chum of Cohen's and former energy deputy secretary, was good to go, as they say in the military, until this nasty little business of alleged Chinese spying at the Department of Energy's Los Alamos nuclear facility came up. Word was the Senate was going to use any nomination as a backdrop to blast the administration for lax security and such even though the nuclear secrets appear to have first been purloined during the Reagan administration. ...."
Newsday/AP 4/9/99 "...Defense Secretary William Cohen's choice to be Air Force secretary withdrew his name over concern his confirmation would focus on lax security at the Energy Department's nuclear weapons labs, the Pentagon said today. Charles Curtis, a former acting and deputy secretary of energy, had been going through final background checks, but the White House had not formally submitted his nomination as Air Force secretary to the Senate. Asked Friday about the status of Curtis' nomination, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said Curtis had recently withdrawn his name. A Washington lawyer, Curtis was a classmate of Cohen at Boston University's law school. Although Curtis' record at the Energy Department was good, Bacon said he was involved in security matters as a leader of the agency. As a result, Curtis was concerned that his confirmation would result in ``a lengthy hearing'' on nuclear lab security and not on his requirements to become secretary of the Air Force, Bacon said. Republicans in Congress have strongly criticized the Clinton administration for not acting quickly enough to tighten security after learning of allegations that nuclear secrets leaked to the Chinese from the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The alleged leaks may have occurred during the 1980s, but weren't suspected until 1995. When the General Accounting Office issued a scathing report in 1977 about the need to tighten security at three weapons labs, the Energy Department said in its formal response that Curtis had ``made the issue of `what the Department should strive to protect' a priority to investigate.'' ..."
The Union Leader 4/9/99 Richard Lessner "...Bill Clinton's kowtowing policy on Communist China - described by one critic as "all carrot and no stick" - has plummeted to the depths of the totally incomprehensible. With Red China's Premier Zhu Rongji in Washington, Mr. Clinton has been reduced to sputtering rank gibberish. Mr. Clinton insists that his policy of "constructive engagement" with Beijing has yielded security benefits for the United States. This astounding declaration came the day before the New York Times reported that in 1995 China stole U.S. neutron bomb secrets. And this followed previous revelations that for three years beginning in 1995 the administration did nothing when it learned of Red China's spying at the Los Alamos nuclear weapons lab - spying that allowed Beijing to miniaturize its atomic warheads and mount multiple warheads on its missiles. These missiles are being massed threateningly opposite Taiwan. Thus Bill Clinton's notion of "security benefits."..."
FoxNews 4/8/99 "...A complex money trail links the head of China's military intelligence, General Ji, with the Democratic Party. Sources say the Dems may have received illegal campaign contributions in exchange for as many as seven nuclear missile secrets.... BEGIN TRANSCRIPT: FOX NEWS CORRESPONDENT CARL CAMERON: National Security Advisor Sandy Berger was told in 1996, (inaudible) intelligence sources say, that China had stolen nuclear secrets from U.S. labs like Los Alamos in New Mexico in both the '80s and in the Clinton administration's first term. On the day of the president's last news conference, when Fox News broke the story, Mr. Clinton said he had never been briefed, but would check. Department of Energy sources tell Fox News classified documents prove Berger was told that on Clinton's watch China stole, from Lawrence Livermore Labs and elsewhere, technology for the electromagnetic pulse and neutron bombs. Over the years, sources say, secrets for as many as seven other warheads have been obtained by China...."
Date: 4/9/99 Author: Paul Sperry Investor's Business Daily "...In the mid-1990s, scientists at the nation's nuclear-weapons research labs openly shared data with Chinese visitors. Their guests felt comfortable enough to call Beijing from the labs - and no one stopped them..... How could this happen at such bastions of U.S. military secrets? It was planned that way. As part of the Clinton administration's so-called denuclearization goal, lab directors were actually prodded by former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary and her senior staffers - many of whom were anti-nuclear activists - to open their doors to visitors from other nuclear states and share otherwise classified information. Not just any info - much was still guarded - but the kind that could, among other things, teach Russian and Chinese scientists to test nuclear weapons by computer modeling rather than underground detonation, sources familiar with lab operations say. In 1995, President Clinton announced that the U.S. would pursue a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as a way to stop the building, use and spread of nuclear missiles after the Cold War. To get Russia and China - not to mention U.S. lab directors - on board, Clinton had to convince them that computer models could tell whether existing bombs work without actually blowing them up. Up went billion-dollar labs designed to simulate nuclear blasts through ''virtual testing.'' And out went the welcome mats to foreign scientists. Thousands visited the labs. Some even got jobs.... But he's not sure that O'Leary was in lock step with the White House's plan to denuclearize the globe. He says O'Leary was in over her head when it came to making national security decisions. ''She knew nothing about it,'' he said. ''She was a public affairs director.'' Before Energy, O'Leary headed the PR shop at Northern States Power Co. in Minneapolis. Another former close aide, who wished to go unnamed, also says O'Leary was underqualified. ''It was chaos back then,'' she said. O'Leary did not return calls to her Maryland office. Others doubt O'Leary winged it. ''It is not at all accurate to write this off to incompetence,'' Gaffney said. ''She populated the senior ranks of DOE with anti-nuclear activists. People are policy.'' O'Leary did surround herself with no-nukes. A key adviser, still at Energy, was Dan Reicher, formerly a lawyer for Natural Resources Defense Council's nuclear program. Among the program's top goals? Cutting ''nuclear weapons arsenals with the goal of eventual elimination,'' NRDC's Web site says. Another: Stopping the commercial use of plutonium. It also boasts playing a ''pivotal role'' in ''educating the executive branch'' on the need for a nuclear weapons test ban. Ongoing projects include researching the ''technical steps required for transition to a nuclear-weapons-free world.''
In other words, denuclearization -the administration's policy.....Step No. 1 is getting nuclear states to stop blowing up bombs. To do that, Energy has to show them that testing can be done above ground by computer. It plans to sink $4.5 billion a year over the next 10 years into supercomputers and simulation facilities, among other things, at the labs. Meantime, Energy had invited Chinese scientists to the labs to pick up technical pointers on virtual testing, as well as other techniques like lab security - under the assumption they'd go back to Beijing and start their own programs. But it's plain that Beijing is interested in gleaning U.S. nuclear techniques for targeting rather than testing - much to the chagrin of trusting no-nuke activists in the administration, critics say. ''Looking back on it against the current scandal, these people were running amok,'' Gaffney said..."
Congressional Record: Testimony Deputy Secretary of Energy of Elizabeth A. Moler 10/6/98 "…am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you our foreign visitors and assignments programs and policies at our three weapons laboratories….First, I would like to assure the Subcommittee that we at DOE are fully aware of our responsibilities as stewards of the nation's preeminent national security laboratories. More specifically, we are as committed to protecting classified and sensitive information as we are to maintaining the scientific excellence of the laboratories….Without wishing to steal their thunder, let me highlight the key elements of our improved program…."
Electronic Telegraph 4/11/99 Tony Paterson "…Experts have little doubt that the NSA is at the forefront of the European industrial espionage war, not least because Washington has instructed its security services to collect information for the benefit of American industry. Early in his presidency, Bill Clinton decreed that industrial espionage should be one of the main tasks of the CIA. "What is good for Boeing is good for America," he was quoted as saying. The NSA operates a global data surveillance network involving 52 super computers…." Jolly notes "…No.. wonder Clinton and Berger are not upset with what the Chinese are doing. For goodness sake look at how they are subverting our government. They just do not want to leave the Chinese out of the game. I guess that is why they had to give them all those super computers. Like they didn't kow that they could be used for other things... humph…"
The Political Review @ HYPERLINK http://www.freeper.com www.freeper.com 4/8/99 D K Zimmerman "…Just what this administration thinks it is up to is a serious concern at this point. Many speak darkly of conspiracy and even treason, but how could anyone seriously suggest a sitting president is guilty of such crimes or desires? Clinton's earliest presidential acts included shutting down our last nuclear weapon assembly line and our cruise missile contracts. Not much later, Clinton ensured one John Huang had access to classified data for which he was never properly cleared. Huang was allowed to carry this data out of his government office to a private office. From there, he phoned, mailed, and faxed numerous documents to Riaddy and Chinese agents, when he wasn't just dropping over to the Chinese Embassy to spend the night….. The Cox report detailing the findings of a House investigation into similar and possibly related security issues remains heavily classified at White House insistence. ….Milosevic has no demonstrable territorial designs beyond his borders, while Albania clearly does. We are expected to ignore the fact that China was Albania's sole ally for decades before Kosovo when all of a sudden, off we go to war. It is pure coincidence that we allied ourselves with Albanian factions, ignoring their atrocities and massacres of Serbians. Buried by war news is the report that the FBI quite naturally requested a wiretap be approved to investigate the Los Alamos suspect. Since the theft was first suspected, roughly 2,700 wiretaps have been approved by the Justice Department. Exactly one was turned down, the one concerning the most serious loss of nuclear secrets in forty years. Also relegated to back pages are reports that Chinese espionage efforts have heavily compromised several highly classified black projects. Our investigators have discovered that Chinese agents have so thoroughly penetrated them, they use terminology and slang common only to those working on them. Every one of these fiascoes took place since Clinton took office. Combined, they are even more significant than the Los Alamos loss. Recently, Clinton withdrew "launch on warning" prerogatives from subordinate commands. Launch on warning was essential to our Mutually Assured Destruction Doctrine, ensuring a rapid response to inbound missiles, before they begin landing. Regardless of even a significant numerical superiority, who would try a sneak attack, knowing we would launch in retaliation before their missiles arrive? Considered in isolation, it is a reasonable decision to remove this Cold War relic…... It would take 4 to 5 years to recover our production capability. Yet our warheads will soon begin to fail inspection due to normal decay. In this context, removal of launch on warning is incredibly risky, even as Kosovo assumes strategic importance….. Pre-Kosovo, discussions focused on the desirability of replacing our aging cruise inventory with newer ones. Now they have turned to the two year window of opportunity our strategic shortage presents to our enemies while we tool up another cruise missile production line. And the Air Force conversion effort further reduced our nuclear capabilities. Recently, a former ambassador to China charged that intelligence sources have tapes of John Huang discussing classified material with the Chinese. They are being withheld, allegedly at White House insistence, due to their sensitive nature. Yet to date, Huang has not even been questioned by the FBI. Even if this is mere incompetence, it qualifies as criminal. Meanwhile, the White House stonewalls questions concerning its blatant disregard for national security and arrogantly laughs off credible ones concerning military support for any action in Kosovo…."
Investor's Business Daily 4/12/99 Paul Sperry "…Our newest nuke - the W80 cruise missile - was first produced in 1990. No newer models are in the works. Meantime, China is busy making its next generation of long-range land-based nuclear missiles - the Dong Feng (East Wind) 31 and 41 - and long-range submarine-based missiles -the Julang (Giant Wave) 2. These missiles can strike the U.S. Other than Russia, China is the only potential foe that can do that. And it's fully prepared to pull the trigger: At least 13 of its 17-plus long-range, land-based missiles are aimed at U.S. cities. Of course, that's just a handful next to the thousands of American missiles that can target China. Aging or not, the country's total nuclear arsenal boasts nearly 10,000 weapons. That's ''enough to produce nuclear winter and the end of most life on Earth by a factor of 10,'' said Helen Caldicott, author of ''Nuclear Madness.'' But China is hard-pressed to make its weapons more accurate and deadly. And it's stealing U.S. lab technology to do it. At the same time, the Clinton administration has put America's nuke program in the deep freeze…."
Investor's Business Daily 4/12/99 Paul Sperry "…At the same time China builds more lethal nuclear missiles - using U.S. technology - America's nuclear arsenal collects dust. It's been 10 years since the nation built a new missile, and seven since it tested old ones….In fact, the Pentagon can't be sure existing missiles even work. And it won't be sure until around 2010, when weapons testing is scheduled to resume. Even then it's iffy. Scientists at the nation's nuclear labs won't be able to blow up bombs in the Nevada desert to spot bugs and perfect designs as they've done for 50 years. President Clinton banned that for ''virtual testing,'' which uses computers to simulate detonations. But virtual testing is itself virtual. At this point, it's just a theory. Scientists will need another 10 years - and billions of dollars in new equipment -to come up with the massive number of computations to mimic a real nuclear blast. All this worries some national security experts. They fear the administration hasn't taken post-Cold War nuclear threats seriously enough. As America's nuclear edge grows duller by the day, they point out, China's gets sharper…. By not testing, ''you also preclude the introduction of new weapons into the inventory,'' Gaffney added. It's just too risky to mix untried designs into the arsenal, he explains. "
Investor's Business Daily 4/12/99 Paul Sperry "…Thanks to recent spying at U.S. labs, China may now have the ability to tip its nuclear missiles with several warheads. And it may have the know-how to perfect a neutron bomb, which can kill troops and knock out electronics without destroying buildings. More, China may have snatched the secrets to making a so-called electromagnetic gun, which shoots a pulse that can short computers and power grids. These are the reported leaks. More may come to light later this month when a select House panel releases declassified parts of a report on Chinese espionage. The bulk of the report is said to focus on lab leaks - parts the White House is trying to block. Not only is China stealing U.S. nuclear secrets, it's aiding the weapons programs of nuclear wannabes like Pakistan and Iran. In essence, a nuclear arms race has started in South Asia and the U.S. is sitting on the sidelines - unable to test weapons and, therefore, hamstrung in its efforts to design new ones…
AP 4/11/99 "...CIA technicians found 31 secret files in the unsecured personal computer at the home of the former Director John Deutch shortly after he stepped down as the nation's top spy, it was reported Sunday. The Central Intelligence Agency turned the case over to the Justice Department, which investigated for a year before deciding not to file charges, Newsweek magazine said. The Justice Department returned the case to the CIA, which Newsweek said was preparing a critical report and considering revocation of Deutch's security clearances..... Quoting Justice Department sources, the magazine said Deutch's mishandling of classified material came to light shortly after he resigned in December 1996. He was to continue as a consultant..... During the Justice Department investigation, Deutch was reappointed to a federal panel that studies how to combat proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and was given top security clearances, Newsweek said...."
The New Australian No. 115, 12-18 4/99 Peter Zhang "... As more Americans learn about China's successful intelligence operations in the US and the disgraceful role that Clinton and his financial backers played in selling sensitive technology to Beijing for use by its military the more they will become incensed, despite most media efforts to suppress the scandal. (I consider the phrase "transferring technology as a weasel-attempt by Clinton supporters to evade the enormity of their actions. Fund raising is one thing - treason is another.) .... Now technology is useless on its own, being mere knowledge. Never mind, though, Clinton also helped overcome that little difficulty by allowing the sale of advanced equipment and the use of US personnel to train Chinese technicians in its use..... The real puzzle is not the spying but why Americans are tolerating a president who sacrificed national security for a bucketful of campaign funds. Americans should know that their president will be having talks with Zhu Rongji, one of the men who OK'd bribes (sorry, I mean campaign contributions) for Clinton's election campaigns. Do not doubt for a moment that Chinese military intelligence would have given this politically sensitive action the green light without permission from Zhu, Zhang and several other high-ranking party officials. Make no mistake, this operation came from the very top. Now these men would only have agreed to an operation like this if they had good reason to believe it would not be uncovered. But such a belief suggests that the recipients of the bribes (sorry, contributions) and those like Johnny Chung who acted as conduits for the money honestly believed they were protected at the highest level of American government. And the White House is the highest level. This is not mere speculation on my part, though logic really allows of no other conclusion, but comes from Chinese sources whose comments led in only one direction.... The truth is so terrible and embarrassing I believe it will never be publicly told. How can a nation like the US allow it to be known that a president engaged in actions that most other countries classify as treasonable?.... We must not, however, allow things to get out of perspective. China is not going to launch an attack this year, next or in ten years. Her ultimate aim at the moment is domination of Asia and the Pacific, not war and occupation. ...Those who believe that China is planning for immediate war against the US overlook an important fact: modern war can only be fought by countries with modern economies, i.e., countries in an advanced state of economic development....Time is on the side of peace and peace is what the Chinese people want. Rapid economic growth plus the free flow of news and knowledge, courtesy of technology, combined with a growing popular desire to be rid of the nationalist fist could bring about the kind of political changes that would not make China a threat to world peace. The present oligarchy lacks the legitimacy that tradition bestowed on German and Japanese militarists. Sure, these generals tend to be nationalists in the worst possible way but they lack, at least for the moment, the kind of hereditary respect that would legitimise their actions and rule. So there is real hope...."
THE WASHINGTON TIMES 4//9/99 Jerry Seper "... Federal law enforcement officials, congressional investigators and others said several hundred thousand dollars in cash went to the campaign through several emissaries handpicked by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The money, the sources said, originated in Beijing and initially was routed by the PLA to China Resources Holding Company Ltd. in Hong Kong. From there, it was transferred to the Hong Kong Chinese Bank -- jointly owned by the Chinese government and Lippo Group, a multibillion-dollar Indonesian conglomerate owned by longtime Clinton supporters Mochtar and James Riady, the sources said. Eventually, the cash was moved to other banks, then wired to the emissaries, who distributed it to the Clinton-Gore campaign and to other state and federal races, the sources said. U.S. intelligence officials believe the PLA bought into the Hong Kong bank after Mr. Clinton's 1992 election as a way of gaining access to the president through the Riady family, which has been a supporter of Mr. Clinton since he was governor of Arkansas....At least one House committee is investigating the leadership of China Resources, based on preliminary information showing that top PLA officers have assumed key positions with the firm to continue efforts to influence U.S. policy on several issues. Of particular concern, the sources said, is a possible connection between China Resources and the PLA's chief military intelligence officer, Gen. Ji Shengde, who -- according to Chung's grand jury testimony -- ordered that $300,000 be transferred to Chung for donations to the Democratic Party. That transfer -- first reported by the Los Angeles Times -- took place after Chung personally met with Gen. Ji in Hong Kong in a meeting arranged by Miss Liu. The sources said Chung testified that Gen. Ji told him he already was engaged in similar transactions with others serving as conduits for Chinese money for Mr. Clinton....Lippo denies any wrongdoing in its relationship with the president, although the sources said the PLA was counting on the Riadys' ties to Mr. Clinton for access of its own. They said the PLA knew the Riadys' Worthen National Bank in Little Rock, Ark., had given Mr. Clinton a multimillion-dollar loan to get through the 1992 presidential election, and had handed over $100,000 to former Associate Attorney General Webster L. Hubbell after he quit the Justice Department and before he pleaded guilty to two Whitewater felonies. Lippo sold a 15 percent interest in its Hong Kong bank to China Resources in 1993, four days after Mr. Clinton's 1992 election victory. By July 1992, the company had sold off half the bank to China Resources in what U.S. authorities believe was a continuing effort by the PLA to cash in on the Riadys' relationship with Mr. Clinton. China Resources paid what U.S. intelligence officials said was a huge premium over the net asset value of the bank, giving Lippo a profit of $164 million. A key player in the suspected plot appears to be Mr. Huang, a former Lippo employee, Commerce Department official and Democratic National Committee fund-raiser, who served as vice president of the Hong Kong bank from 1985 to 1986. When Mr. Huang left Lippo to join Commerce, he received a $780,000 bonus. China Resources, according to the sources, was used by the Chinese government as a cover for its spying activities. Owned by the PLA, Chinese military intelligence officials are said to be free to penetrate its operations for economic espionage. More recently, it has invested in several Lippo ventures within Indonesia. ...."
AP 4/12/99 Jim Abrams ".... An intelligence officer told a Senate panel Monday that the acting energy secretary last year kept him from briefing Congress on an alleged case of Chinese espionage because she said it would harm the administration's China policy. The former official strongly denied the charge. Notra Trulock, a senior Energy Department intelligence adviser, said he had been blocked from answering a July 1998 request from the House Intelligence Committee for a briefing on an alleged case of spying at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1980s. Trulock told the Senate Armed Services Committee that Elizabeth Moler, then the acting secretary, ignored a memo he sent her on the request and then, when he approached her personally, rejected it. Moler, he said, told him that the House Intelligence Committee "was only interested in harming the president on his China policy.'' ...."
AP 4/12/99 Jim Abrams "....Trulock said he was also thwarted by Energy Department officials in 1997 when he recommended changes in counterintelligence policies. "They were ignored, they were minimized and occasionally even ridiculed,'' he told the panel. He said officials urged him to bury the Los Alamos case, arguing that it was of historical interest only and would harm the credibility of the labs. A Taiwan-born American is suspected, but has not been charged, in the passing of nuclear weapons technology to the Chinese...."
AP 4/12/99 Freeper Brian Mosely "..."It's still sinking in ... It's a good sign that the newspaper committed the kind of resources it did to this story at a time when another story out of Washington was commanding so much attention. ... I'm going to celebrate by going back to work on another story.''- Jeff Gerth of The New York Times, who won the prize for national reporting along with other members of paper's staff for a series that disclosed the sale of American technology to China. ..."
Freeper summaries on Trulock testimony 4/12/99 Trailer Trash "...Trulock's warnings in 96 and 97 were ignored, minimized, and even ridiculed. For 14 months the higher up would not pull any clearances. They briefed Berger twice. None of the conclusions were questioned. Just simply covered up. He (Trulock) was later removed from his position...." Freeper knarf "...Trulock; 3 days after his third report he was removed ..."
Freeper Right-winger on Trulock testimony 4/12/99 "...Foreign powers have sought to aquire secrets from our labs. Between 85 and 87 had started a good program to put forth reforms. but after oleary left someone blocked any eforts. Kindred Spirit - May 94 - may 98 was dir intell at doe. after feb 95 - feb 98 was resp for counter intell. Foreign intell - eliz monich? dep Johny someone. 4 year anniversary of problems in doe labs. By early 96 we had identified a NUMBER of suspects. But al kept access till 98. By 96 warned of cont targetting of our labs by chinese. Specific collection targets. Warnings ignored, minimized and ridiculed by lab officials. Dir fbi urged penia and mohler that FBI investigations should NOT take precedence over security. But for 14 months people kept access and security. Politization of intell. over the 4 years, briefed over 50 officials on their findings and work. NSC. Berger. Other NSC. SEc def & staff. CIA DEUCH & Tenent, ATT GEN, SEC STate.. Supposed diffs between Trulock and CIA were spin. After cox testimony lab directos and DOE decided that it was all the delusions of "one man". Revisionist history at it's worst. REsults oof teem of bomb designers. and analyst. one had more bomb experience than ALL china. URGED ME TO COVER UP AND BURY THIS CASE! Officials argued historical interest only. Not relevent to labs mission. Brought curtis's reforms to a halt in it's tracks. Then they could resist the fact that esp ad taken place. By mid 1998 labs still did not have a program for counter intell. Same responce in other programs. Stockpile stewardship. Anny intell repsonce of finding of any DOE official was doomed. The combined effect of these actions was to supress information for the administration. Governedby intell procedures approved by AG in 92. Any persons involved with intell activities are to report questionable activity. Inspector gen then investigates. Reports steady pattern of abuse. But no action taken after 2nd report to IG. 3rd report and trulok was removed. Obligations to inform congress couldn't be clearer. During pena mohler tenure didn't reutrn to congres till sept 98. DOE did NOT participate tin 17 briefings levin mentioned. Mid 97 had devel new info and briefing to intel committees erquired. we were denied. Jul 98. recieved direct specific request. WHo denied? Mohler. We had satisfied notifications the prev year. Jul 98 recieved direct request from Porter Goss. Tru documented in memo. was found in mohlers office safe when she left office. The safeguards put in place failed utterly. Infact intel procedures are observed at labs in the ?breac? shoot the messenger. mid 97 wittnessed pattern of harrassment intimidation. Shelby in closed sessin. Forced tru to compete for his new position as dep sec doe. Conduct of effective non politicized intell must be considered compromised. Concerned episode does indeed raise questions about the labs. Vagues answers and occasional lies. Implications are particlually disturbing . All must rely on the credibility of labs for certifications etc. Should be skeptical of labs being self-policing...."
World Net Daily 4/12/99 David M. Bresnahan "...China has detonated at least one neutron bomb above ground with the knowledge and perhaps even the co-operation of the U.S. Photographs of the secret test in late 1995 or 1996 have been provided to WorldNetDaily through a U.S. intelligence source who cannot be identified. The photographs have been tested and evaluated by several sources who have concluded they are genuine. The pictures show what is alleged to be the detonation of a neutron bomb above what appears to be an orchard, somewhere in China. The photos were most likely taken from an airplane, although some sources believe they could have been taken by satellite. The possibility that they were taken by a U.S. spy satellite was not ruled out. ...He believes there is a likelihood that the pictures were taken by a U.S. spy satellite of the KH type. This would mean that the U.S. knew in advance that the test would take place and the location of that test. WorldNetDaily sent copies of the pictures to the man who originated the idea of the neutron bomb, retired nuclear physicist Sam Cohen. He confirmed that he believes the photographs to be genuine.... Cohen said it is likely that the device was a low yield neutron bomb of approximately one-kiloton in size. It would have been dropped from a plane at an altitude of approximately 10,000 feet. The explosion should have taken place in the area of 3,000 feet above the ground to have the optimum effect of destroying life without damaging property....Cohen, and a different military source familiar with such tests both agreed that one test above ground is not enough. It is expected that this was one of at least two tests. A previous underground test by China was dismissed by U.S. officials as improperly conducted. Cohen and others agreed that U.S. technology has enabled China to develop their nuclear capabilities, and that technology was not stolen from the U.S. It was cooperatively provided they all agreed. What appears to be a defect in the fireball in the pictures is actually purposely created to tailor the effect of the bomb. Cohen said he first proposed this very technology 35 years ago. Cohen put together a study group of other nuclear physicists working with him for the government and determined that a neutron bomb could be tailored to produce a pattern. His group found that advanced, discriminate, tailored effects of battlefield nuclear warheads with a very low yield could be designed....The U.S. government has known about the Chinese test and most likely has the data from that test. All sources agreed that is why no mention has been made...."
Newsday 4/13/99 Knut Royce "...China allegedly has stolen design information for as many as eight of America's nuclear warheads, as well as some ballistic missile technology, making its espionage far more extensive than previously disclosed, several administration officials said. One senior administration official familiar with classified material from an ongoing CIA damage assessment and a still-secret congressional report on China's alleged nuclear pilferage said the probes retrace China's espionage effort to the late 1950s, when a U.S. defector reportedly turned over design data for the Titan intercontinental ballistic missile. Since then, he said, China surreptitiously obtained from two major American weapons labs "all of our nuclear designs," according to some of the more pessimistic intelligence conclusions. The New York Times recently disclosed that Clinton administration officials have concluded that designs for two U.S. bombs apparently were stolen by China: the neutron bomb, which kills troops but spares buildings, and the miniaturized W-88 bomb, which is deployed in mobile missiles, multiple-warhead long-range missiles and in submarines. But the national-security breaches are far more extensive than those two bombs, the senior administration official told Newsday. As many as eight U.S. warhead designs have fallen into China's hands, he said. Another administration official familiar with the CIA task force's ongoing damage assessment agreed. "If you take the darkest view [of the available intelligence], they may have [stolen] some information about six, seven or eight different designs," he said..."
Newsday 4/13/99 Knut Royce "..."But how much from each and where did it come from is a matter which is under review," he said. In separate interviews, three officials said much of what the United States knows of Beijing's nuclear program was initially provided by a Chinese government official "walk-in," or would-be spy who in June, 1995, contacted the CIA to hand over a 1988 document describing China's nuclear program. Among the warheads listed in the document was one strikingly similar to the W-88....CIA analysts have concluded that the Chinese official who brought the information to the CIA did so as a veiled "message" from Beijing that China was a power to contend with, especially on the issue of Taiwan, which it considers a breakaway province, the two U.S. officials said. "We're sending you a message: We have all your nuclear weapons," was the intelligence analysts' conclusion about China's motive, a senior administration official said. ....Some CIA analysts have linked China's divulgence of its nuclear program to a Clinton administration decision that same month to issue a visa for Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-Hui, to receive an honorary doctorate from Cornell University in Ithaca, N.Y. He was the first Taiwanese president to have received such a visa, and that embittered China's leadership, which viewed it as a signal that Washington could be moving to recognize two Chinas. Several months after the CIA, together with Energy Department scientists, determined that as many as eight of the warheads in the Chinese document appeared to have American design origins, the agency relayed the information to the FBI for investigation. The CIA analysts also concluded that China felt confident it was not compromising any ongoing espionage activities because the information in its report was already seven years old...."
Knight-Ridder 4/14/99 Dan Stober "...This miniaturization of the bomb, most fully developed in the W-88, is perhaps the most strategically significant development in nuclear weapons since the invention of the atomic and hydrogen bombs. Possession of this technology may allow China to follow in the footsteps of the other major powers by placing multiple warheads on their missiles, vastly increasing their destructive power. But experts caution that even with this technology, China remains so far behind the United States in terms of nuclear might that the nuclear equation between the two states will remain virtually unchanged for years to come.... Over the years, U.S. weapons designers have reduced the size of thermonuclear weapons from refrigerator-sized devices to something closer in size to a bag of golf clubs. Chinese scientists reportedly tested a miniature thermonuclear warhead in the mid-1990s, after receiving secret data on the U.S. warheads from the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1980s.... Possession of the miniaturization technology may allow China to put several warheads on one missile, either on land or on a submarine, expanding the number of targets without greatly increasing the number of missiles. Or single warheads could be placed on small, mobile missiles towed behind trucks, valuable because they can be hard for an enemy to find and destroy.....The immediate danger to the United States is almost nonexistent, according to Swaine, the RAND expert.....China is in the midst of a major modernization of its military. ``But we don't see any evidence that the Chinese have embarked on a full blown effort to arm their missiles with multiple warheads,'' he said. ``The leap in logic that people are making from small nuclear warhead to MIRV (multiple warheads) to national danger is an enormous leap,'' Swaine said....At the same time, the physicists surrounded the spherical hydrogen capsule with a layer of bomb-grade uranium, which also explodes, dramatically increasing the ``yield'' of the weapon. Thus the physicists built three bombs in one: plutonium, hydrogen and uranium.The configuration is known as an ``Oralloy thermonuclear weapon.'' (Oralloy is the name given to bomb-grade uranium.) The process is also referred to as ``fission-fusion-fission.''..."
AP Jim Abrams 4/15/99 "...Energy Department officials acknowledged Thursday they withheld information from a House subcommittee last fall on an alleged Chinese spying case. A department intelligence officer said he was told by the deputy energy secretary not to talk about the case, a charge the senior agency official denied. ``We are very upset,'' said Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., chairman of the House Armed Services military procurement subcommittee. He said the two officials, testifying under oath in a closed session in October, dodged specific questions about spying activities at the department's national weapons laboratories. ``I apologize,'' said Notra Trulock, the agency's special adviser for intelligence. He said he acted at the behest of then-Deputy Secretary Elizabeth Moler, who also testified at the hearing, when he did not discuss the investigation into possible Chinese espionage at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. Trulock said Moler also edited written testimony he had prepared for the hearing to delete references to counterintelligence operations. Moler denied editing the testimony and said she only instructed Trulock to limit his comments to the subject of the national labs' foreign visitor program. She said then-Secretary Federico Pena had decided that, because of the particularly sensitive nature of the case, briefings to Congress should be limited to the House and Senate intelligence committees. She said that was a common practice and that she had advised Trulock to follow that policy. ``With the benefit of hindsight, we should have been more responsive,'' she said. ..."
http://www.investors.com 4/15/99 Brian Mitchell "..... ''There's an increasing corruption in Washington in foreign policy, where commercial interests are taking the higher priority, and where people go in and out of government and into the K Street lobbies,'' said a senior foreign policy official in the Reagan administration. ''The problem is that so many of these business interests don't give a darn about U.S. national security,'' he said. The Clinton administration, with bipartisan support from ex-officials and American businesses, has forged a formidable consensus on granting China favorable trade relations. But it's recently been challenged by revelations of Chinese espionage..... Still, some fans of free trade worry. ''We shouldn't lose sight of the fact that trade is mutually beneficial to the U.S. and China,'' said Dan Griswold, associate director of the Center for Trade Policy at the Cato Institute. ''But the bottom line is, we shouldn't be selling technology to China that it can turn around and apply to direct military use against our interests,'' Griswold said. The boom in trade has coincided with a crackdown on dissidents by Chinese authorities. The State Department's 1998 report on human rights in China cited ''widespread'' abuses, including ''extrajudicial killings, torture and mistreatment of prisoners, forced confessions, arbitrary arrests and detention.'' The report also faults China for slave labor, forced abortion, forced sterilization, trafficking in women and children, restrictions on religion and oppression of ethnic minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang provinces. The State Department's 1998 report on human rights in Yugoslavia accuses it of many of the same abuses. Not included, though, are slave labor, forced abortion, forced sterilization and trafficking in women and children. ''Otherwise, it would be hard without a label to tell which country was which if you just read the reports,'' said William Hawkins, an aide to Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif...."
The Federalist 4/16/99 "... The Federalist has obtained evidence that, as a matter of highly classified policy based on the now-flawed Cold War theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the Clinton administration deliberately left the back door open to our most sensitive nuclear technology facilities, so China could obtain offensive nuclear weapons and delivery technology which would eventually put them on an equal footing with the U.S. In our Cold War with the USSR, our nuclear secrets were also obtained by Soviet espionage, and the resulting MAD standoff was a centerpiece of U.S. policy. But the Soviets were an entirely different adversary than the Red Chinese, who analysts estimate could become far more ´´adventurous´´ under the MAD umbrella. Evidence of Mr. Clinton´s indifference to the weapon technology transfers, in deference to his MAD policy, is apparent in the rejection of an FBI request for a wiretap on We Ho Lee, who, though suspected of being a Chinese spy, was selected by senior Clinton personnel at the Department of Energy to run a sensitive new nuclear weapons program. From 1993 to 1997, federal agents requested 2,686 wiretaps to assist various investigations. The Justice Department rejected only one -- We Ho Lee. Though both the CIA and FBI directors informed Mr. Clinton that Chinese spying was ´´widespread´´ in nuclear facilities, he told the nation just prior to Zhu´s visit that there was ´´no evidence´´ of such spying. ´´That statement was not true and Mr. Clinton and his administration know it to be not true,´´ says a well-placed CIA analyst. The Clinton sellout to China is best summarized by Sen. James Inhofe´s comments on the Senate floor. (Mr. Inhofe is a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee.) ´´Of all the lies this president has told, this is the most egregious of all. ... This is a story...about a President and an administration that deliberately chose to put national security at risk, while telling the people everything was fine. The President withheld information and covered up the Chinese theft of our technology.´´ ..."
AP 4/16/99 JIM ABRAMS "... Energy Department officials say they kept a House Armed Services subcommittee in the dark last year about alleged Chinese espionage at a national weapons lab as part of a policy of limiting those being told of the case. Notra Trulock, the agency's special adviser for intelligence, told the military procurement subcommittee Thursday that he was under specific orders from Elizabeth Moler, then deputy energy secretary, not to talk about the alleged Chinese theft of nuclear warhead secrets from the Los Alamos National Laboratory in the 1980s. ``I did not make full disclosure'' at a closed hearing of the subcommittee last October, Trulock said. ``I apologize.'' The panel's chairman, Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., said the lawmakers were ``very upset'' by the failure of Trulock and Moler, who were under oath at the time, to reply to questions about espionage at the national labs and asked, ``Why weren't we told the whole truth?'' ..... Trulock on Monday backed up their contentions, telling the Senate Armed Services Committee that Moler last July prevented him from talking to the House intelligence panel about the case. On Thursday he said Moler edited the testimony he had prepared for the October Armed Services Committee hearing to take out references to espionage at the national labs. Moler, who also appeared at both the Monday and Thursday hearings, took strong issue with Trulock's version of events, saying she never tried to stop him from testifying and did not edit his testimony. But she acknowledged that Federico Pena, then energy secretary, had decided the agency, because of the sensitive nature of the case, should limit its Capitol Hill briefings to the House and Senate intelligence committees. She said this was ``common practice.'' She said she told Trulock to limit his testimony to the subject of security issues involved in visits to the labs by foreign nationals...."
Providence Journal 4/16/99 "...But the anger of the American people ought to be directed at the Clinton administration. For just as we are learning the details of Chinese espionage, we are also learning the pace at which the Clinton White House reacted to these events. Needless to say, the White House chronology has changed repeatedly since the first revelations of Chinese espionage. And both President Clinton and Vice President Gore have sought to deflect blame by pointing out that the initial Chinese penetrations occurred during the Reagan-Bush administrations. Indeed, they did. But no one knew about them until the Clinton-Gore administration. And while Samuel Berger, the national security adviser, was first informed about the theft of nuclear secrets in 1996, he did not tell Bill Clinton until sometime the following year (1997). Mr. Clinton issued an executive order tightening security at nuclear weapons facilities in February 1998! In other words, Mr. Berger sat on this extraordinary information for more than a year, and Mr. Clinton did nothing about it for another year, during which time the Chinese were undoubtedly burrowing ever deeper into our nuclear-weapons establishment. ..."
Publications of the Center for Security Policy No 97-D 121 9/2/97 on getting support within the labs for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty "...Unfortunately, Mrs. O'Leary made the lab directors an offer they couldn't refuse. As Secretary Schlesinger observed at a symposium convened in July by the Center for Security Policy to consider the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent: "[The DoE weapons labs] have been silenced...in that it was plain that laboratories that spoke out firmly about the desirability of nuclear testing would discover a significant diminution in their budgets. That has a powerful impact." The impact was particularly powerful on one of the Nation's two nuclear design labs -- Lawrence Livermore -- which Mrs. O'Leary was prepared to shut down altogether if it did not play ball on her favorite arms control agenda item, the CTB..... As could have been reliably predicted, moreover, now that Mrs. O'Leary has left public service the required amounts for this so-called "stockpile stewardship" program are not forthcoming. Some of these critically needed facilities may not get built at all; others won't come on-line on time. Meanwhile, confidence is eroding in an American nuclear arsenal plagued by the collapse of its supporting industrial infrastructure, loss of skilled physicists and engineers and bureaucratic mismanagement. The lab directors are in the unhappy position of having, under duress, compromised their integrity -- and contributed to jeopardizing that of the U.S. nuclear deterrent -- only to fall prey to a classic bait-and-switch scheme...."
NewsMax 4/19/99 Wesley Phelan "...At the April 15 deposition Huang invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege a total of 419 times..... Among the allegations Huang refused to deny under oath were: seats on Commerce Department trade missions were sold for contributions to the DNC and the 1996 Clinton-Gore campaign; then-DNC co-Chairman Senator Christopher Dodd told him to leave town in 1996, so he could not be served with the subpoena; he was in contact with White House officials during the period when he was avoiding subpoena; he was debriefed by DNC officials while avoiding subpoena; he requested reimbursement for travel expenses by the DNC while avoiding subpoena; President and Mrs. Clinton are his close friends and personally recommended him for appointment to the DNC; he passed money from PRC officials to the DNC; he passed classified U.S. government documents to the PRC while working at the Commerce Department; he received a security clearance to work at Commerce, even before he was physically employed there; he used the offices of Stephens, Inc., across from the Commerce Department, to communicate with Chinese intelligence; he asked for a parting bonus from the Lippo Group, his previous employer, in return for providing Lippo with classified Commerce Department documents; China Resources, a business partner of Lippo, is a front for Chinese intelligence; participants in the 1994 Commerce Department trade mission to the PRC passed classified documents to Chinese officials; U. S. government officials made arrangements for the transfer of satellite technology to the PRC during that trade mission; he had discussions with Ira Sockowitz about the removal of classified satellite documents from the Commerce Department; he shredded documents detailing his activities at the Commerce Department; he received assurances from Janet Reno's Justice Department that he would never be prosecuted for illegal activities carried out on behalf of the DNC and the Clinton administration; he discussed with administration officials retaliation against Larry Klayman, Chairman of Judicial Watch, for being subpoenaed to testify....."
Associated Press 4/19/99 Larry Margasak "…The Energy Department ignored many warnings about security risks at nuclear weapons labs over decades as dangers "languished for years without resolution or repercussions'' against responsible officials, congressional investigators conclude in a scathing report. With the labs now under heightened scrutiny because of allegations that China stole nuclear secrets, the General Accounting Office documented the warnings it has issued in 32 reports over the past 19 years, citing nearly 50 recommendations it claimed were mostly neglected. … FBI agents had been brought in a decade ago for similar help but left in the early 1990s "because of resistance within DOE to implementing the measures the FBI staff believed necessary to improve security,'' reported the GAO, Congress' investigative arm…Rezendes said the most serious problems that were not addressed by the department over the past two decades were: —Ineffective controls over foreign visitors to the most sensitive Energy Department facilities….. —Weaknesses in efforts to control and protect classified and sensitive information. In one instance, a facility could not account for 10,000 classified documents. —Lack of physical security such as fences, and security personnel who, through the years, have proved unable to demonstrate basic skills…. —Backlogs in security clearances…..—A failure to track and control nuclear materials, including material sent overseas. …As an example of the lingering, unaddressed problems, the GAO report cited findings — originally in 1988 — that the required background checks were performed for fewer than 10 percent of the visitors from sensitive countries…The agency wasn't even aware of many visits, the GAO said. When the agency reviewed the same problem in 1997, "procedures for obtaining background checks had not been effectively implemented and at two facilities, background checks were being conducted on only 5 percent of visitors from all sensitive countries and on less than 2 percent of the visitors from China.'' The Los Alamos facility in New Mexico allowed "unescorted, after-hours access to controlled areas'' to preserve an "open campus'' atmosphere, the report said…."
THE WASHINGTON TIMES 4/20/99 Audrey Hudson "...The Department of Energy does not perform routine background checks at its nuclear facilities, assuming that other security measures will catch a spy, according to the General Accounting Office (GAO). "The DOE doesn't do background checks because, from their perspective, even if the person is a spy from China, they have security and restricted areas so there was no need to know if foreign visitors were a spy," said Victor Rezendes, GAO director of energy, resources and science issues. He spoke at a hearing yesterday of the House subcommittee on oversight and investigations. Mr. Rezendes described the attitude at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, where it is believed a spy for China obtained high-tech secrets, as maintaining an "open, campus-style atmosphere." "They don't consider security a high priority. They don't care if there are foreign intelligence officers there or not. They think they have a defense mechanism in place, but every time we looked at one of their defense mechanisms, we found problems," Mr. Rezendes said..... A laboratory employee has admitted to providing classified information on nuclear weapons development and testing to China. Earlier this year, Energy officials said they had evidence China also obtained information on an advanced nuclear warhead.... In 1998, GAO found 45 major security violations at Los Alamos that Mr. Rezendes described as "severe." Despite these findings, the Department of Energy gave the facility's contractor, the University of California, a rating of "excellent." "I can't understand how they would get that rating with the problems they've had there," Mr. Rezendes said. The GAO contends security is weak throughout laboratories responsible for designing and maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons. One unidentified facility could not account for 10,000 classified documents. Equipment and property worth millions of dollars were missing from others..."
WorldNetDaily.com 4/20/99 Charles Smith Softwar "...However, Mr. Clinton now faces a new scandal -- registered foreign agents in secret meetings at the White House on super-computers for Russian nuclear weapons labs. The new scandal is quaintly dubbed "Computer-Gate." In 1994, a consortium of U.S. computer companies, the Computer Systems Policy Project (CSPP) was represented by Tony Podesta, brother of White House official John Podesta. Tony Podesta obtained special powers for his CSPP U.S. computer CEOs. They were allowed to attend secret meetings inside the White House. The meetings were on computer hardware and software exports to China and Russia....The secret CSPP/White House meetings included registered foreign agents. In 1994 and 1995, CSPP Director and DNC donor Ken Kay was an employee of Podesta Associates. According to the February 1994 Department of Justice Foreign agent index, Tony Podesta and Podesta Associates registered as an "agent" of a unspecified foreign nation. In fact, Podesta Associates also registered a second time in April 1994 as a "foreign agent" for a company located in Chile. In addition, according to the Department of Justice 1995 Foreign agent index, Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering was also registered as a "foreign agent." In 1995, Charles Levy, CSPP lawyer, DNC donor and employee of Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering attended the secret meeting at the White House. At the same time their employee was in the White House, the powerful law firm also represented a bank in Bermuda, the Banking Federation of the European Union and the Swiss Bankers Association. Under the Clinton administration, registered foreign agents obtained secrets that cannot be revealed to the American public. What kind of secrets? According to a May 1995 CSPP letter to Ron Brown "all references and terminology in the U.S. export regulation ... should be eliminated, including all references to 'supercomputers' and 'statement on security procedures.'" Another clue is a November 1995 CSPP letter to Ron Brown that states "we want to express our great appreciation for your role in the President's recent decision to significantly reform computer export controls." Within weeks of the November 1995 CSPP thank-you to Ron Brown, Russian and Chinese weapons labs bought CSPP computers for nuclear weapons research...."
New York Times 4/21/99 JAMES RISEN and JEFF GERTH "...A comprehensive new analysis by U.S. intelligence officials has concluded that China stole design information related to the United States' most advanced nuclear warhead from a government nuclear weapons laboratory, government officials said. The intelligence report is expected to be presented to the Clinton administration and Congress on Wednesday. Previously, the White House, citing other intelligence reports, had said that the evidence of Chinese atomic espionage is less conclusive. Although Energy Department officials have raised alarms about evidence of Chinese espionage at the national weapons labs since 1996, a 1997 report by the CIA was used by the White House to downplay the Energy officials' conclusions in the matter, officials said. President Clinton also said as recently as last month that, "It is my understanding that the investigation has not yet determined for sure that espionage occurred." ...U.S. officials said that the new intelligence analysis includes a broad examination of the development of China's nuclear weapons capabilities over the last few decades. It determined that Beijing benefited from espionage through the theft of W-88 design data from Los Alamos. But it also found that China obtained some sensitive nuclear data from nonsecret sources, including academic exchanges and inadvertent leaks of information by scientists...."
Reuters 4/21/99 Tabassum Zakaria "....CIA Director George Tenet briefed congressional intelligence committees Wednesday on an intelligence report assessing the implications of China's acquisition of U.S. nuclear secrets. The report found that China obtained at least basic design information on several nuclear weapons including the Trident II W88 miniaturized nuclear warhead. China also obtained information on a variety of U.S. weapon design concepts and features including the neutron bomb, the report said. Report findings said the full extent of weapon information acquired by China could not be determined, such as whether any weapon design documentation or blueprints were obtained. U.S. intelligence officials believed China probably used U.S. design data in its own weapons but was unlikely to have tried to duplicate U.S. arms, the report said. ....The report said China's technical advances were not due only to espionage but also drew on contact with scientists from other countries -- including the United States -- on conferences, publications, media disclosures, declassified U.S. weapons information and on China's own research.
The intelligence report said it was not known if China had passed on to other countries classified U.S. nuclear weapons information. A review of the report conducted by a panel led by retired Admiral David Jeremiah, a former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the loss of classified U.S. information was particularly significant in the current environment because of a decrease in U.S. research efforts...."
AP 4/21/99 John Diamond "…Through aggressive spying, China obtained classified information on a variety of U.S. nuclear weapons, making it possible for Beijing to modernize its arsenal in the next few years, U.S. intelligence officials told Congress on Wednesday. In a long-awaited damage assessment, administration officials disclosed for the first time that China gathered classified information not just on the W-88 warhead and the neutron bomb but on ``several'' modern U.S. warheads…. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby said the briefing Wednesday made it clear that Chinese spying continued into the Clinton administration, something that the president in the past has denied knowledge of. ``It confirms my worst fears,'' Shelby, R-Ala., said of the damage assessment. ``We made it easy for the Chinese because of weak security at our national labs.... We took too long to find out what was going on and we still don't know how deep and wide the problem is.'' ….The multi-agency assessment team led Robert Walpole, the CIA official in charge of strategic and nuclear issues, was overseen by an outside panel of experts headed by retired Adm. David Jeremiah…. The declassified assessment did not name the several other U.S. nuclear warheads about which China obtained ``at least basic design information.'' To identify them, said the senior official, would provide clues as to how U.S. intelligence learned about the Chinese espionage successes and would let Beijing assess the accuracy of its stolen information. In assessing damage to U.S. national security, the intelligence team concluded that by obtaining more U.S. nuclear technology, ``the Chinese might be less concerned about sharing their older technology'' with other countries, posing a proliferation risk. The Jeremiah panel said loss of classified technology may be more damaging to the United States now than during the Cold War, when substantial weapons research kept the United States ahead of competitors…."
New York Times 4/21/99 JAMES RISEN and JEFF GERTH "...Energy Department intelligence analysts initially detected the theft in 1995, and senior White House officials, including Samuel Berger, now the national security adviser, were first briefed on the matter in April 1996. But the White House did not move to increase security at national laboratories until nearly two years later. After receiving more detailed evidence of Chinese spying in the summer of 1997, the National Security Council sought a quick, narrowly focused analysis from the CIA and used it to cast doubt on the troubling conclusions reached by Energy Department analysts, officials said. Gary Samore, a senior NSC official, relied on that CIA analysis in September 1997 as the basis for his report to Berger that the evidence of Chinese espionage was less conclusive than the Energy Department had said, a White House official said. At the time, Samore and Berger were deeply involved in planning the agenda of a U.S.-Chinese summit meeting. Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin used the meeting to elevate the relations between the two nations. In recent weeks, the White House itself has examined whether Samore accurately portrayed for Berger the findings of the 1997 reports from the CIA and Energy Department, officials said. Berger has been told that Samore overstated the degree to which the CIA 1997 analysis cast doubt on the Energy Department findings, according to an administration official...."
NYTimes.com 4/22/99 Frank Pellegrini "....This one's going to be hard to ignore. The White House and Congress will be presented Wednesday with a new intelligence report that concludes that yes, China did steal nuclear secrets from Los Alamos in the 1980s. But China's nuclear-weapons program also gathered sensitive information from nonsecret sources, including academic exchanges and inadvertent leaks of information by scientists. Congress is likely to turn the spotlight on the Clinton administration, which may have glossed over similar warnings in 1997 to avoid souring U.S.-China relations, and did nothing when government investigators found security at national laboratories troublingly porous...."
The New York Times 4/22/99 Jeff Gerth "...China is likely to use stolen advanced American nuclear weapons secrets to upgrade its weapons within years, not decades, a senior intelligence official said Wednesday..... The public assessment does not address whether China's legal and illegal acquisition of American nuclear weapons information affected American national security. The study was done at the request of a select congressional committee that found last year that national security had been harmed as a result of China's 20-year pattern of acquiring American technology, including nuclear design secrets stolen from American weapons laboratories. The lengthy secret report utilized earlier assessments by the CIA and the Energy Department that came to similar conclusions that China had stolen W-88 design secrets, which enable nuclear weapons to be miniaturized, officials said. But in 1997, on the eve of a Washington summit meeting at which Chinese-American relations were elevated to a "strategic partnership," White House officials magnified the differences between the CIA and the Energy Department reports to cast doubt on the Energy Department's troubling conclusions, officials said. According to the latest assessment, China's quest for smaller nuclear weapons probably reflects its desire for a more mobile force that can survive and retaliate against a nuclear attack by the United States or Russia, or a "second-strike capability." ..."
Capitol Hill Blue 4/22/99 Doug Thompson "...While a now public CIA report confirms China stole valuable nuclear secrets from the United States, intelligence professionals say privately it does not go far enough in disclosing how the Clinton administration aided and abetted the spying activities by the communist country. "Although the Chinese have been conducting intelligence operations in this country for decades, they have made incredible strides in the past six years with the help of the Clinton administration," says intelligence analyst Sander Owen. "The Chinese took the secrets out the door, but the administration held it open for them." A number of intelligence professionals interviewed by Capitol Hill Blue agree. "The White House bent over backwards to accommodate the Chinese," says one current Defense Department analyst. "And, if you look closely enough, you will usually find a large campaign contribution involved."
Capitol Hill Blue 4/22/99 Doug Thompson "...In 1996, the Clinton administration, over the objection of the CIA and the Defense Department, approved the sale of sensitive satellite technology to China by Loral, a company headed by Clinton campaign contributor Bernard Schwartz. That technology, intelligence analyst Owen says, was a key component in developing the missile technology that China is using to developing a delivery system for its new nuclear weapons. "Countries spy on each other, that's a fact of life," Owen says. "But usually the country that is being spied on doesn't give the one doing the spying this much help." ..."
Capitol Hill Blue 4/22/99 Doug Thompson "...During its assessment of theft of nuclear secrets from this nation's national labs, the CIA confirmed: The Clinton administration stalled the FBI investigation of a Chinese-born scientist working at Los Alamos National Labs in New Mexico. The scientist has since been fired and is under investigation for his role in the China spying scandal; The Clinton campaign received hundreds of thousands of dollars in Chinese campaign contributions there were laundered through phony American corporations or shell entities controlled by Clinton confidant Johnny Chung. The Clinton administration placed Democratic fundraiser John Huang in the Commerce Department, where he worked to make connections with Chinese companies and funnel money back into the Clinton campaign.
Capitol Hill Blue 4/22/99 Doug Thompson "...Earlier this year, Capitol Hill Blue reported that career intelligence professionals are so concerned about leaks from the White House that they intentionally withhold classified material from Clinton and other administration officials." One recently retired CIA employee reconfirmed this Wednesday, saying classified reports sent to the White House are often incomplete or are "sanitized" to minimize damage. "It's a buyer's market for US secrets," he said, "and we never knew who the administration was selling to on any given day."..."
Associated Press 4/22/99 H Josef Hebert "...Despite security concerns, scientists at federal weapons labs must be allowed freedom to exchange ideas within the scientific community, the director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory said Thursday..... But John C. Browne, who became director at Los Alamos in 1997, said his scientists "know how to draw the line'' when talking to outsiders and should be given some leeway. "It is a campus. It's a campus behind a fence,'' said Browne during a hour-long meeting with reporters. "We can't just put everybody behind a fence and lock them up and let them do their job.'' .... He said he's still not convinced that a Los Alamos computer scientist, who has been the target of an FBI investigation for three years, gave the Chinese the W88 information. The scientist has not been charged, but was fired for security violations earlier this year. "It's still not clear from what I read whether our guy was the guy that did this,'' said Browne..... "We've got to demonstrate to people that the lab ... can be trusted. The thing that hits me most is a feeling that the country no longer trusts Los Alamos,'' said Browne...."
AP 4/22/99 "...China is a few years away from fielding improved nuclear weapons with the help of classified information gained by spying on the United States, according to a U.S. intelligence damage assessment of Chinese espionage. In addition to gaining improved weaponry, including lightweight warheads for use on multiple-warhead ICBMs, China may also be more likely to spread its older weapons technology to other countries as its own weaponry improves, a U.S. intelligence team concluded. In a long-awaited damage assessment, administration officials disclosed Wednesday for the first time that China gathered classified information not just on the W-88 warhead and the neutron bomb but on ``several'' modern U.S. warheads - particularly ``re-entry vehicles,'' the nuclear weapons mounted on multiple-warhead rockets. The assessment made clear that China's espionage efforts were likely to continue.....But a senior intelligence official speaking on condition of anonymity said the multi-agency assessment team predicted in its classified report that China would field improved weapons within a few years. ...Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby said the briefing Wednesday made it clear that Chinese spying continued into the Clinton administration. Clinton has said he knows of no espionage breaches at the weapons labs during his tenure. ``It confirms my worst fears,'' Shelby, R-Ala., said of the damage assessment. ``We made it easy for the Chinese because of weak security at our national labs. ... We took too long to find out what was going on and we still don't know how deep and wide the problem is.'' ...."
Washington Times 4/22/99 Bill Gertz and Nancy Roman "...The official said details of the compromise were outlined in a Chinese document that a Chinese official gave to the CIA in 1995. "Some of that information could only have been obtained from espionage," the official said at a background briefing on Chinese spying at U.S. nuclear weapons laboratories. "That's why we feel strongly about making the statement about espionage. . . .The damage assessment was ordered in March by CIA Director George J. Tenet based on the recommendations of a special House committee headed by Rep. Christopher Cox, California Republican. Its report, submitted to Congress Jan. 1, is classified, and Mr. Cox has been working since January to get the administration to declassify it. He and the administration have been wrangling over which sections of the 700-page report can be made public. Sources close to the negotiations over the report said if the White House does not agree to release the report before the committee's authority expires, parts of it approved by the administration will be released anyway.....
Washington Times 4/22/99 Bill Gertz and Nancy Roman "...According to a one-page summary of the key findings of the damage assessment, titled "Implications of China's Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Information and the Development of Future Chinese Weapons":
* "China obtained at least design information on several modern U.S. nuclear re-entry vehicles, including the Trident II (W-88)." Re-entry vehicles are ballistic missile warheads.
* "China also obtained information on a variety of U.S. weapon-design concepts and weaponization features, including those of the neutron bomb."
* The full extent of weapon details stolen by Chinese spies is not known, and it is not known whether China stole weapon design documents or blueprints.
* China probably used the warhead design information to build similar warheads, rather than seeking to replicate U.S. warheads.
* The nuclear warhead data "probably accelerated its program to develop future nuclear weapons" and "allowed China to focus successfully down critical paths and avoid less promising approaches to nuclear weapons design."...."
St Louis Post-Dispatch 4/22/99 Dena Bunis "...President Clinton for the first time Thursday acknowledged that Chinese government espionage occurred during his watch, a pair of congressmen said after an hour-long meeting with the president at the White House. Republican Rep. Christopher Cox, chairman of the House select committee on China and Rep. Norman Dicks, the senior Democrat on that panel, said Clinton did not dispute that China has stolen U.S. military and nuclear secrets for the past two decades, including during his administration. As recently as March 19, Clinton said he knew of no instances of the Chinese stealing weapons and nuclear secrets since 1993, when he took office.....Leavy said Clinton has received ``fuller briefings'' since that press conference.....About 10 people were at the White House meeting, including National Security Advisor Sandy Berger. As more details of China's spying have been revealed, critics have questioned whether Berger -- first briefed about Chinese atomic espionage in April 1996 -- acted quickly enough to counsel the administration to intensify security at the national labs....."
SOFTWAR News 4/22/99 "... On Thursday, April 22, 1999, this reporter took a conference call with Federal Judge Robert Payne, and a Dept. of Justice (DOJ) attorney representing the Commerce Dept. The DOJ attorney explained that Commerce would abide by the ruling made by Judge Payne but that they were not going to send classified or secret documents.... The Judge over-ruled the DOJ request and noted that "all" means everything, including classified materials. Judge Payne ruled that Commerce must turn over "all" documents on time by Friday, April 23, 1999. ....The DOJ attorney then explained that she could not provide the classified documents by Friday, April 23, because of the "government shutdown". The Judge asked her to explain. "What shutdown?" he questioned. "Er... The war ..." she replied.... The Judge ruled "NO" exceptions - no matter how many bombs are dropped on Kosovo....The DOJ attorney then explained she was not "cleared" to see the secret documents. She stated that many of the documents in question originated at "other agencies" including the "CIA and State Dept." In order to review them for her written argument she, of course, needed to read them. However, not being "cleared", she couldn't read them..... The Judge quietly told the DOJ attorney to "get cleared" and if necessary "haul someone down from the CIA to testify" on the nature of any secret materials. The Judge then granted her one month to complete her argument on what the Commerce Dept. wants to keep secret about meetings with Chinese Army officers. The secret documents, however, must be turned into the Court on time. The Judge will review them and lock them in the Court safe, which is protected by armed Federal Marshals, 24 hours a day..... The DOJ attorney then proceeded to explain, in detail, over an insecure party line, exactly when and where the secure courier would pick up the secret documents, leave Washington, and arrive to deliver them in Richmond....."
The Union Leader 4/23/99 Richard Lessner "...The link between the Clinton-Gore campaign and Red China's military intelligence chief, however, may only be the tip of the illegal contribution iceberg. Millions in Asian money flowed into the Clinton-Gore campaign and the Democratic Party from sources connected to Beijing. The money trail suggests that the Communists used various corporations and business figures as cut-outs to conceal the real source of the contributions. It is this fund-raising nexus between Red China and the Clinton-Gore campaign that elevates Beijing's nuclear spying above the level of a garden variety espionage affair. Was the Clinton administration's inattention to security, and failure to act when informed of Red China's spying at our top secret nuclear weapons labs, related to the campaign funds that were flowing in from Asia? Already one Energy Department official has testified under oath that, when he tried to blow the whistle on lax security at the Los Alamos lab, he was warned off by a Clinton appointee, who ordered the man to withhold from Congress what he knew about possible espionage. The man was told that those investigating possible espionage were interested only in damaging President Clinton and his policy toward China. It also is highly suspicious that the President personally waived export restrictions on the transfer of missile guidance technology to China for two U.S. aerospace firms - Loral and Hughes - whose executives were among the largest contributors to the Clinton-Gore campaign....No, it's not espionage that is troubling; the Clinton administration's lackadaisical attitude toward security is the concern. That and the possibility our secrets were compromised for political motives and campaign contributions. So far, however, this scandal has yet to spark much public outrage. One reason for this, we suspect, is that the affair has been almost totally neglected by the major TV networks. Contrast this with the Iran-Contra scandal, which led the network evening news shows night after night, the Chinagate affair has been conspicuous in its absence. And imagine for a moment the media firestorm had Ronald Reagan or George Bush taken an illegal campaign contribution from the military intelligence chief of a right-wing dictatorship that was simultaneously stealing our nuclear weapons secrets! ..."
WorldNetDaily,sm 4/23/99 John Doggett "...Summit leaders will discuss an American initiative that will allow NATO to respond to threats of nuclear weapons or non conventional terrorism from countries outside Europe or the United States, officials said. The initiative will develop joint logistics and improve interoperability command, control, and communications facilities, and develop detection of chemical and biological weapons. According the Thursday's New York Times: "Kosovo has brought NATO into the never-never land," said David Gompert, vice president of Rand who was on the National Security Council in the Bush administration. "It has brought us into a situation where a regime that slaughters its own people is no longer sovereign and where the United Nations Security Council is no longer a requirement." .....In 1992, Strobe Talbot, who is now Clinton's No. 2 National Security Advisor, said the idea of a nation-state didn't make sense anymore. Once he became president, Clinton supported the Convention on Bio-diversity that they produced at the U.N.-sponsored Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The treaty treated America as an ecological miscreant and protected third world countries that are destroying their rain forests. In 1995, Hillary lead a delegation to the U.N.'s Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China. This conference proposed new U.N. guaranteed rights for children. One of these "rights" would allow the U.N. to remove your child from your home if your 10-year-old didn't want to obey you. In 1997, the Clinton Administration supported the Kyoto global warming treaty...In 1998, the Clinton Administration supported creation of an International Criminal Court in Rome. The International Criminal Court (ICC) treaty says that the U.N. can enter any nation and remove its leader if the U.N. decides that the leader is a "war criminal." It also creates a permanent criminal prosecutor's office. Clinton's reps backed away from the treaty when supporters of the ICC claimed that it could overrule decisions of the United States Supreme Court. ...They have supported creating a global income tax, taxing all international banking transactions, taxing all stock market transactions, and taxing all proceeds of underseas mining. The tax on international banking transactions alone would generate a trillion dollars for the U.N.....If the move to change NATO's charter succeeds, it wouldn't take much for it to become the military arm of the U.N. If the move to give the U.N. independent taxing authority succeeds, the U.N. would become a global government with unprecedented power and wealth. And Bill Clinton could be in charge of the whole ball of wax...."
4/21/99 Gretchen Glass - "...National Security Advisor: Samuel R. Berger, a paid lobbyist for the Chinese while he was a partner in the international law firm of Hogan and Hartson where he headed the firm's international trade group. Mr. Berger is still listed as an attorney with Hogan and Hartson, therefore, as a partner, he is still receiving benefits, directly or indirectly, from dealings with China and Russia...."
4/21/99 Gretchen Glass - "...Chairman of the IOB [Intelligence Oversight Board]: Anthony S. Harrington, is a senior partner of the international law firm of Hogan and Hartson (with Berger) and, as a senior partner, receives benefits, either directly or indirectly, from dealings with China and Russia. Mr. Harrington is still listed as an attorney with Hogan and Hartson...."
4/21/99 Gretchen Glass - "...Chairman of the PFIAB [President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board]: Warren B. Rudman, is a partner in the international law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison with offices in Communist China and who, as a partner, receives benefits, either directly or indirectly, from dealings with Communist China...."
4/21/99 Gretchen Glass - "...Inspector General of the DOJ: Michael R. Bromwich who is/was a partner in the Washington D.C. office of Mayer, Brown & Platt. The firm has offices in Moscow and Beijing, with emphasis on Communist China. If he is still a partner, on leave of absence or not, he is benefiting from the firm's dealings with China and Russia..."
WorldNetDaily,sm 4/23/99 John Doggett in 1992 "...Strobe Talbot, who is now Clinton's No. 2 National Security Advisor, said the idea of a nation-state didn't make sense anymore..."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "....After leaving the Hill in late 1993, I joined Time magazine. After a three- month investigation into Chinese procurement activities in the United States, I discovered the sale to a Chinese state-owned aerospace firm, CATIC, of virtually an entire defense plant owned by McDonnell Douglas in Columbus, Ohio, where the B-1 bomber had been made. The CATIC deal was part of an audacious, and until then unreported, Chinese effort to buy cutting-edge U.S. defense manufacturing gear at auctions, as more and more defense plants closed in response to the Pentagon's defense build-down. My story was pulled by Time the week O.J. Simpson burst onto the front pages--but not because of O.J. The Commerce Department had written a letter to Time's editors (which I subsequently obtained), calling my reporting "one-sided" and "unfair"--all this before my story was even printed! Time fired me within hours. The American Spectator published my article some six months later ("China Shops," March 1995), and has since published nearly a dozen of my feature- length investigations of China's creeping infiltration of U.S. society...."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "....When the Clinton administration took power in 1993, the Chinese had two ICBMs capable of targeting the United States. Today, says Deputy National Security Advisor Gary Samore, that has grown to "less than two dozen." But thanks to the theft of the W-88 warhead design, and the transfer by U.S. satellite manufacturers of technology used to boost multiple satellites to different orbits, the Chinese may be able to put up to five Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads on each missile. According to reports for the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Chinese will soon begin building two new-generation missile systems, the DF-31 and DF-41, also equipped with multiple warheads, which could expand their nuclear forces exponentially over the next five to ten years. From the bottom rank among the five declared nuclear weapons states (not including India and Pakistan, which demonstrated their nuclear weapons capabilities last year), China will soon slip into third place, just behind the United States and Russia. All this has happened as a direct result of the Clinton administration's policy of engagement. ..."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...Similarly, prior to January 1996, when computer export controls were lifted after intensive lobbying from Silicon Graphics and other top DNC contributors, the Chinese had only three U.S. High Performance Computers (HPCs), all of which were subject to stringent Defense Department monitoring. In April 1997-- just 14 months after the decontrol--Undersecretary of Commerce William Reinsch told Congress that U.S. companies had sold 46 supercomputers to Chinese end-users, and that the Chinese were not allowing the U.S. government to verify how they were being used. By June 1997, concerned that we were helping the PLA to improve weapons design, missile targeting, and nuclear simulation, the House voted to restore licensing requirements on HPCs. But the measure was ultimately defeated under intense industry and administration pressure. In January 1999, Reinsch's Bureau of Export Administration delivered its first congressionally mandated report detailing supercomputer exports over the preceding 12 months. Out of a total of 390 HPCs exported by the United States during that period, 191 of them had gone to China. Despite U.S. efforts, the Chinese only allowed government officials to inspect three of them once they had reached China. Congressional sources tell TAS that they have been told by administration officials that as many as 600 HPCs have been sold to the Chinese since the 1996 decontrols--more raw computing power than can be found in the Pentagon and the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons labs, combined. ..."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...Supercomputers are only one element in a deadly mix of high technologies released for sale to the Chinese by the Clinton administration since 1993. An internal memorandum written by Michael Maloof of the Pentagon's Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), subpoenaed by the Cox committee, paints an astonishing picture of the cumulative impact of U.S. technology transfer to the Chinese military over the past five years. The combination of supercomputers, satellite sales, and advanced telecommunications switching technology since 1994 "have provided the Chinese military with a nationwide encrypted command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) network that will serve it well into the next century," Maloof warned his superiors. "Together, they provide the PLA with a communications infrastructure that it could not have developed on its own." Extensive manufacturing technologies were decontrolled along with the actual products U.S. companies were allowed to ship to China. Since 1993, the PLA has been importing massive amounts of equipment to manufacture fiber- optics cable, which allows for secure communications links impervious to electronic eavesdropping. And companies tied to former colleagues of then- Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry led the way in transferring encrypted Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) telephone switching equipment, now used by the PLA for its military communications network. "The decision to allow... ATM switching technology in 1994 occurred over the objection of DoD technical experts," Maloof wrote. "Despite initial NSA concerns, it was silent when the decision finally occurred." As I wrote in "Peking Pentagon" in April 1996, it appeared that William Perry personally intervened to get NSA to drop their objections to the sale of this technology, despite the fact that the Chinese buyer was a PLA-owned company....."
(Reuters) NewsEdge 4/26/99 "... Newsweek and Time magazines reported in their latest issues that Sylvia Lee passed information to the FBI from 1985 to 1991 while working as an administrator at the Los Alamos National Laboratories in New Mexico. Lee's husband, Wen Ho Lee, is under investigation for possibly leaking information to China while he worked as a scientist at Los Alamos. Investigators alleged that Beijing used stolen information on the W-88 miniaturized nuclear warhead program to produce its own weapons..... Mrs. Lee's involvement with the FBI was reportedly only disclosed to top U.S. intelligence officials earlier this month. Newsweek reported that even FBI Director Louis Freeh, Attorney General Janet Reno and CIA Director George Tenet were unaware of the association...."
Washington Post 4/26/99 Page A4 Walter Pincus "...Legislators, who recently learned of Sylvia Lee's FBI role, have questions about the thoroughness and speed of the bureau investigation into Chinese spying on U.S. nuclear laboratories. The Senate and House intelligence committees plan to question FBI Director Louis J. Freeh about whether Sylvia Lee's bureau relationship caused any delay in the inquiry, congressional sources said. Her FBI relationship was first reported in this week's issue of Newsweek magazine. ..... Sylvia Lee's close relationship and popularity with Chinese scientists led the Beijing government to invite her and her husband to take part in a 1980s conference in China. Sylvia Lee was asked to speak even though she was not a scientist. Los Alamos officials provided her with a videotape as her presentation "because the lab was anxious to have her go there," one intelligence source said. However, some Energy officials and congressional investigators, unaware of Sylvia Lee's FBI connection, have cited the trip and speech as among the reasons Wen Ho Lee became a suspect. Sylvia Lee retired several years ago...."
The New Australian No. 117, 26 5/2/99 Peter Zhang's "... It was revealed this week that a CIA report found that China stole invaluable nuclear secrets from the US. What is of particular interest is that a number of people involved with US intelligence are arguing in private that the report had been deliberately diluted in order to conceal the extent to which the Clinton administration aided Beijing's intelligence operations. One intelligence analyst was quoted this week as saying that "The Chinese took the secrets out the door, but the administration held it open for them." Yet in issue No. 116** I pointed out that "The Americans gave Clinton the key to the candy store and he sold it to Beijing." This is from my own sources which are greatly inferior to those available to the CIA. Americans must ask themselves two simple questions: 1. Who ordered the suppression of information that the report omitted? 2. Were these the same people sabotaged an FBI investigation into the alleged spying activities of a Chinese-born scientist employed at the Los Alamos National Labs and describe in one intelligence report as a 'walk-in'.*** Now most people think the whole thing revolves around Clinton's campaign funding scandal. It does not. The whole thing boils down to Clinton's corrupt nature and absolute lack of patriotism. As I pointed out last week, the Clinton election campaigns involved millions and not a miserly $300,000 as Zhu falsely stated. Part of the price for Beijing's financial help was to give Chinese agents a virtual free hand. This included John Huang's top-secret clearance, his appointment to the Commerce Department and virtually free reign of the White House. .... Some Americans are apparently arguing that the CIA report was watered down because no one wanted to tell Clinton what had happened. This is utter nonsense. My own sources have made it clear to me that Clinton fully understood the main thrust of Beijing's funding conditions, though not fully aware of the details, and agreed to them anyway. His only desire was to win - regardless of the cost to the national intererest. It was told to me, and I believe it, that Clinton was indirectly responsible for the gutting of the report. This way he can claim that an independent CIA report had nothing to say that was significantly damaging to the Clinton administration. And woe betide any CIA official who challenges this view. I have already said that the money trail leads right up the White House lawn and into the Oval Office. I can only wonder at how successfully the American people have been deceived on these matters. The sooner they wake up to the damage that has been inflicted on them by Clinton the safer they and the rest of the world will be...."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "....The case of Wen Ho Lee, who allegedly compromised the secrets of the W-88 warhead used on our Trident missile system, is not the only one in which the Clinton administration's cavalier attitude toward nuclear weapons and national security has encouraged spying. In December 1997, another Taiwan- born scientist working in a U.S. nuclear weapons lab, Peter Lee, pleaded guilty to giving the Chinese the secrets of a highly specialized laser plasma system used to test nuclear weapons. The system is considered crucial to maintaining the viability of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, now that the major nuclear powers have agreed to a moratorium on nuclear testing. Until the invention of the laser system, the U.S. had to actually detonate nuclear weapons from the stockpile to ensure that they worked. "This system gives China the means to test new weapons and to validate their designs, without anyone having a clue to what they are doing," a former U.S. intelligence officer told TAS. For his crime, Peter Lee was fined $20,000 and sentenced to 12 months in a halfway house, from which he has since been released...."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "....The cases of Chinese nuclear spying revealed to date are "perhaps just the tip of an iceberg," says Senator Richard Shelby, the powerful chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The reason is simple, and systemic: From its first days in office this administration has disdained nuclear weapons, seeing them as the cause of an expensive environmental clean-up, not the cornerstone of fifty years of world peace. Add the belief that we might share U.S. military technology with the Chinese, because we will always stay " one step ahead" of potential adversaries, and the result is contempt for any form of national security export controls. Whether it's nuclear weapons secrets from our labs, or supercomputers and advanced telecommunications gear from Silicon Valley, this administration has presided over the greatest transfer of military technology to a potential adversary of any administration in history. Repeated statements by Clinton and his advisors on the need to "engage" China, regardless of the spying scandals, can only encourage the Chinese to go for more...."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "....TAS has learned that the most sensitive section of the report for the White House does not deal with the satellite launches, or even the theft of W-88 nuclear weapons design...the message of the Cox Report is devastating in its simplicity: Communist China is spying the pants off us, and it is using some 1,000 commercial companies, employing more than 10,000 Chinese nationals residing in the United States, to do so. "The weapons suppliers and procurement companies are also collectors," says one source familiar with the report's conclusions. "The operations that led to some of our most significant losses were not run by (China's) Ministry of State Security, but were done right out of those companies, which are closer to cabinet departments than commercial companies." The administration is desperate to quash this information because it has done nothing to curtail Chinese spying in the U.S. since Clinton claimed the White House. Some would say the president and his policies actively encouraged the Chinese to expand their intelligence and influence- peddling operations in the United States...."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "....U.S. law enforcement officials say they are "overwhelmed" by the sheer number of Chinese Communist agents operating in the United States, and can only focus on a few high-profile cases. On February 11, for instance, Customs undercover agents in Boston arrested Chinese national Collin Shu (a.k.a. Zhihong Xu) on charges of attempting to purchase state-of-the-art fiber- optics gyroscopes (FOGs) used in guidance and navigational systems for ballistic missiles and combat aircraft. ..."For every case like this one," a Customs agent says, "there are probably a hundred other cases we never see at all. We only catch these cases because we get lucky, or because someone tips us off. When the Chinese work with only Chinese networks, we never see a thing." ..."
Florida Times-Union 4/25/99 Editorial "... Security experts believe China has obtained extremely valuable military technology from national weapons laboratories in the United States. Furthermore, the security weakness that allowed China's spies access has been known for a long time. The Clinton administration has been lax in taking steps to prevent the espionage, and perhaps has compounded the threat by loosening restrictions on technology exports to China at the same time..... The administration first claimed the spying was done in the 1980s, an era it often tries to use as a scapegoat. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby said the briefing made it clear that Chinese spying continued into the Clinton administration. Other news reports indicated China obtained incomplete information and came back for the rest in the 1990s..... Thus, the administration acknowledges that it realizes Chinese spies are after military technology and that the national labs are where the Chinese most likely would look. Despite years of warnings about weak security, they did little. One high-level official has said he was ordered by the head of the Energy Department to keep quiet about the leaks. While doing little or nothing to protect national security, the administration was making the Chinese spy network's job easier by ordering the release of technology for commercial satellite launches, which The New York Times said ''inadvertently'' aided the Chinese war machine. China opposes deployment of U.S. missile defenses in Korea. And a Democratic fund-raiser says the top Chinese spy tried to contribute $300,000 to the Clinton/Gore campaign...."
Newsweek/Periscope - Exclusive 5/3/99 Gregory L. Vistica and Daniel Klaidman "...NEWSWEEK has learned that Lee's wife, Sylvia, was for years an FBI informant. According to senior intelligence officials, from 1985 to 1991, Sylvia Lee-an administrator at Los Alamos who arranged lab tours for Chinese delegations and attended academic conferences in Beijing-covertly helped the FBI keep tabs on prominent Chinese scientists and develop personality profiles on them. In fact, her role may have been more complicated than some in law enforcement first realized. Intelligence sources say that in the late 1980s, officials in Beijing took a special interest in Sylvia Lee, inviting her to attend an academic conference in China. The advances were unusual. A nonscientist, she seemingly had little to contribute to the meeting, and presented a videotaped lecture prepared by the lab. Lee's boss at Los Alamos at the time was a leading expert on laser technology, and the Feds believe the Chinese may have been trying to use her to obtain the lab's laser research. The FBI briefly worried that Sylvia Lee might have been a double agent. When Energy Department investigators first surmised the Chinese had stolen secrets from Los Alamos, they concluded that both Wen Ho and Sylvia were likely suspects...."
The Chinese connection to the Galaxy New Technology venture was a defector also working at Stanford. "Defector" Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials. Hua studied missile engineering in Russia and worked inside China's missile program for 24 years. In 1989, Hua fled China after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on student democracy demonstrators. In America, Hua went to work as a researcher at Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control. The Center's co-directors were William Perry and John Lewis. In 1992, Chinese Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) Lt. General Huai Guomo contacted Hua Di to start a joint venture called Galaxy New Technology. The very same Lt. General Huai who attended the November 1994 meeting with PLA General Ding, Defense Secretary Perry and Dr. Lewis. "Lewis and I were matchmakers," recalled Hua about Galaxy New Technology in 1996. "(General) Huai is my good friend." .....In late October 1998, it was announced that Hua Di had returned to China. Hua Di met with Chinese security officials in late 1997 and was assured that he would not be prosecuted. On December 31, 1997 Hua returned to China. On Jan. 6, 1998, Hua was arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials. Stanford officials and Hua's business partner, John Lewis, have written to the Chinese government appealing for Hua's release. The Clinton administration, Dr. Perry and the mainstream press remain strangely silent about imprisoned defector Hua Di. Hua Di passed false missile information to the west, obtained secure communications for the Chinese Army and penetrated into the Clinton White House through the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Hua Di served his party, and comrade General Ding. In the end, Hua arranged for his two employers, General Ding and William Perry, to profit in a deal to harden and secure Chinese military communications. Hua Di returned home to a hero's welcome and a fat bank account made on profits from the Galaxy New Technology deal. Hua Di was no fool - nor was he a dissident. Hua Di was a spy. One of many in a network of spies run by Chinese mastermind General Ding. In a single stroke, Dr. Perry and the Clinton administration sold Ding far more than his spies could ever steal in a decade of espionage. In the process, the Marxist General Ding and his American partners, Perry and Lewis included, also made a tidy profit
Washington Times 4/30/99 Unsigned "...The latest Chinese nuclear-espionage bombshell has just exploded, sending shrapnel throughout Janet Reno's Justice Department. It involves the downloading of millions of lines of computer code detailing the history of U.S. nuclear-weapons development from highly classified computer systems to a widely accessible computer network. The downloading, most of which occurred during 1994 and 1995, was done by Energy Department scientist Wen Ho Lee. The FBI has uncovered evidence suggesting that someone accessed these supersecret files after Mr. Lee placed them in the unclassified network. For several years, the Justice Department obstructed the FBI's efforts to detect Mr. Lee's downloading activities.....Senior managers at the Los Alamos nuclear-weapons laboratory, which is run by the Energy Department, will soon be disciplined for their failure to monitor Mr. Lee's activities while he was under suspicion of espionage. But Attorney General Reno's Justice Department is far more culpable for this catastrophic national-security debacle. Time and again, the New York Times reports, the Justice Department declined to pursue FBI requests for wiretaps. Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the Justice Department's Office of Intelligence Policy Review would have been required to petition a special court to obtain either a wiretap of Mr. Lee's phone or to gain surreptitious access to his office computer. Despite Mr. Lee's role as the principal espionage suspect, Miss Reno's Justice Department declined a 1997 FBI request for a wiretap and surreptitious access to Mr. Lee's office computer. Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy Review maintained there was insufficient evidence for it to seek the necessary court permission The FBI appealed that decision to Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, the second-highest Justice Department official. Mr. Holder also denied the request to pursue the wiretaps. It's worth recalling that in 1997, while President Clinton was pursuing his "strategic partnership" with China, not only was the FBI investigating Chinese nuclear espionage but congressional committees and an incompetent Justice Department task force were investigating Mr. Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign and the Democratic Party for receiving laundered money from the Chinese Communist government. Miss Reno repeatedly refused to seek an independent counsel, despite a 1997 recommendation to do so by FBI Director Louis Freeh. Meanwhile, her deputy and other Justice officials were refusing to act on FBI requests to obtain wiretaps that would have uncovered Mr. Lee's unauthorized downloading of the secrets of 50 years of U.S. nuclear-weapons development. Normally, the Justice Department favorably responds to FBI requests for such wiretaps in 99.9 percent of the 700 or so requests it receives each year. Why the issue of Chinese nuclear espionage was given a free pass by Justice wiretap gatekeepers is worth knowing...."
Bill O'Reilly/Fox News 4/30/99 Freeper truthkeeper reports "...Dickie says Clinton had hired Warren Rudman (of Watergate fame) to conduct an investigation of campaign finance. (Personally, I never heard this.) He says this was a mistake on Clinton's part, because when Rudman's report comes out in 4-5 weeks, "there will be a nuclear explosion in Washington." O'Reilly, however, feels Rudman has just been another Clinton apologist up till now. O'Reilly is dumbfounded by the apathy of the media and THE AMERICAN PEOPLE on the Chinagate scandal...."
Hong Kong Standard 5/1/99 "...The FBI intercepted a 1982 telephone call in which a Los Alamos weapons-lab scientist now suspected of espionage contacted a colleague who was then under investigation for spying for China, government officials said. .... Investigators first began looking at the Los Alamos scientist, Wen Ho Lee, in 1995 after US intelligence intercepted a Chinese document showing Beijing had obtained classified information about the W-88, a US nuclear warhead Mr Lee had helped develop. But as early as 1982 the FBI intercepted a call Mr Lee had placed to a known espionage suspect who had worked at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, according to three government officials familiar with the briefing. The officials said Mr Lee made the call unsolicited and expressed sympathy to his colleagues and offered to assist him...."
WorldNetDaily 4/30/99 Jon E. Dougherty "...Current and former members of the Chinese military are urging Beijing to take a more "hawkish" approach against U.S. hegemony in Asia in the immediate and long-term future, according to experts who spoke with WorldNetDaily. At the same time, People's Liberation Army (PLA) officials are working double-time to acquire new, more modern weapons systems and then proliferating those systems to other nations deemed "hostile" or "potentially hostile" to U.S. national interests. Wes DeMont, a former FBI agent who investigated espionage activities for the Bureau, said China has become more aggressive in recent years in attempting to acquire sensitive military technology from the United States "and anywhere else they can get it." Recent revelations involving the theft of U.S. nuclear technology by spies within the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons laboratories have stunned many congressional and administration officials. But DeMont said that's not the only problem the U.S. may encounter from the Chinese in the coming months. "Right now, as we bomb Yugoslavia and Iraq simultaneously, we're just about stretched to our military limits," DeMont said. "Imagine, if you can, what would happen if the U.S. suddenly had to fight a three- or even a four-front war, a real war. There is just no way we can do that with our current resources." .....As China moves to circumvent U.S. influence, experts like DeMont believe "it's only a matter of time, perhaps even later this year," that either China or, more probably, North Korea, may "capitalize on the opportunity of a weakened U.S. military." "And China has repeatedly said that if North Korea acts 'within their interests,' Beijing would support them," he added..... DeMont said, "At that point, it may not make much difference. The damage is already done." He also said that it is reasonable to assume much of the stolen U.S. nuclear technology "has landed in the hands" of military and government officials of other nations, like North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Pakistan. Santoli said that the Chinese indeed are continuing to ship ballistic missile components and material to some of these countries, "in violation of the promises they made to the Clinton administration not to do so." ..."
American Investigator 4/30/99 Scott Wheeler "...American Investigator provided exclusive, never before seen, amateur videotape footage of Charlie Trie hosting a delegation of Arkansas State officials on a trip to the Peoples Republic of China. Former State Auditor Julia Hughes Jones went on this trip. Jones said, "This was 1992 and we were the guests of Chang Chun." Wheeler reported, "Mrs. Jones provided American Investigator with this tape and this letter from Governor Clinton welcoming the same officials from China to Arkansas a month earlier. But perhaps even more revealing is Charlie Trie's discussion with this Chinese official." In the tape, one Arkansas official spoke up and said, "His policy for China could be influenced certainly by people sitting at this table a lot more than George Bush's." Trie interrupts: "Want to invest in China...so he knows, Bill Clinton." Trie interprets and then says, "He says they can set up Bill Clinton with China, it will be a pleasure." Wheeler asked for Mr. Timperlake's analysis of the tape. Timperlake said, "The tape I saw...[is] the beginning of a showdown in a way of a mutual negotiation with the subtleties: You saw Charlie Trie operating as Bill Clinton's number one Chinese American, meeting with communist Chinese officials and talking about investments and money and the president. Wheeler reported, "Mrs Jones told American Investigator why she believes their 1992 trip to China helped facilitate the financial pipeline from Beijing to Clinton." Jones: "It helped Charlie Trie get established as a middleman. Charlie has always been a hustler, a go-getter. Of course, he knew who had power and who didn't." Wheeler said, "Mr. Timperlake explains why he believes Mr. Trie was actually involved in something more sinister." Timperlake: "Now it's been reported that you were part of the Chinese military intelligence operation. One begins to wonder if maybe, just maybe, Charlie Trie was telling the truth in that tape that, yeah, he was one of the key guys. Not as the policy guy - he is the bagman, the message conveyer, get the job done on the ground guy, the soldier, if you will."...Ed Timperlake commented, "It's hard to prove conspiracy, but when you have one of the principles, on tape, talking to Communist Chinese officials and alluding to the fact that the president can be brought along on this and he's the guy to do it. That tape is very damning." Wheeler reported that Mr. Timperlake believes that the damage to national security is severe. Despite that, neither the White House nor Mr. Trie would respond to repeated requestsfor comment on the matter...."
Washington Post 4/30/99 Vernon Loeb "...Secret computer programs transferred by an espionage suspect at Los Alamos National Laboratory from a classified computer network to a vulnerable desktop machine are mathematical models, known aptly as "legacy codes," embodying 50 years of American nuclear know-how. Their discovery last month during a search of Wen Ho Lee's office computer, shortly after the physicist was fired for other security violations, has sent shock waves through the weapons laboratory and the Department of Energy because the codes are in some ways even more valuable than blueprints, nuclear weapons experts say..."The legacy codes themselves embody generations of work by the most knowledgeable experts in the nuclear weapons community," said Matthew G. McKinzie, a physicist and nuclear weapons expert at the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). "The codes represent the best physics and the best computational techniques, along with the best tried-and-true understanding of these weapons. The Chinese, in getting these codes, would be able to assimilate all that -- and that's what makes this so serious.".....Codes exist for all weapons in the nation's nuclear arsenal. They have evolved over the years as weapons scientists refined their expertise through dozens of new warhead designs and more than 1,000 nuclear tests. The Chinese, by contrast, have only their 45 tests to go on..... But by using a code and the input data, McKinzie said, it would be possible to reverse engineer a weapon and go even further by manipulating the design parameters fed into the code. This, in some senses, makes having the code and the input data even more valuable than a blueprint, McKinzie said, since it gives scientists the ability to both replicate a design and understand theoretically how various warheads actually work..... The legacy codes Lee transferred from Los Alamos's classified network to its unclassified system are an older generation of programs -- still highly valuable for Stockpile Stewardship -- that produce two-dimensional models of a nuclear detonation. Lee worked in Los Alamos's X-Division, where warhead design takes place, specializing in hydrodynamics -- the way metals behave when they are reduced to liquids as a warhead detonates...."
Fox News 4/30/99 Carl Cameron Freeper Yikes "...This morning on FOX, Carl Cameron gave a very concise, cogent summary of what has transpired at the Los Alamos lab over the past years. Most of what he reported we already know here. However, at the very end of his report, Cameron mentioned that in addition to e-mail transmission of code, there were faxed transmissions and, get this, 100,000 printed documents also were taken from the building...."
New York Post 4/30/99 By VINCENT MORRIS "...Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott said yesterday U.S. nuclear secrets aren't safe, and predicted Americans will be "shocked and horrified" when they learn how lax security is. Lott said spying at America's atomic labs - which President Clinton has never publicly acknowledged as a problem in his administration - is an ongoing problem....Richardson's admission comes as Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), who led a special nine-member Congressional committee that wrote a blistering report on lab security, said the report - due Friday - may not be released until early May..... "When our secrets are stolen by the People's Republic of China, they don't stay in Beijing," Cox told the Post. "For all practical purposes, they have entered the stream of commerce. Our intelligence tells us [China] is the leading proliferator of weapons to third-world countries." ..."
Capitol Hill Blue 4/28/99 03:58:52 "...In reaction to widespread spying, legislation has been introduced in both the Senate and House to stop visits to U.S. nuclear labs by scientists from Communist China and other "sensitive" countries..... ``Sensitive countries,'' according to Shelby, are ones considered dangerous to the United States and determined to be interested in acquiring American nuclear weapon secrets.....The CIA coordinated an investigation into the impact of the spying on China's military capabilities and concluded the stolen information was likely to show up in Chinese weapons over the next several years..... The CIA-led investigation found that China had gathered information not just through espionage but also from contact with scientists from the United States and other countries and by public avenues such as conferences and publications. The CIA also found the Clinton White House assisted the Chinese efforts by approving transfer of sensitive technology to the country over the objections of intelligence experts. Those transfers often benefitted campaign contributors to Clinton's Presidential campaign funds..... "
New York Times 4/29/99 William J. Broad "...At their most basic level, the codes are equations rooted in the laws of physics, which are taught in high school and college. But added layers of hard-won tricks and lore turn the codes into informational gems, spelling out, for instance, not only how nuclear weapons can be constructed, but also how they can be made smaller, lighter and more powerful. "It's a stunning revelation," said Dr. Matthew McKinzie, a former Los Alamos researcher now at the Natural Resources Defense Council, a group in Washington that tracks nuclear arms. "It's the distillation of 50 years of work, over 1,000 nuclear tests and thousands upon thousands of man-hours." ....Over 50 years, experts said, that work yielded 100 or so advanced computer programs, about as many as there are types of nuclear warheads in the U.S. arsenal. Those secrets, known as the "legacy codes," consist of millions of lines of computer instructions that detail the physical principles at the heart of U.S. atomic warheads.... Downloaded as well, federal and lab officials said, were data on the materials and shapes of parts that make up specific weapons designs. Someone who put all that data together could create virtual blueprints of the nuclear explosive parts of a weapon..... A Los Alamos physicist who has worked extensively on bomb codes, Dale Henderson, said, "Computation is the only place where everything comes together.".... "
American Investigator 4/28/99 Scott Wheeler "...Debuting on April 30 at 10:00 p.m. EDT, the internationally-syndicated newsmagazine show American Investigator uncovers new evidence in the China campaign fundraising scandal. Amateur videotapes from October of 1992 show Charles Yah Lin Trie leading a delegation of Arkansas state officials on a trip to China, during which Arkansas officials tell Chinese officials that "Clinton's policy for China could be influenced, certainly by people sitting at this table."..."
Dayton Daily News 4/28/99 "...Cox says the committee will spell out in its yet-to-be-declassified 700-page report that: --Spying at the Los Alamos laboratory where the atomic bomb was developed, was first suspected by a Department of Energy official in 1992, three years earlier than previously reported and four years before the White House was briefed on the matter. --In addition to gathering sensitive information at Los Alamos, spies working for the People's Republic of China obtained classified U.S. nuclear weapons information at four other American laboratories. Cox declined to identify the labs. --China has obtained design information on nuclear warheads in addition to the much publicized acquisition of information about the Trident II (W-88), the most sophisticated weapon in the U.S. arsenal. --Interagency conflicts among the Justice Department, the CIA and the Energy Department led to delays in the investigation. --Loose controls over sales of supercomputers have resulted in the Chinese obtaining sophisticated technology to conduct "virtual weapons tests.".... The committee unraveled a trail of espionage and national security concerns that date back to the Carter administration and continue throughout Reagan, Bush and Clinton administration.... But the committee's findings leave unanswered questions about U.S. policy toward China, according to Cox. It took the Energy Department more than a year before it heeded the FBI's 1997 recommendations to strengthen security at weapons laboratories and restrict the Chinese suspect's access to classified information.... "The Chinese are clearly moving in the direction of having hundreds of warheads aimed at the U.S.-all mounted on systems that will be much more difficult for the U. S. to target or defend," said Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank. The Chinese will also have the capability to improve their weapons reaching throughout Asia. "The bigger question-if the milk is spilled, how do we deal with the consequences?" Sokolski said. "I don't know how we will clean it up."..."
The Daily Republican 4/28/99 Howard Hobbs "... According to the findings in an "unofficial" release of the Cox Report obtained by The Daily Republian Newspaper, "...millions of lines of computer code that approximate how this country's atomic warheads work were downloaded" from a Top Secretcomputer system at the Los Alamos, N.M., weapons lab. A Communinsy Chinese agent, Wen Ho Lee, then obtained the files and transferred the secret data to China durirng the period of time President Clinton was promoting China for Most Favored Nation status in 1995 and 1996.... the theft of U.S. miniturization technology pales in the face of allegations of the theht by a Chinese agent of a wider assortment of nuclear engineering and actual test data since Bill Clinton took office in 1992..... The Clinton administration has downplayed the impact of Chinese nuclear spying and has attempted to depict it as a problem he inherited from the Reagan and Bush administrations. However, that characterization has fallen flat in the face of new evidence uncovered in congressional investigations revealing that the Los Alamos W-88 theft has been mishandled after its discovery in 1995 well into Prewsident Clinton's watch...."
Reuters 4/28/99 "... Richardson said: "This kind of egregious security breach is absolutely unacceptable, and we now have strong barriers in place that will prevent these kinds of transfers.'' ...."I know that the Chinese have gone very deep in their espionage, probably more successful than any country has ever been against the United States,'' Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby said. "To what extent, we're not sure yet, we just know that the possibilities, if not the probabilities, of the great loss of this information is real,'' Shelby told Reuters. The Alabama Republican has introduced legislation that would bar foreign scientists from "sensitive'' countries from visiting U.S. nuclear labs unless the energy secretary certified the visit was necessary for U.S. national security..... Last week, the head of the Los Alamos laboratory told reporters the fired scientist, Lee, had shown a suspicious pattern of behavior and failed to protect classified information. But thousands of other people had access to the same information on the W-88 miniature warheads, Los Alamos National Laboratory Director John Browne has told reporters...."
New York Times 4/28/99 James Risen and Jeff Gerth "....A scientist suspected of spying for China improperly transferred huge amounts of secret data from a computer system at a government laboratory, compromising virtually every nuclear weapon in the United States arsenal, government and lab officials say. The data -- millions of lines of computer code that approximate how this country's atomic warheads work -- were downloaded from a computer system at the Los Alamos, N.M., weapons lab that is open only to those with top-level security clearances, according to the officials. The scientist, Wen Ho Lee, then transferred the files to a widely accessible computer network at the lab, where they were stored under other file names, the officials said. The Taiwan-born scientist transferred most of the secret data in 1994 and 1995, officials said..... Federal investigators did not discover the evidence of huge file transfers until last month, when they examined Lee's office computer in connection with their investigation of the earlier theft at Los Alamos, a sprawling lab complex about 35 miles outside Santa Fe. They then found evidence that Lee, who held one of the government's highest security clearances, had been transferring enormous files involving millions of lines of secret computer code, officials said. Although Lee had been under investigation in the W-88 case for nearly three years, Los Alamos officials failed to monitor his computer use and let him retain his access to nuclear secrets until late 1998.... There were varying assessments of the gravity of the security breach. One official familiar with the new evidence said, "This is much, much, much worse than the W-88 case."... The fact that the huge data transfers were not detected until the last few weeks has sparked outrage among officials who wonder why computer use by a scientist already under suspicion as a spy was not being closely watched by Los Alamos or the FBI. ....The legacy codes can be used to help design nuclear weapons through computer simulation, and so are valuable on their own. But they become more valuable when combined with specific performance data, which would then enable someone to generate a computer simulation of American warhead designs. Officials said Lee transferred both the legacy codes and the input data for specific U.S. warheads that go with the legacy codes. The codes and performance data provide what a Los Alamos scientist described as a "rough approximation" of the physical processes that occur in a nuclear weapon. Ray E. Kidder, a nuclear-weapons physicist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California, said the combined data was equivalent to a scientific blueprint. "If you've got the source code and the input data, you can reverse-engineer the thing and have a complete plan for nuclear explosive part of the weapon," Kidder said.....
Houston Chronicle 4/29/99 William Safire "...During President Clinton's watch, America's most vital nuclear secrets -- guarded intensely for five decades -- have been allowed to spill out all over the world. Earlier this year, I surmised that what now worried our scientists most was the possible theft of the "Lagrangian codes" from our national laboratories. These are the supercomputer programs that -- when fed secret data "benchmarks" from all our nuclear tests -- enable foreign scientists to simulate our explosions and erase our lead. We are now informed by The New York Times' Pulitzer-Prize-winning investigative team that the codes -- "legacy codes," as they are known at Los Alamos -- were allegedly downloaded by Wen Ho Lee in 1994. Our nuclear genie is out of the bottle. "The People's Republic of China is the No. 1 proliferator," said Rep. Chris Cox, R-Calif., chairman of the select committee on Chinagate. "Now the secrets are out there in the stream of commerce, and probably on to Iran and North Korea and Libya." The hemorrhage is horrendous.
Houston Chronicle 4/29/99 William Safire "...Suspecting Lee at Los Alamos to be a spy for China, FBI agents in 1997 alerted the White House and went to the Department of Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy Review to request application to a special court for a wiretap under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. But Acting Director Gerald Schroeder and his aide Alan Kornblum decided the evidence was insufficient and refused to apply. The FBI then went over Schroeder's head to the office of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, and was turned down again. The FBI never returned with new evidence to Schroeder. Did Freeh appeal to Janet Reno about "overlawyering" in a national security case, or was he too browbeaten to try? The bureau learned that when it comes to China, Reno's Justice Department assigns only its most incompetent operatives and penalizes prosecutors who target Asian financing of the 1996 election. Consider: Justice makes some 700 court applications a year for taps under that surveillance law. Maybe once or twice a year, says a Justice intelligence official, it finally refuses the FBI's request that it apply. This case, involving an embarrassment to China when Clinton was proclaiming "strategic partnership," was the one..."
Los Angeles Times 4/28/99 Bob Drogin "...Rep. Christopher Cox of Newport Beach said an unclassified version of the House committee report, due to be released early next month, will document "literally scores" of cases where China illicitly acquired sensitive U.S. military and commercial know-how, from supercomputers and satellites to design details for America's most modern nuclear warheads. "These are not isolated incidents," he said in a telephone interview that provided new details of the committee's still-secret probe. "This is a very deliberate pattern of action." .... "It involves many people, many of whom we have yet to meet," Cox said...... Rep. Norman D. Dicks of Washington, the committee's top-ranking Democrat, also disputed Cox's account. "We didn't interview any of these spies," he said..... "
Money Line Lou Dobbs CNN 4/28/99 "...LOU DOBBS, CNN ANCHOR: ...Our top story tonight: a colossal breach of security at Los Alamos, and more charges of White House inattention, Energy Department incompetence and Justice Department inaction. The Energy Department tells CNN that a suspected Chinese spy downloaded secret computer code, possibly compromising countless American nuclear weapons secrets....BILL RICHARDSON, ENERGY SECRETARY: In the course of the investigation, we found out that a massive number of information was transferred, from classified to unclassified, during the period of 1983 to 1995. This was serious. This was unconscionable..."
DRUDGE REPORT FLASH 4/29/99 "...The DRUDGE REPORT has learned that the FBI is investigating if Lee may have passed on nuclear weapons secrets from the lab to Beijing -- via e-mail from the office network!..."They don't know at this point what went out of the lab," Sen. Richard Shelby [R-AL], chair of the Senate Select on Intelligence, told reporters after his committee questioned FBI director Louis Freeh for nearly three hours in a closed-door hearing about the case.... The AP and the WASHINGTON POST are reporting in Friday cycles that the FBI intercepted a telephone call in the early 1980s made by Lee, then a new Los Alamos employee. The call was to an individual at California's Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Laboratory who was suspected of giving neutron bomb secrets to the Chinese. In the call, Lee said: "I can help you -- I can tell you who ratted on you." The Livermore scientist's name is still classified. One person present a Thursday's Hill grilling of Free tells the POST: "Where were (government investigators) on the whole deal? This should have set off alarm bells ringing everywhere. If you intercept a phone call from one Chinese-American at one laboratory to another Chinese-American spy (suspect) at another laboratory, that should set off an alarm."...."
London Telegraph 4/29/99 Hugo Gurdon "...The Los Alamos case may turn out to be the most comprehensive espionage disaster ever. Laxity in President Clinton's government and the weapons establishment could dwarf Britain's blunders, which so outraged Washington in the Cold War cases of Kim Philby, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean...Federal investigators discovered the scale of the intelligence debacle only last month, when they looked into Lee's computer after he was sacked. The suspected spy has not been charged but is under constant surveillance as the FBI attempts to build a prosecution case against him. Lee reportedly transferred enormous files containing millions of lines of secret information. His superiors allowed him to keep his top security clearance until late last year and no one monitored his computer transactions, even though he has been under investigation for the W88 theft for three years..... Mr Cox said: "These are not isolated incidents. This is a very deliberate pattern of action." Other Congress members said the investigation confirmed their worst fears that China had penetrated deep into America's weapons know how. One analyst said: "Penetrated may be the wrong word. They walked in through an open door." The Chinese appear to have obtained "legacy codes" which are made up of computer data used to design nuclear weapons, analyse test results and evaluate weapons materials and the safety characteristics of America's nuclear arsenal. Fed into computers, the legacy codes could help a foreign power design its own weapons. When combined with performance data the codes would enable an enemy to create a computer simulation of American weapons designs...."
4/29/99 VINCENT MORRIS ".... Richardson's admission comes as Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), who led a special nine-member Congressional committee that wrote a blistering report on lab security, said the report - due Friday - may not be released until early May. "It may be two more weeks," said Cox, who warned that stolen computer codes help not only China, but other countries hostile to the United States. "When our secrets are stolen by the People's Republic of China, they don't stay in Beijing," Cox told the Post. "For all practical purposes, they have entered the stream of commerce. Our intelligence tells us [China] is the leading proliferator of weapons to third-world countries." ..."
Electronic Telegraph 4/30/99 David Rennie and Hugo Gurdon ISSUE 1435 "...CHINA yesterday tacitly admitted that it obtained secrets about missiles and warheads from America's nuclear weapons laboratories. But Beijing denied stealing the damaging information or spying on the US. Instead, it blamed what may be the West's worst espionage disaster of the nuclear age on simple American carelessness. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said: "If there has been a leak of secrets, that is their own affair . . . We have never stolen nuclear or military secrets from the United States." It was for America to decide whether it should tighten security procedures. An investigation by the New York Times revealed on Wednesday that virtually every nuclear weapon in America's vast arsenal had been compromised by a spy who downloaded millions of lines of secret code from a secure computer into an unclassified one which could be tapped by an outside power..."
Rush Limbaugh Show 4/29/99 Freeper Newsman "...Wen Ho Lee, a former Los Alamos National Laboratory computer scientist fired for security breeches, apparently took the "mother lode" or "crown jewels" of American nuclear weapons technology "and made them available to people who had access to unclassified computer systems at the lab," Dr. Frank Gaffney, of the Center for Secure Policy, said today on the Rush Limbaugh program. Lee, 59, who worked at the lab for nearly two decades, has been notified by the FBI of his impending arrest in 10 days. Why a 10-day wait was not explained, but one possibility is that agents may need that additional time to tie up some loose ends. Gaffney said that the Taiwanese-born naturalized American citizen presumedly made the U.S.'s top nuclear secrets "available" not only to the Chinese communists, but perhaps to the Russians, the Iranians, the North Koreans, and others that have been at one time or another "permitted to have access" to our sensitive nuclear facilities. "The thing that is most mind-boggling about this, Rush," he added, "is that I believe at some level President Clinton and his Department of Energy actually wanted this kind of information to be shared with the communist Chinese. But let me tell you why: The Clinton Administration for many years has had as the centerpiece of its arms control philosophy the notion that the world will be a much safer place if everyone will stop conducting nuclear tests. So they put together - a few years ago - a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was designed to stop everyone from doing nuclear tests."...According to investigators, Wong was allowed to transfer this very extensive top-secret technology from a secured computer to his unsecured computer in the lab. In turn, foreign agents were able to extract from his unsecured computer this voluminous information by using high-tech super computers furnished to them by the Clinton Administration...."
Rush Limbaugh Show 4/29/99 Freeper Newsman "...Now "I remember Madeline Albright once said that she was uncomfortable with the U.S. being the only super power. I forgot her exact words, but the conclusion I drew from it was that these people think the world will be safer if two or more countries have these capabilities, which they think will mean it is less likely that any of them would ever use them." Limbaugh then asked Gaffney: If only one nation, such as the U.S., has nuclear capabilities, do these people regard the world as being more dangerous "because we know [in such a case] that nobody else can fire back?" And so, "in their world," do they think everybody would be safer to just "let them have all the stuff?" "Indisputably," replied Gaffney. "It's bizarre, but that seems to be their mind set. And we are desperately seeking under the president's leadership, such as it is, to try to make sure that, at a minimum, other people have these kind of [nuclear] capabilities." "This to me, and to other virgin ears," suggested Limbaugh, "sounds extremely treasonist." "I can't speak to the legal question here," answered Gaffney, "but I can tell you if you put together the entirety of what we know - what we know let alone what we may yet discover! - of what the administration has done to accommodate, and in some ways to facilitate the penetration of our political system, of our economy, of our military, industrial, and intelligence sectors by the communist Chinese, at the minimum it speaks to an indifference to American security that is profoundly troubling."
Reuters 4/29/99 "..."The FBI director did tell us that this, the espionage ...in our labs is the highest priority that the FBI has in America today,'' Sen. Richard Shelby said after the panel questioned FBI Director Louis Freeh for nearly three hours at a closed hearing. The FBI is investigating allegations that nuclear weapons secrets were stolen from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, which fired a scientist last month on suspicions he gave classified information to China. U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said Wednesday that classified nuclear weapons computer codes at Los Alamos were transferred to an unclassified computer system. That statement came on the heels of The New York Times report that the scientist suspected of spying for China, Wen Ho Lee, improperly transferred millions of lines of computer code related to how U.S. nuclear warheads work to an unclassified computer network...."As the investigation is unfolding, it's confirming some of their (FBI's) worst fears'' about how much information China probably has, he said. "They (FBI) don't know how deep and wide it is at this point, but it's bad,'' Shelby said. The Alabama Republican has proposed legislation to suspend visits by scientists from certain "sensitive'' countries to U.S. nuclear laboratories unless the energy secretary certified the visit was necessary for U.S. national security...."
Newsweek 5/3/99 Mark Hosenball "...Edward McCallum had a problem on his hands. In early 1997, the chief security officer for the Department of Energy-the man charged with safeguarding the nation's nuclear-weapons plants and research facilities-was preparing to issue a scathing report accusing the institutions of not doing enough to protect against spies and terrorist attacks. ... Chinese spies and the threat of terrorist attack were just the beginning of Richardson's problems. NEWSWEEK has learned that the department is now grappling with yet another security problem: over the years, according to the Energy Department's own figures, the country's nuclear facilities have lost track of more than 5,000 pounds-two and a half tons-of plutonium. At Rocky Flats alone, officials acknowledge, some 2,400 pounds of plutonium is unaccounted for, though the plant's overall security rating today is "satisfactory." ... "
GAO/RCED-97-229 9/25/97 on DOE "..."Moreover, we noted during our review that people with suspected foreign intelligence connections were let into the laboratories without background checks. We were able to document 13 instances where persons with suspected foreign intelligence connections were allowed access without background checks--8 visitors went to Los Alamos and 5 went to Sandia--during the 1994 through 1996 period...."Finally, neither Los Alamos nor Sandia has developed security plans--even generic ones--for foreign nationals who will be in controlled areas. The DOE order governing unclassified foreign visits and assignments identifies security plans as the basic means by which vital information is protected and requires they be developed. However, DOE and laboratory officials told us that because of the exception granted by DOE to these two laboratories--which also streamlined requirements for background checks and visit approvals--security plans are no longer required for visits to controlled areas. Livermore has not sought such an exception and requires a generic security plan for all foreign visitors to its controlled areas." "Assessments and records from all three laboratories indicated vulnerabilities and problems involving the improper release of unclassified sensitive information and classified information in unclassified settings. In most of these cases, the information was actually or potentially available to foreign visitors....Although this situation is viewed by counterintelligence experts as an ideal opportunity for foreign intelligence-gathering efforts, DOE has not comprehensively assessed the threat of foreign intelligence against the laboratories..... Furthermore, DOE has not developed any meaningful programmatic measures by which to evaluate the effectiveness of the laboratories' counterintelligence programs nor has it periodically evaluated them. ."..... However, officials from that division could identify only one review it has conducted at the weapons laboratories, which occurred in 1996 in the form of a "staff assistance visit" conducted at Los Alamos..... For example, while Livermore's counterintelligenceprogram had 5.5 staff years in 1996, Los Alamos' program had only 1.1 staff years, despite having almost twice as many visitors from sensitive countries."..."
Commentmax.com 4/29/99 Tony Snow "...Committee Chairman Christopher Cox says we've got ourselves a new arms race. And Rep. Norm Dicks, the ranking Democrat on the committee, calls the security breach the biggest thing since Aldrich Ames sold secrets to the Soviets. Cox notes that China didn't make up 20 years of research time, as press reports have indicated, but 50. It got to swap its 1950s-vintage nuclear warheads for state-of-the-art models. Despite the president's claims to the contrary, most of the pilferage took place on his watch. The trouble began when Clinton effectively abolished export controls on China in 1994. The decision invited American businesses to get rich by trading away our security. Supercomputer companies, which had been denied permission to sell to China in previous administrations, went wild. The Cox Committee didn't determine the exact number of computers that made their way to the workers' paradise, but estimates range as high as 600. These computers, along with codes stolen from our nuclear laboratories, enable China to simulate nuclear weapons tests. One expert says Beijing's scientists don't need to detonate bombs "because we've already done it for them."...."
Newsmax 4/29/99 Wesley Phelan "...On Tuesday, April 27, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) issued letters to Department of Energy employees Elizabeth Moler and Notra Trulock, asking them to make arrangements with his office to take polygraph tests relating to their April 12 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Moler became Deputy Secretary of Energy in June of 1997, and served as Acting Secretary of Energy from July 1 to August 1, 1998. Trulock was in charge of counterintelligence for the department from 1994-98. In his sworn testimony before the committee, Trulock stated that Moler denied his repeated requests to brief Congress about Chinese espionage that his division began uncovering at Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1996. Prior to Moler's appointment the counterintelligence division briefed Congress on a regular basis about the emerging Chinese espionage scandal. After Moler's appointment the briefings were terminated. In 1998, Representative Porter Goss (R-FL), Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, requested a briefing from Trulock while his committee was considering DOE's counterintelligence budget request. A few days later, on July 21, Trulock sent a memo to Moler recommending that Goss be briefed. At a subsequent meeting Moler allegedly said, "You don't want to do that because Congress would only use what you say to undermine President Clinton's China policy." ...When asked what would happen if one of the witnesses was found to be willfully telling a lie, Hoitsma said, "that sort of thing could be referred to the Justice Department for a perjury prosecution. Or it could go to the Inspector General of the Energy Department since these are Energy Department employees." ..."
Washington Times 4/27/99 Frank J. Gaffney Jr. "...Lately, it seems that scarcely a day goes by without some new revelation about serious security problems at the Department of Energy (DOE) - or the Clinton administration's lack of seriousness about addressing them competently. Less obvious, but no less troubling, are the steps the administration is taking to punish conscientious DOE employees who have been raising alarms about these problems. Much of the blame for the present mess appears to lie with President Clinton's first energy secretary, Hazel O'Leary. Mrs. O'Leary made no secret of her hostility to her department's most important function - maintaining the nation's strategic deterrent and the thermonuclear weaponry that underpins it. While she has mercifully been gone from office for three years, the legacy of the gaggle of anti-nuclear activists Mrs. O'Leary recruited to staff senior DOE positions and the "denuclearization" and "openness" policies she and they promulgated together linger on. In fact, just last month, the current energy secretary, Bill Richardson, succeeded in sneaking through the Senate the nomination of an advocate of the abolition of nuclear weapons to serve as assistant secretary for nonproliferation and national security. This dark-of-night operation is all the more outrageous in light of the mounting evidence that this appointee, Rose Gottemoeller, is implicated in a number of the security scandals now coming to light - and the personnel actions being taken against the whistle-blowers.
Washington Times 4/27/99 Frank J. Gaffney Jr. "...First, Mrs. O'Leary banned personnel badges that clearly indicated whether the bearer had a security clearance and, if so, how high. Her reasoning: Such badges were discriminatory. And second, she ended the practice of requiring reports to DOE headquarters about foreign nationals from "sensitive countries" who visited the unclassified areas of the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories. Among those who has had the unenviable task of dealing with the deleterious consequences of this sort of security malpractice is Notra Trulock. Until the Cox committee's findings about Chinese espionage at Los Alamos came to light, Mr. Trulock was chief of intelligence at DOE. When his years of warning about the penetration of some of the United States' most sensitive facilities - warnings that were suppressed by, among other superiors, Rose Gottemoeller, to whom the intelligence office reported until a reorganization last fall - were publicly vindicated, Mr. Trulock was demoted and his future at the department seems in jeopardy..."
Washington Times 4/27/99 Frank J. Gaffney Jr. "...Consider the following: * Information insecurity: On April 17, 1995, President Clinton lent his authority to an "openness" initiative championed by Mrs. O'Leary, the current White House chief of staff, John Podesta, and then-NSC staffer Morton Halperin with his signature of Executive Order 2958. This order called for the automatic declassification by April 17, 2000, of all documents containing historical information that are 25 years or older.... Leading senators were horrified to learn last year that Restricted Data (and "Formerly Restricted Data") governed by the Atomic Energy Act were being hastily thrown out with the bath water as officials were not being given the time or resources to declassify sensitive documents on a page-by-page basis. Instead, it had to be done by the box, if not by the shelf. Mr. Podesta, apparently infuriated at any interference with the declassification initiative, instructed Secretary Richardson to have Ms. Gottemoeller reprimand a senior DOE bureaucrat, Joseph Mahaley, for encouraging Congress to intervene. (The personnel action - which would, among other things, have denied Mr. Mahaley an expected performance bonus - was quietly withdrawn after he threatened legal action.)
Washington Times 4/27/99 Frank J. Gaffney Jr. "...First, Mrs. O'Leary banned personnel badges that clearly indicated whether the bearer had a security clearance and, if so, how high. Her reasoning: Such badges were discriminatory. And second, she ended the practice of requiring reports to DOE headquarters about foreign nationals from "sensitive countries" who visited the unclassified areas of the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories. Among those who has had the unenviable task of dealing with the deleterious consequences of this sort of security malpractice is Notra Trulock. Until the Cox committee's findings about Chinese espionage at Los Alamos came to light, Mr. Trulock was chief of intelligence at DOE. When his years of warning about the penetration of some of the United States' most sensitive facilities - warnings that were suppressed by, among other superiors, Rose Gottemoeller, to whom the intelligence office reported until a reorganization last fall - were publicly vindicated, Mr. Trulock was demoted and his future at the department seems in jeopardy..."
Washington Times 4/27/99 Frank J. Gaffney Jr. "... Just last week, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller took another personnel action, this time against Edward McCallum, a retired Army colonel who until April 19 was head of DOE's Office of Security and Safeguards. In that capacity, he has worked tirelessly to call attention, including in unclassified official reports, to the dangerous decline in the security of critical sites in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Apparently panicked at the mounting evidence that Col. McCallum's heretofore unheeded alarms were becoming a serious embarrassment to the Department of Energy, Ms. Gottemoeller summarily effectively fired him. On the basis of transparently trumped up charges that Col. McCallum, of all people, was handling classified information indiscreetly, Ms. Gottemoeller has placed him in the bureaucratic equivalent of limbo - on indefinite, unappealable administrative leave with pay...."
New York Times 4/29/99 Eric Schmitt "...Senior lawmakers expressed outrage and frustration on Wednesday over the government's failure to monitor a scientist suspected of spying for China, who officials now say may have given away secrets to virtually every nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal. After a three-hour closed hearing, the Republican chairman of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, Frank Murkowski of Alaska, criticized witnesses from the Energy Department, CIA and FBI for not taking responsibility for lax security at Government laboratories..... The witnesses were two Energy Department officials, Notra Trulock, acting deputy director of intelligence, and Ed Curran, counterintelligence director; Robert Walpole, a senior CIA official, and Neil Gallagher, assistant director of the FBI national security division.... The information, which Lee, who was born in Taiwan, transferred mainly in 1994 and 1995, was apparently accessed by someone after the files had been placed in the unclassified network, officials said..... Lawmakers said on Wednesday that those assurances were wrong. "This clearly points out a situation where we have the utmost secret, national security weaponry blueprints, and oversight that's not working," Murkowski said. "During this time frame there were some inexcusable lapses of accountability."... "It's inconceivable to the average person that Wen Ho Lee would not be watched closely after being suspected of espionage and be returned to an area of our most top guarded secrets," Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., who heads the Intelligence Committee, said in an interview. A Justice Department official acknowledged missteps in handling the FBI request, which career prosecutors never knew about. "People in the criminal division," the official said, "would liked to have been consulted early on, and it didn't happen in this case." ..."
LA Times 4/29/99 Bob Drogin "...The FBI plans to arrest suspected spy Wen Ho Lee on charges related to the transfer to China of top-secret nuclear weapon computer programs and data into an insecure computer over a 12-year period, a senior Clinton administration official said Wednesday. The official said the FBI is "reasonably close" to making a case and expects to arrest Lee within 10 days on charges of unauthorized disclosure of highly classified material..... The FBI only discovered the transfer of the massive computer files in late March, and officials said it appeared to be the most solid evidence yet linking Lee to possible espionage.... Richardson is expected to discipline several Los Alamos and Energy Department officials in the next few days as a result of an internal probe into the Lee case. The probe has attempted to determine why Lee was allowed to work in classified areas at Los Alamos until last year, and why he kept his classified security clearance until shortly before he was dismissed. The FBI first identified Lee, who was born in Taiwan but is a naturalized American, as a possible Chinese agent in 1996. Agents did not interview him, however, until late last year, and were unable to obtain a search warrant for his home and other property until earlier this month.... "
Washington Post 4/30/99 Walter Pincus& Vernon Loeb "...Amid new allegations of questionable activity by an espionage suspect at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Congress erupted in complaints yesterday about FBI and Justice Department handling of security breaches and possible espionage by China at the nation's nuclear weapons laboratories. After grilling FBI Director Louis J. Freeh for nearly three hours in a closed-door hearing, members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from both parties appeared equally outraged at what they depicted as lax handling o f past and present investigations into suspected leaks of classified data. Their concern was aroused in particular by Freeh's testimony that the suspect, Wen Ho Lee, had been cited for suspicious actions going back almost 20 years, according to congressional and administration sources. This information hit particularly hard because it came on top of the disclosure Tuesday that Lee had moved secret nuclear weapons data from a highly classified computer network to an unclassified system vulnerable to access by outsiders....Freeh's appearance included disclosure that Lee had a series of questionable activities documented in his security file going back to the early 1980s and continuing to 1994, according to the sources. "Any one of these should have led to lifting his security clearance years ago," one source said. Failure of the FBI almost 20 years ago to follow up on an intercepted telephone call was one critical focus of the session, according to administration and congressional sources. The call in the early 1980s, made by Lee, then a new Los Alamos employee, was to an individual at the Lawrence Livermore Nuclear Laboratory who was then suspected of having given neutron bomb secrets to the Chinese, according to sources. In it, Lee said, " 'I can help you -- I can tell you who ratted on you,' " one source said. The Livermore scientist, whose name is still classified, was permitted to resign in 1981, sources said. That case has never been closed, according to FBI sources...."
Rush Limbaugh Show 4/29/99 Freeper Newsman "... "One of the things that backs up what you say," Limbaugh noted, "is the discoveries that the FBI tried twice to wiretap Lee, but the Justice Department said "no." "They allowed every other wiretap, except the wiretap on him."
Houston Chronicle 4/29/99 William Safire "...Suspecting Lee at Los Alamos to be a spy for China, FBI agents in 1997 alerted the White House and went to the Department of Justice's Office of Intelligence Policy Review to request application to a special court for a wiretap under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. But Acting Director Gerald Schroeder and his aide Alan Kornblum decided the evidence was insufficient and refused to apply. The FBI then went over Schroeder's head to the office of Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder, and was turned down again. The FBI never returned with new evidence to Schroeder. Did Freeh appeal to Janet Reno about "overlawyering" in a national security case, or was he too browbeaten to try? The bureau learned that when it comes to China, Reno's Justice Department assigns only its most incompetent operatives and penalizes prosecutors who target Asian financing of the 1996 election. Consider: Justice makes some 700 court applications a year for taps under that surveillance law. Maybe once or twice a year, says a Justice intelligence official, it finally refuses the FBI's request that it apply. This case, involving an embarrassment to China when Clinton was proclaiming "strategic partnership," was the one..."
Houston Chronicle 4/29/99 William Safire "...Moreover, Congress should examine the ultra-gentle prosecution of a Los Alamos nuclear simulation scientist, Peter Lee, who was let off with a year in a halfway house. The sentencing judge was never told all Justice knew of his spying...."
Washington Post 4/29/99 Vernon Loeb and Walter Pincus "..."It's staggering - I'm still in shock here," said Robert S. Norris, a senior analyst and nuclear weapons expert at the Natural Resources Defense Council. "If someone had access to [Lee's] unclassified computer, this could be all over the world." Norris's colleague, physicist Matthew G. McKinzie, said that unauthorized access to those programs - so-called legacy codes used to simulate warhead detonations - would represent "an unprecedented act of espionage, in its scope. The espionage in the Manhattan Project [would] pale in comparison." .... The official said that a password was needed to access the information even after Lee transferred it from the classified computer system. The unclassified system allows investigators to determine when and whether the data was accessed, the official said, and initial indications are that the material was accessed "at least a little bit." Who was looking at it remains unclear, the official said, since Lee could have given his password to someone else. Another high-ranking official reported no indication that the information was compromised. He denied a published report of evidence showing a password had been misused to gain access. He also denied that the FBI had been derelict in not searching Lee's computer at the beginning of the espionage investigation in 1996. At the time, FBI agents from the bureau's Albuquerque field office wanted to search the computer but were told they needed a search warrant from a secret federal court under the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act. The warrant was denied, the official said, because of a lack of evidence showing that Lee was engaged in acts of espionage....As soon as FBI agents discovered Lee had transferred massive amounts of secret data to his unclassified computer, Richardson ordered a shutdown of the classified computer networks at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories on April 2 for an extensive security overhaul. The FBI is still reviewing material taken from the search of Lee's home, some of it in Chinese...."
FOX News 4/28/99 The O'Reilly Factor Freeper summary "...If you are a Regular viewer of 'The Factor', you know that one of our themes has been that Mr. Clinton damaged the country greatly by his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The president's defenders never tired saying the episode was just about sex ... but as history unfolds, any clear thinking individual knows that's not true. And that's the subject of this evening's talking points memo... The New York Times is reporting that for almost three years beginning in 1996 a scientist named Wen Ho Lee downloaded millions of lines of computer code that concerned America's atomic war heads. That data was widely accessible to China and other nations. Federal investigators, apparently just discovered this fact a few months ago... but Mr. lee has been under investigation by the FBI since 1996. So... what is going on here? Attorney general Janet Reno apparently blocked wire taps on lee and president Clinton's national security advisor Sandy Berger know about the lee investigation, but did little to bring it to the public's attention. And... where was president Clinton during all of this? Apparently he was preoccupied with ms. Lewinsky and the subsequent investigation. By any measure, the lee investigation was botched and America's security put in jeopardy. The buck stops in the oval office. The President hired Reno and Berger. Yet he's done nothing to explain this incredible incompetence to the American people..."
Washington Times 4/27/99 Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett II "...In our research, we uncovered at least 10 conduits of money from the PLA or Chinese intelligence sources in 1996 into the Clinton-Gore system. The Chung connection is only one of them. Reportedly, when Mr. Chung, now a U.S. citizen, got queasy about betraying his new country, Col. Liu told him not to worry because they had other operations going of the same nature. From the hints she [Liu Chaoying] dropped, Mr. Chung took this to mean the John Huang and Ng Lapsing/Charlie Trie money conduits. Mr. Huang recently took the Fifth Amendment 419 times when asked by Larry Klayman of Judicial Watch about his espionage career at the Commerce Department and his fund raising for the Democratic National Committee. Mr. Ng runs a high-class brothel in Macao and has a separate company that acquires Thai women to work as prostitutes in other establishments. He also has extensive business dealings in China with PLA-associated companies and Chinese intelligence in Macao. Mr. Ng was the source of most of Mr. Trie's illegal campaign contributions. Ted Sioeng is another partner in Mr. Ng's prostitution ring and he, in turn, is the business associate of Cambodia's most prominent narcotics trafficker. Combining all their probable illegal contributions to the DNC in 1996, it would amount to something close to $2 million. All three of them had frequent Clinton-Gore contacts, including the usual grinning photographs with the president, vice president and first lady. Mr. Ng and Mr. Sioeng have fled the country and Mr. Trie is under indictment for minor offenses. We believe the emerging evidence indicates that Gen. Xiong was directing precisely what Sen. Fred Thompson, Tennessee Republican, described as a plan to increase China's influence over the U.S. political process. This plan was lubricated with millions of dollars, and the Chung conduit was only one avenue of many leading to a common purpose: The re-election of the Clinton-Gore team and the defeat of the Republican ticket. There was no real effort to hide the aim here; Gen. Ji told Mr. Chung explicitly that Beijing wanted Bill Clinton and Al Gore re-elected. Nor should there be any surprise at Beijing's choice. John Huang also took the Fifth Amendment when asked if he got his Commerce Department job through the personal intervention of the first lady and he took the Fifth again when asked if he had transferred American military secrets to China.
The American Spectator 5/99 Linda Killian "...Halfway through its investigation of these transfers, the Cox committee began investigating security problems at U.S. nuclear weapons labs. Although some in the Clinton administration had been aware of them for several years, Congress had not been fully informed. Many legislators, including Cox, believe that, had his committee not begun its work, the public might still be unaware of the problems.... To say the Clinton administration handled the situation badly would be an understatement. Congressional sources say an official who suspected there were problems at the lab was ordered not to tell Congress what he knew because critics would attack the White House's "engagement" policy toward China. Undoubtedly, there was concern within the administration over how this would look at a time when revelations about Chinese infusions of cash into Democratic campaign coffers were coming to light. The suspected spy remained in place and the technology transfers continued so that the White House could spare itself embarrassment.... Senator Thompson thinks the White House "probably misled Congress" in failing to adequately inform it. After National Security Advisor Sandy Berger was told about the Chinese security problems, the information fell into a " deep trough" for more than a year, says Thompson. "He's got a lot to answer for. This was a massive bureaucratic mishandling. They were not allowing things to surface that would generate opposition to their China policy." ...."
The American Spectator 5/99 Linda Killian "...As soon as the Cox report was completed, the White House began the job of spinning its results by leaking the most damaging portions and stressing that the problems occurred during previous administrations, a move that angered Cox and other Republicans on the committee. "This is the way the Clinton administration does things, this is their M.O.," said Porter Goss, another member of the Cox committee. "He's instinctively lying about what happened during his administration," said Cox of Clinton, but instructively added: "If we look at this problem as Bill Clinton we miss the point. The problem is China and its espionage efforts targeted at the United States.".... In addition to outlining the problems, the Cox report contains 38 recommendations for improving U.S. security. In early February, the White House leaked 19 of those recommendations which were declassified as well as the administration's responses. ...The administration objected to a proposal for surprise inspections of Chinese facilities that use high-performance U.S. computers, and the refusal of export licenses for such computers if China failed to comply. "Requiring any foreign country to accept visits without notice would be viewed as an infringement of its sovereignty," argued the White House, suggesting that "if China does not permit end-use visits, the administration will continue to implement appropriate measures, including the denial of licenses on a case by case basis." The Clinton administration had relaxed the rule for the sale of supercomputers to China and reversed a 1993 State Department decision that banned satellite exports to China for two years. What's more, decision-making about sensitive exports was moved to the Commerce Department, an agency more receptive to the pleas of large American companies eager to make multi- million-dollar sales. Pentagon workers were directed not to voice opposition, and memos written in opposition to the exports were surpressed or destroyed. In the wake of the Cox Committee's investigation, authority for sensitive sattelite sales has been transferred back to the State and Defense Departments...... "This has become a criminal matter,"says Sen. Thompson, who has been pushing Attorney General Janet Reno for years to appoint a special prosecutor to look into Chinagate. Thompson says he plans to renew that call. "If ever there was a case for an Independent Counsel, this is it. I'm going to continue to ride herd on the Justice Department to the extent that Ican," he says, adding, "We need to get to the bottom of this." ..."
USA Today 4/29/99 AP "...A number of Energy Department and national weapons laboratory officials face possible disciplinary action because a scientist was provided continued access to top nuclear secrets long after he became a target of an espionage investigation, government officials say. An internal Energy Department investigation of the scientist and possible theft of secrets by China at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico is focusing on ''why was this man permitted access for so long,'' a senior official said Wednesday....Meanwhile, it was learned Wednesday that investigators for nearly two years were prevented from examining Lee's personal computer at Los Alamos because Los Alamos employees never had been put on formal notice that their computers were subject to search.... A search of Lee's computer was proposed as early as 1996, but both FBI and Justice Department lawyers said a warrant would be needed because the lab's computers did not contain warnings they were subject to search as government property, the officials said, and there was not enough hard evidence to get a warrant. When investigators finally examined Lee's computer after the scientist had been fired, they found the computer contained extensive files of top-secret weapons design and performance codes, although the computer was part of an unclassified system with wide access and could be used to send data in and out of the lab complex. The discovery of top-secret data in Lee's less secure computer is expected to raise new questions about why he was allowed to keep his security clearance and allowed continued access to some of the lab's most sensitive weapons data more than two years after he became a leading suspect in the alleged theft by China of information on a sophisticated nuclear warheads, the W-88, in the 1980s....Most of the files in Lee's computer had been transferred from Los Alamos' highly secure computer system in 1994-95, although evidence was found the Lee made some authorized transfers as early as 1983, an official said. He said there was no evidence that the files were accessed from outside the laboratory, but also no assurance that they were not...."
http://www.senate.gov 4/30/99 U.S. Senator James M. Inhofe (R - Oklahoma) "..."Based just on what has leaked to the press in the last month, it is apparent that the coverup of China's theft of nuclear secrets is one of the biggest national security scandals in American history," Inhofe said. "The American people are beginning to wake up to the realization that secret files on virtually every technology used in the design of our nuclear arsenal has been compromised, and that the significance of this security breach has been deliberately withheld from Congress and the public by the incumbent administration." ...."We have sworn testimony that members of Congress were denied a proper briefing on these matters for political reasons," Inhofe said. "At the same time, other officials deny there was an attempt to coverup. This is why I am insisting that those giving this conflicting testimony submit to lie detector tests...."Headline distracting events from Kosovo to Colorado cannot diminish the immense significance of the China nuclear secrets scandal. The Administration had better realize that members of Congress are not going to be diverted or appeased by the usual game-playing, delays, and lies we have come to expect from this White House. The American people deserve to know the truth about what happened and its immense significance to our national security and foreign policy."...."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...A secret report [11/98 prepared by U. S. counterintelligence officials throughout the government] to top Clinton administration officials last November warned that China posed an "acute intelligence threat" to the government's nuclear weapons laboratories and that computer systems at the labs were being constantly penetrated by outsiders. Yet investigators waited until March to search the computer of a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory who had been under investigation for nearly three years, suspected of spying for China. And it was not until April that the Energy Department shut down its classified computer systems to impose tighter security over their data. Meanwhile, in February, the scientist, Wen Ho Lee, tried to delete evidence that he had improperly transferred more than 1,000 files containing nuclear secrets, officials said. The classified report contains numerous warnings and specific examples showing that outsiders had gained access to the computer systems at U. S. weapons labs as recently as June 1998....The report was distributed to the highest levels of the government, including Bill Richardson, the secretary of energy; William Cohen, the secretary of defense; Janet Reno, the attorney general; President Clinton's national security adviser, Sandy Berger, and three dozen other senior officials at law enforcement, defense and intelligence agencies. A government official gave a copy of the report to The New York Times. ... According to the report, the Energy Department recorded 324 attacks on its unclassified computer systems from outside the United States between October 1997 and June 1998, including instances when outsiders successfully gained "complete access and total control to create, view, modify or execute any and all information stored on the system." The document does not say where the computer attacks originated...."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...The 25-page counterintelligence report contains many examples of lax security and serious intelligence breaches at the labs that have not been previously disclosed, involving more than a dozen foreign countries. Foreign spies "rightly view DOE as an inviting, diverse and soft target that is easy to access and that employs many who are willing to share information," the report states.....The report also singles out Russia and India as immediate threats. "China represents an acute intelligence threat to DOE," the report said, referring to the Department of Energy. "It conducts 'a full court press' consisting of massive numbers of collectors of all kinds, in the United States, in China, and elsewhere abroad. "China is an advanced nuclear power yet its nuclear stockpile is deteriorating," it continued. "As such, China has specifically targeted DOE for the collection of technical intelligence related to the design of nuclear weapons." The report concludes, "This effort has been very successful and Beijing's exploitation of U.S. national laboratories has substantially aided its nuclear weapons program." The report states that the maintenance of nuclear weapons, so-called "stockpile stewardship," is the area of most intense interest to China. Lee was at the center of Los Alamos' stockpile stewardship program for years...."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...The report also includes detailed information about a number of incidents in which China could have obtained sensitive weapons information, as well as some of the ways the espionage could have taken place, including these: A Chinese scientist working at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, on Long Island, was able to send dozens of long, technical faxes to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, enabling the Chinese research center to duplicate Brookhaven experiments as they were being conducted. China might be using its exchanges with American scientists for espionage. Chinese intelligence officials have also arranged the visits of American scientists to China to "enable Chinese experts to assess and develop these contacts," according to the report. Thirty-seven Chinese intelligence officers have visited or been assigned to the labs and other Energy Department facilities over the last five years...."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...The report also focuses on security breaches at the labs involving other countries, citing numerous incidents. For example, Russian intelligence has intercepted communications from Los Alamos concerning nuclear power plants used for military purposes. In addition, the report says that an unknown individual sent 38 faxes to India from inside a sensitive area of the Oak Ridge Laboratory, in Tennessee, during a 30-day period in 1995 and 1996. The report grew out of a comprehensive counterintelligence review prompted by an espionage investigation that came to focus on Lee in 1996...."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...A select congressional committee sent the president additional warnings about the security of the weapons laboratories in a separate report that was also secretly delivered in January of this year. ..."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...The search of Lee's computer "should have happened earlier," Richardson said. But he defended waiting until April 2 to shut down the computer systems at the laboratory, saying: "It wouldn't have made much of a difference to have gone earlier." "The shutdown was the most extreme of measures," he said. After learning on March 30 that Lee had improperly moved vast amounts of nuclear secrets, Richardson said he decided to "speed up" plans adopted months earlier to improve computer security...."
Washington Weekly 5/2/99 RICKI MAGNUSSEN AND MARVIN LEE "...QUESTION: So you think that Clinton is close to the Chinese military? TIMPERLAKE: think the Chinese military penetrated to the highest level of the Clinton administration including the White House. QUESTION: But the question is if president Clinton is an innocent, ignorant victim, or is he actually working on their behalf? TIMPERLAKE: Here it comes: Ng Lap Sen, A communist Chinese official who also owns the Fortuna hotel in Macao and wired millions to Charlie Trie showed up not only in the White House but in the White House residence. Now that's a powerful statement. A communist Chinese official gangster wiring millions, his minion is a gangster who offered a bribe to the president through the president's legal defense fund. Two days after Ng Lap Sen enters the country with $75,000 in cash he's in the residence of the White House. So president Clinton has no willful blindness or deniability. He was there, he met with the fellow apparently six additional times. QUESTION: But the question is if he really knew who this was? TIMPERLAKE: Well, here's the argument: the Secret Service has as their sacred trust to protect the integrity and security of the President of the United States and the security of our leader, I mean the Commander-in-Chief. They would have to have known who this person was. There's no doubt in my mind that they knew exactly who this person was and the only person who could clear him in was the President of The United States. That's it. QUESTION: So you think that president Clinton is actually working on their behalf. TIMPERLAKE: He actually cleared this person in, because I trust the integrity and judgment of the FBI and the Secret Service. Here's the rule: Intelligence goes up and out, that's the rule of intelligence. When you get it, it goes up through the chain of command and out to the users, that's how it is. I trust the integrity of the FBI and the Secret Service. They would do due diligence, they are not weak on that, and they would brief the president or the people around him, on how bad these people were....."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...In April 1996, Energy Department officials briefed Berger, then the deputy national security adviser, on the case and how it related to China's nuclear strategy. Berger took no action and did not inform the president of the matter, White House officials have said. The FBI meanwhile began a criminal inquiry. But little investigative work was done by FBI agents throughout the rest of 1996. In 1997, the Justice Department declined an FBI request to ask a court for authority to monitor Lee's phone and to gain access to Lee's office computer. Justice Department officials argued there was insufficient evidence to convince a judge to approve the surveillance. The FBI had asked the Energy Department not to move Lee from his job at Los Alamos, fearing this might alert him that he was a suspect. But the inquiry appeared to be stalled. In April 1997, the bureau's agents in Albuquerque, N.M., told Energy Department officials they could transfer Lee to a less sensitive job. But that message apparently never reached Energy Department officials in Washington, officials said. The job Lee was shifted to that month was one in which he was responsible for updating a computerized archive of nuclear secrets...."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...In July 1997, Berger was briefed again. This time, the briefing included evidence that the Chinese were focusing on computer systems at Los Alamos, in particular computer simulations and codes for nuclear weapons, according to one U.S. official. At about the same time, officials at the Energy Department, the lab and the FBI were all also warned that the Chinese were attempting to gain access to computer systems at Los Alamos. The July discussion was also broader, including other security problems, the W-88 theft and other espionage cases, including one involving a scientist who had worked for weapons labs and their contractors, officials said....That scientist, Peter Lee (who is not related to Wen Ho Lee) later pleaded guilty to attempting to pass classified information in 1985 and making false statements about a trip to China in 1997. The November 1998 report cited his case as "a good example of China's use of cultural ties to collect successfully." After Berger's 1997 briefing, he discussed the matter with the president, and White House officials began to draft a presidential directive ordering better security at the laboratories, White House officials said. Meanwhile, the FBI's investigation of Wen Ho Lee continued without success...."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...In the summer of 1998, Chinese-American FBI agents, posing as Chinese spies, tried to establish a covert relationship with Lee, officials said. In their sting, what the FBI calls a "false flag" operation, the FBI agents called him, pretending to be Chinese spies checking up on Lee in the wake of Peter Lee's conviction earlier that year, officials said. Wen Ho Lee listened, and then called the agents back to refuse their offer to get together. ..."
New York Times 5/2/99 Jeff Gerth James Risen "...In November, the secret counterintelligence report was completed. Richardson, prodded both by Congress and by the mounting evidence of security problems, took action to screen foreign visitors to the labs, proposals that had lain dormant for years at the Energy Department. In December, Lee was subjected to a polygraph for the first time. During that first examination, for reasons that officials could not explain, investigators did not ask Lee to consent to a search of his office computer. Government attorneys had concluded that the earlier Justice Department denial for an FBI surreptitious search required Lee's permission to examine his office computer. In February, Lee took a second polygraph. This time, officials said, he was asked about his computer use and some of his answers were seen as deceptive. Two days later, apparently aware that investigators were now suspicious about his computer use, Lee deleted between 1,000 and 2,000 files, officials said. Lee's deletions involved millions of lines of computer codes he had downloaded, mostly in 1994 and 1995, from his classified computer system to an unclassified system. Such unclassified systems at the labs have been successfully attacked by outsiders, according to the 1998 intelligence report. In early March, Lee was interviewed by the FBI. During the interviews he gave permission for his computer to be searched. On March 8, he was fired from Los Alamos for security violations. Over the next few weeks, investigators pored through his computer records, recreated the deleted files and learned that Lee had downloaded computer data and codes that, in effect, were the distillation of more than a half-century of research on how to perfect nuclear weapons, officials said...."
The Center for Security Policy 4/26/99 No. 99-D 48 "...Lately, it seems that scarcely a day goes by without some new revelation about serious security problems at the Department of Energy (DOE) -- or the Clinton Administration's lack of seriousness about addressing them competently. Less obvious, but no less troubling, are the steps the Administration is taking to punish conscientious DOE employees who have been raising alarms about these problems. Much of the blame for the present mess appears to lie with President Clinton's first Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary.(1) Mrs. O'Leary made no secret of her hostility to her Department's most important function -- maintaining the Nation's strategic deterrent and the thermonuclear weaponry that underpins it. While she has mercifully been gone from office for three years, the legacy of the gaggle of anti-nuclear activists O'Leary recruited to staff senior DOE positions and the "denuclearization" and "openness" policies that she and they promulgated together linger on. In fact, just last month, the current Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, succeeded in sneaking through the Senate the nomination of an advocate of the abolition of nuclear weapons to serve as Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation and National Security. This dark-of-night operation is all the more outrageous in light of the mounting evidence that this appointee, Rose Gottemoeller,(2) is implicated in a number of the security scandals now coming to light -- and the personnel actions being taken against the whistle-blowers....Two further O'Leary "openness" initiatives contributed to the circumstances under which the penetration of U.S. nuclear facilities by Communist China, among others, has occurred during the present administration. ....First, Mrs. O'Leary banned personnel badges that clearly indicated whether the bearer had a security clearance and, if so, how high. Her reasoning: Such badges were discriminatory. And second, she ended the practice of requiring reports to DOE headquarters about foreign nationals from "sensitive countries" who visited the unclassified areas of the Nation's nuclear weapons laboratories....."
The Center for Security Policy 4/26/99 No. 99-D 48 "...On 17 April 1995, President Clinton lent his authority to an "openness" initiative championed by Mrs. O'Leary, the current White House Chief of Staff, John Podesta, and then-NSC staffer Morton Halperin(3) with his signature of Executive Order 12958. This order called for the automatic declassification by 17 April 2000 of all documents containing historical information that are 25 years or older......"
Washington Post 5/2/99 Vernon Loeb "....The chief suspect in an ongoing investigation of the leak of nuclear weapons secrets to China cooperated with the FBI 17 years ago when the agency was conducting another nuclear espionage investigation, sources said. Wen Ho Lee, who was fired for security violations March 8 from Los Alamos National Laboratory, passed a polygraph examination in 1982 after he called a nuclear weapons scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory suspected of espionage at the time, according to sources familiar with the incident. Lee cooperated with the FBI investigation of the Livermore scientist, who has never been identified or charged..... Committee members grilled FBI Director Louis J. Freeh about why the 1982 call was not investigated further. Three sources at the briefing said senators questioned whether Lee should have been allowed to maintain his high-level security clearance after his call to a known espionage suspect thought to have passed neutron bomb secrets to the Chinese. That scientist was permitted to resign. But one high-ranking U.S. official said in an interview after the Thursday hearing that Lee did not know the Livermore scientist was an espionage suspect. During the intercepted call, Lee expressed condolences after hearing rumors that the Livermore scientist was facing disciplinary action for delivering a scientific paper in Taiwan, the official said. Both Lee and the Livermore scientist came to the United States from Taiwan. After the FBI confronted Lee about the call, he cooperated with the agency and later passed a polygraph examination in which he denied involvement in any espionage activity, the official said. The call to the Livermore scientist "wasn't in the context of espionage," the official said. Another source familiar with the 1982 call said Lee later tried to set up a meeting with the Livermore scientist at the request of FBI agents to help them gain more information, but the meeting never took place...."
Washington Post 5/2/99 Vernon Loeb "...."It wouldn't be beyond the pale--and it wouldn't be unheard of--for somebody to transfer a code to a place where they could access it with a better editor," said Chris Mechels, now vice president of Citizens for Los Alamos National Laboratory Employee Rights....A senior Energy Department official, who asked not to be identified, said he knew of no other case in which such highly sensitive material has been moved into an unclassified computer system. The official said taking legacy codes out of Los Alamos's classified network because it was easier to edit them would be "unimaginable," given the sensitivity of the programs. "It's way beyond the pale," the official said. "For national security reasons alone, you wouldn't do it. To be caught at such a thing--to lose your clearance, your livelihood, for a better editor? I guess my skepticism is showing through."
Reuters 5/2/99 "...The United States should brace for more "revelations'' on the China nuclear scandal, a senior U.S. lawmaker said Sunday. "The damage was bad, a lot worse than people ever imagined,'' said Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Richard Shelby on allegations China penetrated the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico and obtained U.S. nuclear secrets. "I think there will be more revelations that will come out week after week.'' Shelby told "Fox News Sunday'' he hoped that China did not have "it all,'' but "I'm afraid they have a lot more than we ever dreamed they would have.''.... "It looks to me like this is a botched investigation by the FBI, and I think there is some culpability with the Justice Department,'' Shelby said. "I think the Justice Department treated this as an ordinary case when it should have been an extraordinary case.'' Shelby questioned why Justice investigators at one point did not approve a request from the FBI to secretly monitor Lee's computer and telephone. "They had a wake-up call. Maybe they didn't hear it,'' he said..... Shelby said China, which denies the spy assertions, is "so aggressive and so well connected all over America'' on U.S. nuclear technology matters. "I assume and I bet as we sit here, espionage or attempted espionage is going on.'' Asked if other nations, like Russia and India, had obtained U.S. nuclear secrets, Shelby said they were "trying.'' ....Shelby said it would take a long time to put meaningful security measures in place, and that he thought the FBI would eventually have to take over security at U.S. labs...."
USA TODAY 5/1/99 AP "...Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said Friday a suspected spy for China at the Los Alamos National Laboratory should have had his access to top secrets taken away long before it was. ''It seems within the lab, within the Department of Energy there were some communication breakdowns as to why this individual was still pursuing security work of a sensitive nature at a time when there were suspicions about him,'' Richardson said..... Appearing on PBS' The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, Richardson said an internal investigation is trying to determine if government or lab officials should be disciplined because Lee was not moved sooner and stripped of his top security clearance..... Richardson said he knew of ''no evidence'' that any of the computer code data had been shipped via e-mail outside the Los Alamos facility in New Mexico but acknowledged it was theoretically possible. ''We have no evidence yet that China or anyone got this information. ...The evidence on that is not there,'' he said. Richardson. According to Richardson, most of the computer code transfers occurred in 1994-95 but some go back as far as 1983. He said it was ''a very serious violation'' but ''how serious we don't know'' - since there still is no certainty as to who may have seen the data...."
The Daily Republican 5/3/99 "...Counter-Intelligence Report on Chinese Spying Date: November 1998 To: Bill Richardson, Secretary of Energy; William S.Cohen, Secretary of Defense; Janet Reno, Attorney General, Samuel R. Berger, National Security Adviser Re: Number of Pages in Report=25. Acute Intelligence Threat, to the Government's nuclear weapons laboratories; computer systems at labs penetrated. Executive Summmary: The Energy Department recorded 324 attacks on its unclassified computer systems from outside the United States between October 1997 and June 1998,including instances when outsiders successfully gained complete access and total control to create, view modify or execute any and all information stored on the system.....Foreign spies view D.O.E. as an inviting, diverse and soft target that is easy to access and that employs many who are willing to share information. hina represents an acute intelligence threat to D.O.E. It conducts 'a full court press' consisting of massive numbers of collectors of all kinds, in the United States, in China, and elsewhere abroad. China is an advanced nuclear power yet its nuclear stockpile is deteriorating. As such, China has specifically targeted D.O.E. for the collection of technical intelligence related to the design of nuclear weapons. his effort has been very successful and Beijing's exploitation of U.S. national laboratories has substantially aided its nuclear weapons program. The maintenance of nuclear weapons, so-called "stockpile stewardship," is the area of most intense interest to China. Lee was at the center of Los Alamos' stewardship program for years...."
Wall Street Journal 5/3/99 John J. Fialka "...House and Senate investigators are launching new inquiries into the Energy Department's $800 million security program and how it failed to stop the apparent compromise of many of the nation's most valuable nuclear-weapons secrets. ....The panel will hold hearings this week on the latest example of this seeming paradox: Edward McCallum, the Energy Department's top internal critic of security deficiencies, has been put on leave and is being investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigations for allegedly leaking secret information. At the same time, Wen Ho Lee, the former Los Alamos nuclear-weapons scientist who allegedly transferred many of the nation's most sensitive nuclear-weapons codes to an unprotected computer between 1983 and 1995, is described by the FBI as being "unprosecutable." ...The Commerce Committee has threatened to subpoena 13 Energy Department officials who know about the investigation of Mr. McCallum, a 25-year department veteran who, among other things, has complained about difficulties in trying to protect the secret computer system at Los Alamos. The network of 2,000 computers is used to store digital models of nuclear tests that show, moment-to-moment, how nuclear weapons work. Committee members have invited Mr. McCallum to testify along with another department veteran, Glenn Podonsky, who runs internal inspections for the agency. While Republicans are leading the charge in the various congressional investigations, the two witnesses and others are expected to tell of foul-ups and budget shortfalls that date to the Carter administration. Energy Department reports show that Mr. Podonsky, as early as 1994, had identified the problem that researchers could transfer data from the secured computer system to the unprotected one..... David Tripp, Mr. McCallum's lawyer, said the information involved in the allegations against Mr. McCallum wasn't classified and that he is being punished for being "a pain in the neck" about exposing security problems. Rose Gottemoeller, the assistant energy secretary who removed Mr. McCallum from his job, denied that was the reason, calling Mr. McCallum "a valued security professional" who has made "major improvements." ...."
The Union Leader 5/3/99 Richard Lessner "...Worse, the Clinton administration's criminal negligence in the face of this nearly total failure of security verges on - dare we say it? - the treasonous. The scale of our loss has been almost incalculable. This is the most important news story of the year. Even so, the Los Alamos case continues to be overshadowed by the tragedy in Littleton, Colo., and the war in Yugoslavia. It also may be that the American people - having endured Monicagate, impeachment, campaign finance shenanigans, Whitewater - are suffering Clinton scandal fatigue. Yet as worn-out as we all are with this scandal-ridden Presidency, this security is too serious to be casually written off..... As bad as this is, it is not the worst of the scandal. Lee's computer transfers apparently came in 1994 and 1995. Shortly thereafter, the Taiwan-born scientist became the prime suspect in the transfer to Red China of data on the secret W-88 nuclear warhead, the most advanced in the U.S. inventory..... The FBI began to target Lee in the W-88 theft in 1996. Despite this, he was allowed to keep his top secret security clearance and was allowed to continue working at Los Alamos. Despite the criminal investigation, Attorney General Reno's Justice Department blocked an FBI request for court approval to gain surreptitious access to Lee's office and computer files. At that point the investigation inexplicably stalled. Incredibly, in April 1997, Lee was promoted! Despite being the prime suspect in an espionage investigation, Lee was put in charge of updating the so-called "legacy" codes....... And now the FBI is saying it may be prepared to arrest Lee sometime in the next week or so. Is this delay intended to allow the suspected spy the opportunity to flee the country, as so many other witnesses in the Clinton-Gore/Red China fund-raising scandal have done? As we have noted before, what is so disturbing about this espionage case is the Clinton-Gore/Red China fund-raising nexus. At the very time the FBI was being thwarted in its efforts to investigate the Los Alamos security breakdown, the Clinton-Gore campaign was accepting campaign contributions from foreign sources linked to Beijing and, in at least one instance, directly from the chief of Chinese military intelligence. Did Janet Reno's Justice Department drag its feet in order to conceal the Clinton-China connection? Was the inattention to national security driven by political considerations? Was the FBI investigation blocked in 1996 to prevent this espionage scandal from becoming public during the Presidential campaign? ....."
San Jose Mercury 5/3/99 Jack R. Payton "...It doesn't get much worse than this. With these computer files, and the supercomputers we've been selling China in recent years, Beijing now has access to everything our scientists have been able to learn about nuclear weapons since the dawn of the atomic age in 1945. Nothing convicted spy Aldrich Ames did for the Soviets, not even what Julius and Ethel Rosenberg did for Moscow almost half a century ago, comes remotely close to the potential damage of this security breach. And this time, Clinton and his aides can't try to blame it all on the Reagan and Bush administrations as they did in the case of a previous security breach at Los Alamos. These latest leaks took place between 1994 and 1995....."
Christian Science Monitor 5/3/99 Linda Feldmann "...So far, it is not known for sure if China - or any other foreign country - did obtain computer data and codes that embody 50 years of US nuclear know-how. But investigators have determined that these mathematical models, known as "legacy codes," had been transferred to an unsecured computer at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, and that someone had accessed those files. The unsecured computer belonged to Los Alamos scientist Wen Ho Lee, now fired and under investigation for possibly spying for China. If China did acquire the United States's nuclear legacy codes - and analysts are quick to note that this is still not certain - the implications for US and global security could be devastating. Not only could US security be threatened by China, but also by countries that China may be helping, such as Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Regional power balances in East Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East could shift dramatically. If the Chinese got these codes, "this has to be considered one of the two or three great intelligence coups of the 20th century," says Dan Gouré, deputy director of political military studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. These legacy codes are not simply "the how-to manual on the Internet for building a pipe bomb," Mr. Gouré says. "This gives them the keys to the kingdom."..."
National Post 5/4/99 David Frum "...Here's a theory. Weeks before the 1996 election, the Federal Election Commission discovered that the Clinton-Gore re-election campaign had solicited millions of dollars in illegal contributions from shadowy foreign donors. It quickly became clear that both the president and the vice-president were directly and personally involved in this illegal fund-raising:.... Post-election, The Washington Post discovered that at least $300,000 (US) of the millions of dollars of illegal contributions to the Clinton campaign had been given by the Chinese military. And the Clinton campaign was accepting this illegal Chinese money at exactly the same moment as the Clinton administration was authorizing the sale to China of technology that could be used to improve the aiming of ballistic missiles. The Chinese-money shocker of 1996 had mutated into the Chinese-money-for-missiles double-shocker of 1997. Mr. Clinton's breathtaking disregard for law had triggered a potentially administration-destroying scandal...... This original Chinese-corruption scandal was still in the headlines when the FBI came to the Clinton Justice Department with the news that a Chinese-born scientist at Los Alamos may have betrayed the United States' most precious nuclear secrets to China. And that may explain why the Clinton Justice Department was so reluctant to co-operate with the FBI investigation of Mr. Lee..."
National Post 5/4/99 David Frum "...Confronted with information potentially damaging to her boss, her instinct has been from the beginning to try to conceal it. Was that what led her and her aides to try to shut down the FBI's investigation into Wen Ho Lee in 1997? We cannot yet know for sure. What we do know is that when the FBI discovered evidence of the worst incident of espionage since the Rosenbergs gave Stalin the atomic bomb, the Justice Department stalled the investigation for two years, lest (or so it seems) the investigators discover something embarrassing to the president. Mr. Clinton's defenders like to describe their man's wrongdoing as a personal matter -- he may commit perjury and rape during off-hours, but from nine to five he does an outstanding job. What the Wen Ho Lee cover-up proves, however, is that a president's bad character corrupts his entire administration, as entire departments are drawn into the job of covering up his lies and crimes. And this time, the cover-up has put at risk the security of the 270 million Americans and the citizens of the two dozen American allies protected by the American nuclear deterrent...."
New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...The state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation was allowed to buy equipment useful for uranium prospecting made by International Imaging Systems, a California company. China National Nuclear then helped Iran prospect for uranium that American intelligence officials believe will be used in making nuclear weapons...."
New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...The state-owned China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation, which manufactures China's newest anti-ship cruise missiles, was allowed to buy a computer system that is useful for simulating wind effects. Not only did these missiles strengthen the Chinese military, but the company has also exported some to Iran, where, according to the United States naval commander in the Persian Gulf, they threaten our personnel...."
New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...The Chinese Academy of Sciences was allowed to buy equipment from the Convex Computer Corporation (which has since been bought by Hewlett-Packard) for processing data from an experimental fusion reactor. The academy then exported the reactor to Iran, where it is used for training nuclear scientists...."
New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...American equipment was approved for export to the National University of Defense Technology, which helps the People's Liberation Army design advanced weapons; the University of Electronic Science and Technology, which helps develop stealth aircraft and advanced military radar, and the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, which helps develop missiles and specializes in guidance, navigation and flight dynamics. (The licensing records do not reveal whether all the items approved were actually shipped, but there is no reason to think they weren't.) ..."
New York Times 5/5/99 Gary Milhollin Jordan Richie "...In the decade we studied, American companies were also licensed to sell China a great deal of noncomputer equipment that could be used for weaponry. This included $241 million worth of machinery for making special semiconductors that can go into missiles, torpedoes, smart munitions, fuses and secure communications equipment; $131 million worth of high-speed oscilloscopes, which can record data from nuclear weapon tests, help design nuclear weapon firing circuits and develop missile guidance systems; $111 million worth of high-accuracy machine tools that can produce the precision parts needed for nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, and $5.4 million worth of vibration-testing equipment, which can enable nuclear weapons and missiles to withstand shock, impact and rapid acceleration...."
Rumsfield Commission 7/98 "The acquisition and use of transferred technologies in ballistic and WMD programs has been facilitated by foreign student training in the US, by wide dissemination of technical information, by the illegal acquisition of US designs and equipment and by the relaxation of US export control policies....."
Donald Rumsfeld 7/98 "One is technology transfer. We are living in a relaxed, post Cold War world. It's a different world. We've seen liberalized export controls, increased international exchanges of students and scientists, hundreds of Russian and Chinese academic people and students in our national laboratories. We've seen leaks of classified information from all branches of government."
Donald Rumsfield 7/98 "We see active espionage being announced, and it is going on today. We've seen U.S. demarches to country after country, attempting to get their cooperation to not transfer certain types of technology and in short order thereafter, we find that the sources of that information that came to us are closed off, rather than the technology transfer being stopped."
Newsweek Magazine 5/3/99 Gregory L. Vistica and Daniel Klaidman "... Weeks after reports that Wen Ho Lee, a Chinese-American scientist at Los Alamos, may have leaked secret nuclear-weapons designs to Beijing back in 1988, some in the U.S. intelligence community are asking: was the FBI deliberately slow to investigate? The bureau certainly had a reason to be embarrassed about the investigation: NEWSWEEK has learned that Lee's wife, Sylvia, was for years an FBI informant. According to senior intelligence officials, from 1985 to 1991, Sylvia Lee - an administrator at Los Alamos who arranged lab tours for Chinese delegations and attended academic conferences in Beijing - covertly helped the FBI keep tabs on prominent Chinese scientists and develop personality profiles on them..... Intelligence officials still have doubts about whether they will ever gather enough evidence to prosecute Wen Ho Lee, who, sources say, knew about his wife's relationship with the FBI. Lee maintains he is innocent. Earlier this month the FBI sheepishly revealed Sylvia Lee's FBI ties to top intelligence officials, who are furious that the bureau withheld critical information. According to government officials, FBI Director Louis Freeh, Attorney General Janet Reno and CIA Director George Tenet were also kept in the dark. This week Freeh will appear before angry senators on the Intelligence Committee. It won't be an easy sell...."
Time 5/3/99 Elaine Shannon and Michael Duffy "...Mrs. Lee's modest relationship with the FBI complicates the already murky case of her husband, Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwanese-born computer scientist who worked on nuclear-warhead design programs at Los Alamos. In 1995 U.S. intelligence officers learned that China had somehow stolen classified information about the W-88 miniaturized nuclear-warhead program. The ensuing FBI investigation found Wen Ho Lee had violated a number of lab security rules, including failing to report contacts with PRC scientists-lapses for which Department of Energy Secretary Bill Richardson fired him last month...."
Associated Press 5/5/99 H. Josef Hebert, "....As early as 1996, managers at the Los Alamos nuclear lab wanted to examine the computer of a scientist suspected of espionage. But they were warned away by Justice Department lawyers who feared the search would taint information for use in court, the Senate was told Wednesday..... Computer experts reconstructed the files, government officials have said, but questions remain why the search was not conducted much earlier since Lee had been under suspicion of espionage since 1996. "An individual is suspected of being a spy with access to all of our warhead information ... and we did not get into his computer. This is total incompetence,'' Sen. Don Nickels, R-Okla., said Wednesday...... John Browne, the director of the Los Alamos lab in New Mexico, told a Senate hearing Wednesday that as early as 1996 laboratory officials suggested to the FBI, which had just begun investigating Lee, that the Taiwanese-born scientist's computer be searched. They argued they could do so under a 1995 policy directive that advises all lab employees that their computers are subject to search without notice. "The FBI and the Department of Justice felt that the policy was not adequate (and) ... that if we proceeded independently, anything that was found they could not use'' in court, Browne told the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. .... In 1984, Lee was told to take a polygraph test and "showed deception on seven questions'' that should have alerted security officials, said Domenici. Instead, the data became buried and was never passed on to lab managers. When the Energy Department office in Albuquerque, N.M., five years later raised some questions about the 1984 polygraph tests, the file disappeared when sent to Washington, said Domenici, so three years later the regional office had to hire a contractor to reconstruct Lee's personnel file....In August 1997, FBI director Louis Freeh told the No. 2 official at the Energy Department that the investigation of Lee would not be jeopardized if the scientist were shifted to a less sensitive job, or if his security were lifted. But word of Freeh's assessment never reached Los Alamos, according to Browne, who took over as the lab's director in November of that year. "I never received any information regarding this ... and to my knowledge, neither has anyone else at the laboratory,'' Browne told the senators Wednesday. Browne called this perhaps the most serious communications breakdown involving the Lee case and said if he had known of the FBI's go-ahead he would have moved quickly to remove Lee from his job....."
Washington Times 5/4/99 Frank J. Gaffney Jr, "...So much for Mr. Clinton's disclaimers that no Chinese penetration of the U.S. nuclear weapons complex occurred on his watch.... According to the latest article by the Times' Pulitzer Prize-winning team of Jeff Gerth and James Risen, "A secret report to top Clinton administration officials last November warned that China posed an 'acute intelligence threat' to the government's nuclear weapons laboratories and that computer systems at the labs were constantly penetrated by outsiders." This revelation comes on the heels of the penultimate Gerth-Risen contribution, which disclosed that Mr. Lee had apparently put the mother lode of U.S. nuclear secrets - the so-called "legacy codes" and specific weapons design "input data" - onto an unclassified, and easily accessed, computer system at Los Alamos....
Washington Times 5/4/99 Frank J. Gaffney Jr, "...Unfortunately for the Clinton team, any competent investigation will readily establish that the "breakdown" was systemic. It started at the top, with the president and his first energy secretary, Hazel O'Leary, and with the policies they promulgated. A short sampler of these includes the following: * Both Mr. Clinton and Mrs. O'Leary declared their commitment to "denuclearization." While not well defined, this policy, in practice, clearly meant the nation's traditional commitment to assuring the future viability of the nuclear deterrent was greatly diminished, if not now non-existent. * Mrs. O'Leary made a fetish of "openness" - including disclosing the whereabouts of every facility housing nuclear weapons and/or related materials. She prohibited badges that clearly showed who had clearances on the grounds that they were discriminatory. * The president directed in Executive Order 12958 that classified information of historical interest be automatically declassified after 25 years.... * Mr. Clinton's budgets diverted Energy Department funds needed to assure the security of U.S. nuclear weapons sites to other purposes.... * Mrs. O'Leary also directed that the practice of requiring reports about foreign nationals from sensitive countries to unclassified areas of the nuclear laboratories be dispensed with. There were no background checks conducted on most of the thousands of these foreign visitors, at least some of whom would likely have had access to the unclassified computer system to which Mr. Lee is alleged to have transferred the U.S. "legacy codes." ...These Clinton administration actions could not but encourage the perception throughout the DOE nuclear weapons complex that personnel, information and physical security were no longer important. That message was most powerfully communicated, however, by the priority given by the Clinton team to securing international support - particularly from nuclear and nuclear-wannabe states - for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). ....The Clinton administration also encouraged contacts between Russian and Chinese scientists (to say nothing of Iranians, North Koreans, Indians and even Iraqis) and personnel at America's nuclear labs. And it has either explicitly approved or turned a blind eye to the transfer by lab personnel of sensitive U.S. technology, for example, for the nominal purpose of helping the Kremlin maintain the security of its nuclear arsenal stockpile. ....."
Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES 5/7/99 "....The bipartisan committee report sets out that the Chinese government is engaged in a covert operation aimed at influencing U.S. policies. "Technical analyses and methodologies provided by American satellite companies to the [People's Republic of China] during various satellite-launch campaigns result in the transfer to the PRC of technical knowhow," the report says. "Such transfer enables the PRC to improve its present and future space launch vehicles and intercontinental ballistic missiles." A senior Republican Senate aide said the report "confirms our worst fears" about the Clinton administration's policy of loosening satellite-export controls and trying to deal with aggressive Chinese spying on technology. "China developed and implemented a covert-action plan to influence U.S. policy and through illegal campaign contributions sought to loosen controls on critical technologies," the aide said. "And it worked." The aide said technology transfers to China "damaged national security" because "Chinese rockets are now or will become more reliable, more deadly and more potent and could be used against the United States." The report says there is evidence that U.S. satellite technology "was incorporated into the PRC space-launch program," and the panel assumed that "any improvements in the PRC's space-launch vehicles would be incorporated wherever practicable in the PRC's military ballistic missile program. "The committee concludes that the technical information transferred during satellite-launch campaigns enables the PRC to improve its present and future space-launch vehicles and ICBMs." If Beijing uses the space technology in its growing force of strategic intermediate-range and short-range missiles, "national security will have been damaged," the report says. "The committee believes . . . the PRC will use the transferred information to improve its short-range ballistic missiles, intermediate-range ballistic missiles and related technology. These missiles could threaten U.S. forces stationed in Japan and Korea, as well as allies in the region."
Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES 5/7/99 "...The intelligence committee says the CIA regards space launchers as "missiles in disguise," and notes that the Chinese Long March space booster "shares components with the PRC's CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile," most of which are targeted at U.S. cities.... Chung received a $300,000 donation from a Chinese aerospace company that contributed to President Clinton's 1996 re-election campaign. According to the committee, China in 1995 launched "a plan to influence the U.S. political process favorably toward that country. . . . The plan was an official PRC plan, and funds were made available for its implementation." The report says the CIA failed to recognize "the scope of PRC efforts to influence our foreign policy and our elections." It recommended increased efforts to monitor Chinese political-influence operations. .... The Clinton administration transferred jurisdiction for licensing commercial satellites from the State Department to the Commerce Department, which subordinated national security to business interests, the committee says.
Reuters 5/6/99 James Vincini "...U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, stung by criticism in Congress that the Justice Department and FBI bungled the case of a suspected Chinese nuclear spy, announced Thursday that an internal review panel would find out what should have been done differently. A day after Republican senators cited repeated mistakes in the espionage investigation, Reno said a team of federal prosecutors and FBI agents would go back to 1982 to determine what had happened and to make recommendations so cases can be better handled in the future. ``I want to make sure that we've looked at everything to see if there is anything that we could have done differently,'' Reno said at her weekly Justice Department news conference.....Senate Energy Committee Chairman Frank Murkowski, an Alaska Republican, said he wanted ``an explanation of why the Justice Department didn't give the FBI the authority to initiate an investigation and monitor (Lee's) computer.'' Assistant Senate Majority Leader Don Nickles, an Oklahoma Republican, said: ``It's very, very troubling to think this individual, this suspect ... had unbelievable access to very sensitive data on warheads, testing codes, and to think that we didn't even review his computer files until this March.'' Nickles said he wanted to know why the Justice Department turned down the FBI's request several years ago to search the computer of the Taiwanese-born U.S. scientist...."
Time 5/10/99 Romesh Ratnesar "...But the realization that the codes stored on Lee's computer could have found their way into scores of foreign hands, including those of the Chinese government, left U.S. officials dumbstruck. "Holy s___," was what Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said when his counterintelligence chief told him of the data transfers in late March. Republicans were using language even less polite last week when news of the possible heist landed in Washington. Congressional leaders were already fuming about disclosures, first made in the March 6 edition of the New York Times, that since 1996 the FBI had been trying to determine whether Lee had given Beijing classified information about the design of America's most advanced nuclear warhead, the W-88, and that in spite of this possibility, Lee had remained at Los Alamos until he was fired on March 8. The Administration tried to sidestep criticism by insisting that any spying that had taken place had happened during Republican administrations. But that defense may not cut it this time around. Investigators suspect that Lee, 59, downloaded the bulk of the secret codes in 1994 and 1995. He was allowed to retain his high-level security clearance at the lab until late 1998, even while he was under FBI surveillance for the W-88 theft. Agents say they asked the lab to let Lee keep his job so he wouldn't get wise to their probe. Still, it was not until after Lee's dismissal from Los Alamos that anyone managed to check what was on his computer. As more details have emerged, it has sometimes seemed that the only thing more breathtaking than Lee's alleged deceit was how long the government took to ferret it out...."
Time 5/10/99 Romesh Ratnesar "...By then the investigation of Lee had devolved into a bureaucratic Byzantium. The Albuquerque agents filed their warrant request with the Justice Department in July 1997. Officials there concluded that the FBI did not have sufficient proof that Lee posed a national-security threat grave enough to merit a raid on his computer. Exasperated FBI authorities appealed to Attorney General Janet Reno, but she wouldn't budge. Attempts to get more goods on Lee turned up nothing. Says a veteran counterespionage investigator of China's spy network: "They're everywhere, but it's hard to catch them doing anything." ..."
Time 5/10/99 Romesh Ratnesar "...The Energy Department contracts out day-to-day operation of the country's nuclear labs to the University of California and Lockheed Martin Corp. "Security is something they don't even think about," says a retired FBI agent. To break the logjam, agents arranged for Freeh and CIA director George Tenet to receive a stunning briefing in 1997 on security lapses and suspicions of Chinese snooping at Los Alamos. The directors then told Energy Secretary Federico Pena that security was in need of an overhaul. The two also convened a committee of U.S. counterspies, which informed the National Security Council in mid-1997 that the labs needed tighter security and stricter vetting of foreign visitors. Clinton signed off on the proposal in February 1998...."
Judicial Watch Press Release 5/06/99 "...Ever since Judicial Watch filed its first case against the Clinton Commerce Department, uncovering in documentation the role of suspected spy John Huang at the agency, it has been opposed on nearly every effort to get at the full truth by the Clinton Justice Department. Just recently, the Clinton Justice Department, run by Attorney General Janet Reno, even opposed Judicial Watch's request to depose Johnny Chung. The effort was not successful, and Mr. Chung will testify on May 13, 1999. Another example of Reno's attempts to obstruct was her refusal to turn over the original of the desk diary of John Huang, which also proved unsuccessful. Huang was deposed again by Judicial Watch on April 13, 15 and May 3, 1999. While questioned about his diary, he took the Fifth Amendment over 1000 times. Judicial Watch will challenge this with the Court.....Now, the excellent newspaper, The Washington Times, reports today that, "Justice to Probe FBI Handling of Nuke Espionage: Focus on Secrets Passed To China." With revelations in Judicial Watch depositions in recent days that the Clinton Administration has also failed to shore up security at its Commerce Department, where it is likely that classified material was also provided to the Chinese by Huang, having the Clinton Justice Department put in charge of a new task force is like letting the fox investigate his own henhouse massacre. "Why don't we just let the Chinese investigate. While corrupt, at least they're not also incompetent," quipped Judicial Watch Chairman and General Counsel Larry Klayman...."
The Union Leader, Manchester, NH 5/6/99 "...U. S. Attorney General Janet Reno refused yesterday to say in a public U. S. Senate Committee hearing why her Justice department vetoed wiretaps of suspected Los Alamos spy Wen Ho Lee. Appearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Reno was asked pointedly by U. S. Senator Bob Smith, R-NH, why an FBI request to wiretap Lee was twice rejected. She refused to answer publically, preferring to do so during a closed door meeting of the committee. "This is the biggest spy scandal in the history of the United States," Smith said. "Our entire nuclear arsenal has been compromised. I am very concerned that the Attorney general refused to answer, and concerned that no reasons were given for the wiretap refusal...."
WorldNetDaily 5/6/99 J.R. Nyquist "...Chinese spies have probably stolen the secrets of the neutron bomb, the miniaturized W-88 warhead and much more. Before that, there was a scandal involving the transfer of technology to Red China in exchange for campaign contributions. By penetrating the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government, China has acquired missile guidance technology and the ability to place multiple warheads on long range missiles. If this were not enough, Chinese controlled front companies now operate the ports of entry on both sides of the Panama Canal. All these events have been reported in the mainstream press, discussed in books and investigated by Congress. In the course of these investigations we find a dead Commerce Secretary, a dead Assistant Secretary, an un-jailed Chinese agent immediately beneath them in the chain of command, eighteen critical witnesses fleeing the country, and another seventy-nine witnesses taking the Fifth Amendment. In the wake of this ever-unfolding national security debacle, a United States senator was asked about treason in high places. The senator answered, "We don't want to use the 'T' word, yet." But as it happens, more than our military technology has been compromised. There are indications that we've seen only the tip of the iceberg. An emerging body of evidence suggests that U.S. intelligence, the Pentagon, as well as key U.S. banks may have been penetrated -- and manipulated -- by foreign intelligence agents. According to a congressional witness, speaking on condition of anonymity, "There is something wrong with the government agencies responsible for national security; that is, the Pentagon, the State Department, the FBI and the CIA. There is something gravely wrong." Has our national security system broken down? "There is an internal breach," says the witness. "It is wide, it is pandemic and systemic -- and it comes from the top."..."
American Spectator 5/99 John B. Roberts II "...After the 1992 election, matters only got worse. "The priorities were wrong, " says former Secretary Herrington, "and when that was over you had a secretary of Energy put in there whose priorities were world travel, junketing with businessmen and CEOs, and a huge declassification effort including things that shouldn't have been declassified. And you had a culture at DOE that was anti-nuclear." When she took over the department as Clinton's first energy secretary, Hazel O'Leary made clear that she thought DOE had too many secrets. She ordered an agency-wide review of files and documents for the purpose of releasing information. Her new team of political appointees, many drawn from the ranks of the anti-nuclear movement or extremist environmental groups, were eager to ferret out and disclose the department's secrets. O'Leary chose Dan Riecher, from the Natural Resources Defense Council, to be her chief of staff and later named him assistant secretary. "That was like putting a fox in the henhouse," says Brewer, who points out that the activist hard-line NRDC had frequently filed nuisance suits against the department during the eighties. Riecher drew other environmental activists into the ranks of DOE's mid-level and junior political appointees. Another senior O'Leary appointee, Terry Lash, was drawn from the Illinois state environmental protection agency. At DOE, Lash drew fire from Congress for misusing funds appropriated for nuclear reactor and safety research programs by reallocating the money for alternative and renewable energy grants. One former high-ranking Energy Department security official is convinced that O'Leary's environmental activists have used their access to official information to funnel documents to environmental and anti-nuclear groups, ensuring a wave of litigation against future nuclear power or nuclear weapons programs. He believes that classified information has been compromised because of the political ideology of the anti-nuclear activists...."
American Spectator 5/99 John B. Roberts II "...Instead of heeding Trulock's warnings, O'Leary ordered the department's intelligence division to cease gathering information on anti-nuclear extremists and environmental radicals--such as those responsible for the recent arson at a Vail, Colorado ski resort--who frequently impede shipments of nuclear materials. She forbade them even to keep newspaper clippings on the suspect groups. O'Leary's actions were destructive to department morale. "The guys making the nuclear weapons felt like they were the bad guys, and they really got the short end of the stick," recalls Bergen. Tight budgets and program cutbacks at the national labs after the Cold War left U.S. weapons scientists, like their Russian counterparts, wondering about their futures. The new disrepute of the nuclear weapons profession and the government investigations at Rocky Flats combined with the sudden declassification of long-guarded DOE secrets fostered the perception among nuclear lab employees that security no longer mattered. The situation virtually invited foreign intelligence services to redouble their efforts to recruit nuclear spies. Trulock was not the only one to warn O'Leary to tighten security. As part of her declassification drive, the secretary had appointed a top-level committee to decide which secret DOE activities could be declassified. The end-product was something called the Fundamental Review, which determined that many of the documents and programs classified during the Cold War no longer required secrecy. But as the Fundamental Review progressed, there arose a strong belief among the committee that the department's vital secrets needed better safeguarding. "We should identify what really ought to be protected, and build the walls higher around it," explains Troy Wade, who served on the committee. But while O'Leary was more than pleased to accept the committee's recommendations on declassification, she ignored its advice to improve security in coordination with other agencies including the FBI and the Defense Department...."
Investor's Business Daily 5/10/99 Paul Sperry "...Communist China plays a central role in three of the most alarming scandals facing the Clinton administration: campaign finance fraud, satellite technology transfers and nuclear weapons espionage. Yet when Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited the White House early last month, TV newscasters by and large passed on the story, now known as Chinagate, focusing instead on issues like China's entry into the World Trade Organization. It's not as if they didn't have a new scandal hook. Earlier in the week the Los Angeles Times dropped a bombshell: ''The chief of China's military intelligence secretly directed funds from Beijing to help re-elect President Clinton in 1996.'' Network coverage of the scoop? Not a peep. The Big Three - ABC, CBS and NBC - all blacked out the story on both their morning and evening news shows. Surveys show Americans get most of their political information from these networks' evening newscasts, which reach a combined audience of nearly 30 million...... At the request of Investor's Business Daily, CMPA audited nightly newscasts dating back to March 6, when The New York Times first broke the story of Red spying at Los Alamos National Lab. It found that ABC, CBS and NBC together have aired an average of just half of one story a night on the Chinese espionage scandal, or 31 total segments. ''There's almost nothing on TV, certainly nothing that's caught my eye,'' Noyes said. Why would the major networks beg off such a big story? Politics, contends MRC chief analyst Tim Graham. ''This shows the (TV) media doesn't have a liberal bias; it has a Democratic Party bias,'' he said. ''It gives complete, almost Secret Service-level protection to the president.'' ...."
Judicial Watch Press Release 5/7/99 "...While the Cox Report, which was agreed to by all of the Democrats and Republicans on the Congressional Committee, adds knowledge to the facts surrounding Chinagate, its release will show that the Committee did not go far enough in recommending enforcement action against companies that transferred high technology to the Chinese. Many of these companies illegally paid political campaign contributions to the Clinton-Gore campaigns and the Democrat Party to get seats on Commerce Department trade missions to China, and to obtain export licenses and government financing. On the trade missions, Judicial Watch believes U.S. national security interests were compromised. "The Cox Report does not get deeply into this bribery scheme -- which led to the compromise of U.S. national security -- because many of the companies also donate heavily to the Republican Party. Republicans on the Cox Committee did not want to enmesh many of their donors in the Clinton Chinagate scandal. Judicial Watch, however, is non-partisan and will investigate wrongdoing wherever it is found. Its case against the Commerce Department -- which established the bribery scheme and resulted in the testimony of John Huang -- will proceed in an effort to uncover the unbiased facts, in the interests of the American people..."
Washington Times 5/7/99 Helle Bering "....Two weeks after the Chinese nuclear espionage scandal erupted in early March, President Clinton held a news conference to blame previous administrations and to absolve his own. "I am confident that we in the White House have done what we could to be aggressive about this," he said. In fact, the record shows that senior administration officials have, time and again, delayed, obstructed or ignored the investigation. Moreover, White House and other administration officials have repeatedly underestimated the depth and the consequences of China's nuclear espionage. And the news keeps getting worse. It now turns out that in November 1998, a secret report distributed to senior Clinton administration officials --including National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Attorney General Janet Reno and Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Bill Richardson -- informed them that between October 1997 and June 1998 there were more than 300 foreign attacks on DOE's unclassified computer systems. Noting that "China represents an acute intelligence threat to DOE," the secret report stated that instances in which foreign countries successfully penetrated DOE's unclassified computer system resulted in "complete access and total control to create, view, modify or execute any and all information stored on the system," the New York Times reported last Sunday..... even after this secret report was widely distributed throughout the administration last November, investigators in the Clinton administration still did not check Mr. Lee's office computer until March 1999, after the Times reported the espionage scandal. By then, Mr. Lee had been under investigation for espionage for three years. He spent the previous month attempting to destroy the evidence of his unauthorized downloading of the nation's nuclear secrets. It was not until April 1999, nearly a half year after the secret report was issued in November, that Mr. Richardson shut down the DOE's classified computer system in order to improve its security...."
Washington Times 5/7/99 Helle Bering "....Unfortunately, this is only the latest in a string of intelligence disasters. The administration first learned in early 1995 that China may have stolen the United States' most sensitive nuclear secrets..... In late 1995, DOE investigators informed the FBI. By February 1996, DOE counterintelligence officers and the FBI identified Mr. Lee...DOE briefed the CIA in early 1996.... Meanwhile, it is now quite clear, while China was stealing U.S. nuclear secrets, the White House and the Commerce Department were aggressively transferring dual-use technology to China, including supercomputers capable of testing stolen nuclear-weapon design information. In March 1996 President Clinton himself overruled then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher's decision to retain control within the State Department of satellite exports to China. Against the advice of the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies, the president transferred that authority to Commerce. Two months after that decision, the Loral space-launch firm was involved in the unauthorized transfer of missile guidance-and-control technology to China. Loral's chairman, Bernard Schwartz, had actively lobbied the administration to switch satellite-export licensing from State to Commerce while he was pouring money into the Democratic Party...."
Washington Times 5/7/99 Helle Bering "....Then-Deputy National Security Adviser Berger was briefed about China's nuclear espionage in April 1996. Having reversed Mr. Christopher on satellite-export licensing only a month earlier, the White House downplayed the consequences of the espionage, refusing to permit it to interfere with the budding "strategic partnership" with China...."
Washington Times 5/7/99 Helle Bering "....Miss Reno's Justice Department did its part. From October 1996, when the campaign-finance scandal erupted, to the present, Miss Reno has repeatedly refused to seek the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate the Chinese-Democratic Party money connection. Meanwhile, other senior Justice officials repeatedly refused in 1997 to seek a court-approved wiretap that would have allowed the FBI to examine Mr. Lee's office computer...."
Washington Times 5/7/99 Helle Bering "....DOE did its part as well. Without the wiretap, the FBI was unable to pursue aggressively its investigation of Mr. Lee. In April 1997, with its investigation stalled, the FBI advised DOE to remove Mr. Lee from his sensitive position. Instead, DOE inexplicably placed Mr. Lee in charge of updating the computerized archive of nuclear secrets... Most of this downloading, which includes virtually all the nuclear secrets of the U.S. arsenal, occurred in 1994 and 1995. Had Miss Reno's Justice Department obtained the court-approved wiretap in early 1997, the FBI would have learned about Mr. Lee's unauthorized downloading two years earlier. Meanwhile, DOE refused for several years to reinstate the FBI-recommended background checks for visitors to its weapons labs, and the counterintelligence officer who uncovered the espionage has testified before Congress that an acting DOE secretary prevented him from briefing Congress about the Chinese spying...."
The Times of India 5/9/99 Press Trust of India Freeper Jai "...The Clinton administration has admitted that there may have been ``unauthorised transfers of US ballistic missile technology'' to Beijing and said certain state-run firms in China may be engaged in supplying sensitive technologies to Pakistan and Iran. ``Unauthorised assistance and transfers of technology relevant to space launch vehicles and ballistic vehicles and missiles may have occurred during certain space launch failure analysis,'' a statement released by White House staff in Houston said. ....Speaking on the issue, State Department spokesman James Rubin told reporters here on Friday: ``We are concerned, in many respects, about certain Chinese entities that may provide technologies, especially to Iran and Pakistan.'' .... He also said the US was concerned that North Korea may be getting speciality steel from China for its missiles. Rubin, however, said: ``We believe we have made great strides in recent years in getting China to act in greater conformity with international rules and norms in this area (non-proliferation regime).''...."
Reuters 5/9/99 "...Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said Sunday the Chinese government had obtained nuclear secrets during the Clinton presidency - something the administration had previously denied. Speaking on NBC television's "Meet the Press'' show, Richardson admitted security breaches had occurred during the Clinton presidency, despite denials by the president. "There have been damaging security leaks,'' Richardson said. "The Chinese have obtained damaging information ... during past administrations and (the) present administration.'' In a March news conference, President Clinton denied the Chinese had secured nuclear secrets during his presidency....."
Reuters 5/9/99 "...Senator Richard Shelby, chairman of the intelligence committee, said Sunday, "This is probably the most serious espionage we have had in this country in modern times.'' Shelby said his committee's investigation uncovered "very suspicious banking relationships'' which would need further investigation. The Republican from Alabama said millions of dollars were funneled to a small bank in the United States from China, possibly as political campaign donations. Bob Kerrey, the ranking Democrat on the intelligence committee, agreed there had been leaks at the Los Alamos lab...."
The New Australian No. 118, 5/10- 16/99 Peter Zhang "....The most frequent question is: "What was in it for China." Though I had raised the same question myself, it was only in a rhetorical sense as I thought, at least by now, that the answer was obvious. Clinton gave Beijing a free reign and a guarantee that its activities would not be interrupted during, what he quaintly calls, his "watch" so that China could clear out America's military and high-tech secrets. Simple..... His approach to power and people is truly medieval, minus the noblesse oblige. Given this fact, and his support in the media, it is not surprising that reports made out to Chinese intelligence suggested that Clinton would be favourably disposed to dealing with Chinese representatives - for a price. Intelligence assessments were supported by Clinton's action, shortly after entering (or is it soiling?) the Oval Office, in asking all US Attorneys to resign. This unprecedented and dictatorial move gave the Clinton administration control over the prosecutorial machinery of the federal government in every judicial district in the US. No need to tell you who was impressed by this breathtakingly brazen move. Why Clinton even tried to appoint Webster Hubbel to the post of Attorney General. Imagine where that would have led. But what struck a particular chord was the way the American media acquiesced to the Clintons' manoeuvres. Beijing does not underrate the power of the Western media, especially in America. That, with the exception of a few lone voices, it was prepared to collaborate with the Clintons gave further assurance to Beijing that Clinton was able to deliver. ..."
The New Australian No. 118, 5/10- 16/99 Peter Zhang "....But what of the CIA and the FBI, asked some readers? I have no wish to be patronising, but the naiveté of the American public is almost touching. It didn't even notice that William Sessions, FBI Director, a man noted for his integrity and opposition to political interference in the Bureau's affairs, was removed as quickly as Clinton moved into the Oval office. There is no doubt that Clinton deliberately acted to chain the CIA and the National Security Agency as well as the FBI. One method was to have Clinton supporters in sensitive positions so that they could delay, if not derail, any budding investigations into Clinton's China operations. With these bodies effectively neutered Chinese intelligence would have a field day. Now being ineffective does not mean uninformed. These agencies new very well what Chinese intelligence was up to but were largely powerless to do anything. After all, what could they do when the commander in chief, the president himself, had, by his actions, made it clear that investigations into China's spying activities were not to be implemented. Just to make sure that nothing embarrassing emerged, Clinton appointed Janet Reno to head the Justice Department with the intention of sabotaging any investigations into Chinese intelligence operations. I should point out at this stage that several Chinese officials let it drop that they believed Clinton was blackmailing Reno over certain activities concerning her personal life. Whatever the truth of the matter, Reno's role as the last of Clinton's gatekeepers, so to speak, has more than satisfied Beijing's expectations by thoroughly corrupting the Justice Department and blocking FBI requests...."
The New Australian No. 118, 5/10- 16/99 Peter Zhang "....No wonder Beijing was so satisfied with its part of the deal that if felt sufficiently in command to 'request' that Clinton see to it that John Huang be given top security clearance and placed in a favourable position, favourable to Chinese intelligence, that is. Thus we find Huang being given a position in the Commerce Department at the insistence of Clinton. Hence he was able to use his security clearance to directly obtain information from the CIA. I am told that CIA officials were in no doubt about Huang's activities but were held in check by Clinton, despite CIA complaints. Does any reader honestly believe that Clinton is so innocent that he had no idea why Beijing wanted a security clearance for Huang? Of course he knew. So did Beijing really think it was going to get away with spying activities? Of course it did. And it has. Chinese intelligence expected eventual exposure but calculated that by the time it occurred the damage would be done. It was right. Clinton, not China, emptied the Candy store with devastating results for American security. The consequences will be felt for many years to come. To put it bluntly: President William Jefferson Clinton is guilty of high treason. It's time Americans woke up to that awful fact....."
New York Times 5/10/99 JEFF GERTH and JAMES RISEN "...A scientist working on a classified Pentagon project in 1997 provided China with secrets about advanced radar technology being developed to track submarines, according to court records and government documents. Submarine detection technology is jealously guarded by the Pentagon because the Navy's ability to conceal its submarines is a crucial military advantage. The information about the radar technology, which is considered promising and has been in development for two decades, was divulged to Chinese nuclear-weapons experts during a two-hour lecture in Beijing in May 1997 by Peter Lee, an American scientist, court records show. Lee was then working for TRW Inc., which had been hired by the Pentagon. Federal prosecutors in Los Angeles wanted to charge Lee with espionage but were unable to, in part because Navy officials in Washington would not permit testimony about the technology in open court, law-enforcement officials said. The Justice Department in Washington, having some questions of its own, would not approve the prosecution either, the officials said.... The Justice Department's 1997 decision not to approve the espionage prosecution of Lee contrasts with some spy cases involving the former Soviet Union or Israel in which ways were found to protect secrets and bring charges. The 1997 decision not to prosecute came a few months after the Justice Department turned down a request from the FBI to put a covert wiretap on Wen Ho Lee, then a scientist at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
New York Times 5/10/99 JEFF GERTH and JAMES RISEN "...The submarine technology in the Peter Lee case was developed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a weapons lab in California. The Peter Lee case is also significant because it clearly demonstrates that the American government believed that China was successfully engaged in espionage -- obtaining American defense secrets -- during President Clinton's second term. While the Los Alamos disclosures earlier this year prompted an array of investigations, Clinton, two months ago, said no one had brought suspicions of Chinese espionage to him and administration officials initially portrayed the problem as one confined to earlier administrations....The breach involved in the Peter Lee case -- code-named Royal Tourist by the FBI -- occurred in 1997, a point made in a classified November 1998 counterintelligence report ordered by and then sent to the White House.....The November 1998 counterintelligence report citing the Peter Lee case was part of a comprehensive review ordered by President Clinton as part of his effort to improve security at U.S. weapons laboratories, which are run by the Department of Energy. That report states that as late as 1997, Lee had "provided China with classified information." ....Sandy RosenBerger, Clinton's national security adviser, was briefed about the Peter Lee case by Energy Department intelligence officials in July 1997. Berger's spokesman, David Leavy, declined to say when Clinton first learned about Lee's activities....Twogood told the FBI that the information Peter Lee provided the Chinese in 1997 was "classified and sensitive," court records show. The radar program seeks to detect the physical traces, briefly left as signatures on water surfaces, of the undersea motions of submarines. Remote sensing devices located, for example, on an airplane pick up the traces. "The Navy has invested a lot in this area for 20 years and so by definition that implies it's important," said Twogood, currently the deputy associate director for electronic engineering at Lawrence Livermore. The Soviet Union worked hard to develop this technology during the Cold War. Recent American advances suggested that Soviet assertions of success in anti-submarine measures should be taken more seriously, Twogood told Congress in 1994......
New York Times 5/10/99 JEFF GERTH and JAMES RISEN - "...In January 1985, Lee met with top Chinese nuclear scientists, where he twice divulged secrets about his laser work and "discussed problems the United States was having in its nuclear weapons testing simulation program," according to court records. Lee had traveled to China with a group of scientists at the invitation of a Chinese visitor to his laboratory. Lee was supposed to act as a translator for the American delegation, according to the 1998 report on threats to the Department of Energy. Lee later told the bureau that on or about Jan. 9, 1985, in a Beijing hotel room, a Chinese nuclear-weapons scientist asked for Lee's help, saying that China was a "poor country." Lee told the FBI, according to court records, that he decided to help because he wanted to bring China's scientific capabilities "closer to the United States." The Chinese scientist drew a diagram and asked Lee questions about his laser research, according to court records filed in connection with his sentencing. Lee said he responded with detailed answers. The next day, Lee was picked up at his hotel and driven to another hotel to meet a group of Chinese scientists. He answered their questions for two hours, drawing diagrams and providing specific mathematical and experimental results related to laser fusion research. The laser fusion research that he gave to the Chinese was declassified by Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary in 1993, prompting several of Lee's former colleagues to recommend a lenient sentence to the sentencing judge...."
World Tribune.com 5/10/99 Middle East News Line "...The Clinton administration has acknowledged that despite Beijing's pledges Chinese companies are still helping Iran's intermediate ballistic missile program. The administration -- responding to a congressional report by Senator Richard Shelby, an Alabama Republican, about Chinese proliferation -- said China continues to help Iran's nuclear program. "We are concerned, in many respects, about certain Chinese entities that may provide technology - especially to Iran and Pakistan," State Department spokesman James Rubin on Friday, "and we have made those concerns made to the Chinese leadership at the highest levels, including most recently in Premier Zhu's visit. We will continue to work with China to bring its policies and practices more and more in line with international norms.".....Rubin also acknowledged U.S. concerns that despite its commitments Beijing is transferring missile technology to North Korea. "We do have concerns that they are seeking certain technology -- materials called "specialty steel" that can be used in their missile program," he said. "We have heard reports to that effect. We're concerned by those reports. We've raised this issue directly with the Chinese and we're going to be following it very closely." Chaired by Shelby, the Senate Intelligence Committee report said Clinton administration officials and certain U.S. aerospace companies joined to allow unlicensed and unauthorized transfers of U.S. technology to China. "We left the door open for the PRC to abscond with a lot of our most advanced space technologies, and we may never know the full extent of what they got," Shelby said on Friday. "All of you probably realize that the PRC [People's Republic of China] is one of the world's worst proliferators of missiles and missile technology to potential U.S. adversaries and to other unstable parts of the world. The committee found that these missiles may now benefit from U.S. technology."..."
NewsMax.com 5/9/99 "....NewsMax.com's executive editor Chris Ruddy was the first to uncover a possible connection between lax security at our weapons labs and policy changes implemented through O'Leary. In his March 11, 1999 report, "Scientist: Clinton Administration Gave China Top Nuclear Secrets", Ruddy revealed: "China's efforts culminated with a delegation of Chinese scientists who visited (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) in the winter of 1994, and another visit by Department of Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary at about the same time." Ruddy's source, a Livermore whistleblower, contended that, "the Clinton administration has, in fact, aggressively sought to provide China with some of the most closely guarded nuclear weapons technology." At Livermore, this scientist said, "the administration had facilitated the transfer of laser technology employed in the process of making nuclear weapons-grade plutonium." After O'Leary's 1994 meeting at the California lab, "the scientist recalled several Livermore scientists in a heated debate over whether 'this type of information (relating to the weapons enriching laser process) should be considered for technology transfer' to China." "The deal with China for the technology transfer was consumated, the scientist said, sometime later that year after O'Leary's visit, when top DOE officials, Department of Commerce officials representing Ron Brown, White House representatives and Chinese government officials met in a guarded room at the Pleasanton Hilton nearby to Livermore." ...."
National Post 3/13/99 David Frum "…By striving to avoid all conflict with China, the Clinton administration is in danger of triggering a new Cold War with China. Weakness, as usual, is bringing on the strife that strength would have deterred…. Last week, The New York Times gave front-page coverage to a story that had been gathering steam since January:… This act of espionage and treason was exposed at a very fraught moment in U.S.-Chinese relations. Congress is spoiling for a tussle with China, for both bad reasons (protectionism) and good (China's arms buildup and increasingly provocative foreign policy)….. The president is desperately compromised by the illegal campaign money he raised from Chinese donors, some of whom have turned out to be linked to the Chinese government and military. And the secretary of state is the weakest since Jimmy Carter's pitiful Cyrus Vance, despite her repeated declarations of how tough she is. Because the foreign policy team is so tainted, every decision it makes is tainted too. The Chinese espionage at Los Alamos happened 10 years ago. It was discovered in 1996. The administration covered up the spying for two years, did not retaliate against China -- it even kept the alleged spy on the Los Alamos payroll….What makes the administration's handling of the Los Alamos treachery particularly politically deadly is that it follows another cavalier Clinton national security decision: the permission Mr. Clinton granted to U.S. aerospace companies in 1993 to sell to China technology for launching satellites more accurately. This same technology can be used to improve the accuracy of nuclear missiles, and that is just what the Chinese did. The Clinton administration tried to hush that scandal up too, just as it tried to hush up the theft of the warhead secrets. What Congress and the press now see is an administration that has aided China to build a nuclear missile force that can threaten U.S. cities; that has failed to guard U.S. secrets; that fails to punish anti-American espionage; that has let U.S. military strength in the Pacific slip; that blusters and threatens but never actually does anything; and that at the same time was accepting large, illegal cash gifts to the president's re-election campaign from the Chinese. In other words, what we have here is the makings of a foreign-policy explosion…."
The State (Columbia, SC) 5/11/99 WILLIAM SAFIRE "...I called three friends in the departments of Energy, Defense and Justice and asked them to turn on their office computers and read to me the first banner that came on their screens. "Anyone using this system expressly consents to monitoring" is the message. Government employees using government equipment on government time thus waive privacy claims. Wen Ho Lee, the scientist who downloaded millions of lines of the nation's most secret codes to a computer easy to penetrate, also signed a waiver consenting to a search of his computer without his knowledge. And yet the Reno Justice Department denied the FBI's request for permission to search Lee's government computer. Eric Holder, Janet Reno's deputy, decided that a court search warrant was necessary -- but then refused to apply to the special foreign-surveillance court to get it. Of more than 700 such FBI requests a year, a surveillance official admits that a flat turndown is extremely rare. Why this one? Ms. Reno, who never met an investigation of Chinese penetration she didn't try to undermine, is suckering us with a claim that the denial of surveillance was to protect a criminal investigation. That is foo-foo dust. This was counterespionage, and the Criminal Division was kept in the dark...."
The State (Columbia, SC) 5/11/99 WILLIAM SAFIRE "...Making C.D. the scapegoat for the failure to protect America's deepest nuclear secrets is typical of the Clinton-Reno refusal to accept responsibility for endangering national security. Reno has appointed her personal Whitewash Brigade of favorite roundheels. This enables her to rebuff Congress and the press for months with the usual "I cannot comment because an inquiry is ongoing." Her non-investigation of this Lee, following last year's oh-so-gentle prosecution of another Lee for espionage, is part of a pattern of averting exposure of Clinton's national-security laxity. .....With Clintonites hunkered down and Justice covering up, Congress must do the digging. A report by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control showed what Chinese arms enterprises received U.S. technology over the past decade -- but could supply no names of U.S. exporters during the Clinton years. That's because that embarrassment is "proprietary information" at the Commerce Department...."