DOWNSIDE LEGACY AT TWO DEGREES OF PRESIDENT CLINTON
SECTION: BEHIND THE TREASON ALLEGATIONS
SUBSECTION: WILLIAM PERRY
China could not target missiles to the US. It was illegal to export satellites to China. SCM Brooks Telecommunications entered into a joint venture with Galaxy New Technology, a Chinese company controlled by the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND), an agency of the Chinese military". In spite of the Chinese military ownership, Galaxy still qualified as a "commercial" operation, according to the Commerce Department. Therefore, no Government approval required for export after executive changes in April, 1994.
While in Beijing, Secretary of Defense William Perry announced that the People's Republic of China had agreed to cut back on underground nuclear testing. Afterwards, Clinton lifted the ban on exporting U.S.-made supercomputers to communist China.
U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry sat down with his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Ding Henggao of the People's Liberation Army. Together, Perry and Ding hammered out a series of agreements for U.S. technology transfers to China which were approved by President Clinton. In 1994, Ding served not only as a three-star general in the Chinese Army but also as director of China's Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense or "COSTIND." COSTIND owns Wang Jun's company Poly Technologies Corp. Poly Technologies also is backed by the Lippo Group and Bill Clinton's Indonesian billionaire friends -- the Riadys.
Defense Secretary William Perry signed an agreement with COSTIND chairman Lieutenant General Ding Henggao to provide for technology transfers from the U.S. to Beijing under the "U.S.-China Defense Conversion Commission."
July 10, 1996
As Defense Secretary William Perry came under bipartisan attack for security lapses leading up to the Saudi Arabian bombing, President Bill Clinton said Perry was being "treated unfairly" by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Washington Times 3/16/99 Frank Gaffney, Jr. "…Clinton policies, practices and personnel that will, if uncorrected, give rise to a far more ominous problem for this country emanating from the People's Republic of China in the 21st century…* And William Perry, Mr. Clinton's second defense secretary who is currently serving as his special envoy for Asia. Numerous investigative reports (particularly powerful ones have been published by Kenneth Timmerman in the American Spectator and Charles Smith via the e-publication WorldNetDaily. com) have revealed that Mr. Perry has had long and troubling ties to China, including during his service in the Pentagon's top job, which have contributed to the transfer of militarily relevant telecommunications technology to the PLA…."
World Net Daily 3/9/99 Charles Smith "…Saddam Hussein and General Ding Henggao can thank Perry and Hambrecht. China did not have the technology nor the money to field advanced missile command networks. William Perry supplied the technology and William Hambrecht supplied the money. Today, the Chinese Army re-exports U.S. technology directly to the sworn enemy of America and profits from it…. COSTIND General Ding and his wife, Madam-General Nie, also made money on the Hua Mei project. There were profits enough to share. Perry, Lewis and even Mr. Hambrecht all made money on the Hua Mei export….The exported "civilian" technology now threatens the lives of Americans in the skies of Iraq and every nation around the globe. The secure line that now carries orders from Chinese generals to thermonuclear tipped missiles started with a pay-off to American officials. The direct line from pay-off, to export, to weapon of war goes through William Perry and his millionaire buddy, William Hambrecht…."
Softwar 3/10/99 Charles Smith "…General Ding Henggao has retired. The COSTIND commander made famous by his successful penetration of the Clinton White House has decided to hang up his spurs. He and the wife, General Nie Li, made a tidy profit working the "Hua Mei" espionage campaign against William Perry and the Clinton administration. No word on which General, Ding or Nie, will command the finances in their joint retirement….Four of the current COSTIND Deputy Directors served with General Ding, and two worked successful espionage operations against the Clinton administration. The four sub-Directors of COSTIND are Lt. General Shen Rougjun, Lt. General Xie Guang, Lt. General Huai Guomo and Lt. General Shen Chunnian… COSTIND Lt. General Shen met with Ron Brown and CEO of Loral Bernard Schwartz in 1994. General Shen's son, Shen Jun, was also the lead engineer for satellite software at Hughes. COSTIND Lt. General Huai Guomo worked with William Perry and "defector" Hua Di to export the advanced "Hua Mei" AT&T fiber optic communication system to China. AT&T sold the fiber optic system directly to the Chinese Army General Logistics Division (GLD) better known as the PLA Quartermaster Corps…"
New York Times Jeff Gerth 10/19/98 ".The Pentagon was traditionally the strongest voice against technology exports, and Clinton made several appointments calculated to change the culture. William J. Perry, an executive at a Silicon Valley company who was vocally opposed to the existing system of export controls, was named Deputy Defense Secretary and then Defense Secretary. John M. Deutch, a professor with similar views, was named to a senior post at the Pentagon, and then became Director of Central Intelligence. ."One reason I ran for President was to tailor export controls to the realization of a post-cold war world," Clinton wrote.. According to a 1995 estimate, more than $1.9 billion in annual trade with China had been removed from Federal scrutiny. A ban remains in effect on the sale to China of the most militarily potent technologies, like ballistic missiles, spy satellites and advanced fighter aircraft. Beijing buys those weapons from Russia, Europe and Israel. "China has benefited more than any other country from U.S. decontrols on certain dual-use commodities enacted in late 1993 and early 1994," one Commerce Department document says. "There has been a 60 percent decrease in the number of individual export licenses required for trade with China (from 2,229 in 1993 to only 925 in 1994)." The rules shifted much of the burden for controlling exports to the companies making the deals..By 1995, the Pentagon was urging Congress to look more closely at export policy. Military officials noted that the effect of technology was cumulative, and that while individual sales might appear benign, a combination of cutting-edge acquisitions would allow an adversary to build much better bombs or radars. President Clinton, documents show, was moving in the opposite direction.."
Softwar 9/1/98 Charles Smith ".Anewly released document obtained from the Defense Department, using the Freedom of Information act, shows that DoD joined the White House in a coordinated defense of the export to China. The document, a 1996 response letter from the deputy secretary of Defense to National Security Committee Chairman Floyd Spence, R-SC, also provides a detailed view of the Chinese military C4 (Command, Communications, Computers and Control) system. In 1994 SCM/Brooks Communications purchased large quantities of secure communications gear for sale to a so called "civilian" Chinese firm, New Galaxy Technology, including real time, encrypted, fiber-optic video systems. AT&T officials who sold most of the equipment to SCM/Brooks were adamant that there was no need to check the Chinese firm, New Galaxy, since it was obviously led by a civilian, Ms. Nie Lie. However, Nie Lie was the wife of Chinese Army General Ding Henggao. In 1994, General Ding Henggao was director of the Chinese Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense or COSTIND. COSTIND, according to the GAO "oversees development of China's weapon systems and is responsible for identifying and acquiring telecommunications technology applicable for military use." One member of New Galaxy management, according to the Defense document, was Director and President "Mr. Deng Changru." Yet, Mr. Deng Changru was then also Lt. Colonel Deng Changru of the People's Liberation Army, head of the PLA Communications corps. Another Chinese Army officer in the New Galaxy staff is co-General Manager "Mr. Xie Zhichao" who is really Lt. Colonel Xie Zhichao, Director of the COSTIND Electronics Design Bureau. In 1994, despite the red stars and green uniforms, New Galaxy was certified as a civilian company by the Brown-led Commerce Department. New Commerce Department export regulations did not require a pre-sale check on end use with civilian companies. So the deal was completed and the People's Liberation Army obtained an encrypted C4 system from America. And where was the U.S. military watchdog on this? According to the Deputy of Defense, the export was of no concern because "the PLA already has its own, extensive and very modern communications infrastructure that incorporates very advanced technologies, including fiber optic systems and a nation-wide microwave system". Again, what the Clinton DoD left out is that the German built fiber optic system sold to China never worked and was abandoned in 1994."
New York Times 3/15/99 David Sanger Erik Eckholm "…. "With or without the W-88 warheads, China today is able to threaten the United States," William J. Perry, the former defense secretary, said last week in Washington, just after returning from a visit to China where he spent time with military leaders and China's president, Jiang Zemin. "You have to anticipate that ability will improve in coming years. They will evolve into a more global force. The challenge is how do we manage that?" …"
Wall Street Journal 2/17/99 Freeper Stand Watch Listen ".Former Defense Secretary William Perry, brought back into saddle to come up with a solution to the long-neglected North Korea problem, is supposed to make his report soon to the Administration. There aren't many simple answers, but one that ought to be easy is missile defense. Japan wants it. South Korea wants it. Taiwan wants it. And they all want it fast..Of course, any system that could stop a North Korean missile could stop a Chinese one too, and therein lies the rub for Beijing. Last week it issued its sternest warning yet about a regional anti- missile system, most particularly one that includes protection for Taiwan.. Taiwan for its part has just announced that Beijing recently increased by 100 the number of missiles aimed at the island. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. is pledged to defend Taiwan, but the Clinton Administration already is hemming and hawing about whether Taiwan would fall under the American missile defense umbrella. Depends on the meaning of "defend," no doubt. In the meantime, the Administration is also hemming and hawing about a national missile defense, which it claimed last month it now supports after years of saying that any threat of ballistic missile attack was way off in the future. Though it hasn't been brought to the attention of most Americans, the North Korean missiles that Seoul and Tokyo are so worried about can reach Alaska, Hawaii and maybe other parts of the U.S..The latest sign that there's no real interest here is the Administration's opposition to a bipartisan bill that should come before the Senate shortly. This is the third try for the bill, whose main sponsors are Republican Thad Cochran and Democrat Daniel Inouye. This time it has an excellent chance of passing. The co-sponsors include three more Democrats (Senators Akaka, Hollings and Lieberman), and other Democrats have indicated they might vote yes. The unanimous conclusions of the bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission, which last summer warned that the threat of ballistic missile attack is imminent, apparently are sinking in...President Clinton has said he won't make a decision on whether to deploy a national missile defense until the year 2000. In other words, he doesn't want to talk about it.."
North Korean News 12/18/98 ".Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Perry, in the capacity of a coordinator for "North Korea" policy, reportedly debated on a "proposal of cooperation" with somebody and is about to arrange it in detail with reference to the DPRK's "underground nuclear facility" and launch of a satellite, says Rodong Sinmun in a commentary today. Criticising the U.S. imperialist hawks' outcry for "cooperation" and "proposal of cooperation," insisting on "inspection of underground nuclear facility" and countermeasure against "missile threat" as a military provocation against the DPRK and a far-fetched manner aimed at unleashing a war against the DPRK, the news analyst continues: The Korean people will never tolerate any attempt to tarnish the dignity of the DPRK and encroach upon its sovereignty. If the U.S. hawkish elements continue to screw up the tension under such unjustifiable pretext, war will be inevitable on the Korean peninsula.."
AP 3/8/99 "…Five Republican House leaders appealed to former Defense Secretary William Perry, the Clinton administration's point man on North Korea, to recommend a tougher U.S. policy toward North Korea. "North Korea's nuclear ambitions, chemical-biological capability and its burgeoning missile capability present a clear and present danger to the security of the United States,'' the lawmakers wrote to Perry in a letter released on Monday. Signing the letter were House International Committee Chairman Benjamin Gilman, R-N.Y., Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, R-Ill.; House Majority Leader Dick Armey, R-Texas; Rep. Christopher Cox, R-Calif., chairman of the House Policy Committee; and Rep. Joe Knollenberg, R-Mich., a member of the House Appropriations Committee. They urged an overhaul in policy "from the ground floor up.'' …"
AP 3/9/99 Sang-Hun Choe "…U.S. officials will adopt South Korea's policy of greater engagement with North Korea and expand current talks beyond just weapons issues, Washington's point man on North Korea said Tuesday. William Perry, a former defense secretary, agreed to the new approach after meeting with President Kim Dae-jung and other top officials to discuss policy recommendations for President Clinton. "Both sides agreed that a comprehensive approach was needed to address those problems caused by North Korea's nuclear and missile programs,'' Perry and Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young said in a statement. "Such an approach would build upon (South Korea's) policy of engagement with North Korea.'' …"
Softwar Website 12/7/98 Charles Smith ".Neither big hearted Bill Clinton nor Al Bore have made a single comment on the arrest of defector Hua Di by communist China. Hua Di defected to America and became close friends with Clinton buddies, Stanford Professor John Lewis and former DoD Secretary William Perry. Hua's Clinton friends, in turn, enabled him and his Communist buddy, Lt. General Huai Guomo, to purchase a secure, nuclear hardened, fiber optic communication system for the People's Army. Hua returned to the homeland in January, 1998, under a PLA promise that all was forgiven. Hua has reportedly been charged with passing Chinese State secrets to America and now faces the death penalty. Hua's Stanford friends have appealed to Beijing to release him but the White House remains silent, hoping Beijing WON'T release the so- called "dissident". U.S. intelligence officials are concerned because of Hua's successful penetration of the White House for the fiber optic system export. Intell insiders are giving even money that Hua Di was another spy for Chinese mastermind General Ding. Hua's PLA friend, Lt. General Huai Guomo, who set up the fiber optic deal with the Chinese Army, also works for General Ding at the Chinese Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)."
Wall Street Journal 3/23/99 Nicholas Eberstadt "…The latest sorry twist in the Clinton administration's policy toward North Korea has brought us to an extraordinary pass--one where the North Koreans are describing the deliberations between the two states more honestly than the Americans are. This remarkable threshold was crossed last week, when a State Department spokesman denied that food aid is being given to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in return for permission to inspect a facility suspected of being built to develop nuclear weapons. A North Korean counterpart expressed a different view: "There was sufficient debate on and agreement on the payment of the 'inspection fee.' The U.S., though belatedly . . . decided to adopt politico-economic measures as demanded by the D.P.R.K." The South Korean government, which was kept closely abreast of the negotiations, confirmed the North Korean line…So why the obfuscation? The answer, quite simply, is that the Clinton administration cannot bear to acknowledge that its approach to Pyongyang is, in fact, a policy of appeasement…. Like the 1994 Agreed Framework, which was supposed to freeze the North Korean nuclear weapons program, the Kumchang-ri deal implicitly presumes that it is possible to bribe a troublesome power into permanently desisting from a particular unpleasant behavior through a fixed, predetermined compensation….. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry has indicated that he will present Congress with his report on North Korea policy next month…"
Reuters 3/22/99 Sarah Davison Freeper Jolly "…Former U.S. defence secretary William Perry warned on Monday that growing anti-China rhetoric in Washington posed one of the greatest risks to security in the Asia Pacific…"
William Norman Grigg 7/6/99 "…In the wake of Chung's damaging disclosures, State Department spokesman James Rubin insisted that "no controlled information" regarding missile technology "has been authorized to be made available to Chinese authorities." In this fashion Rubin decanted a sophisticated falsehood worthy of Bill Clinton himself: Loral's technology transfers were unauthorized at the time they were made, but essentially authorized after the fact by Bill Clinton's February 1998 waiver. The waiver was issued despite the State Department warnings to the National Security Council that Loral's actions were "criminal, likely to be indicted, knowing and unlawful." Rubin also protested that "the whole underlying suggestion that somehow we want to transfer technology to the Chinese ... is simply fatuous." Perhaps Rubin has not been informed that in late 1994, the Clinton Administration entered into an agreement with Red China's Commission on Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) for the specific purpose of facilitating technology transfers to Red China. As reported in these pages more than a year ago (see "Honoring the Butcher of Beijing" in our January 20, 1997 issue), in October 1994 then-Defense Secretary William Perry signed an unprecedented agreement with COSTIND chairman Lieutenant General Ding Henggao to provide for technology transfers from the U.S. to Beijing under the rubric of the "U.S.-China Defense Conversion Commission." While the putative purpose of that Commission was to assist the Chinese in adapting military technologies for civilian use, Beijing, not surprisingly, has a different perspective, and General Ding has expatiated upon that perspective quite capably. In the Summer 1994 issue of Chinese Military Science, General Ding declared: "Defense and commercial products are becoming more and more compatible. While we emphasize the conversion of defense technology into commercial use, we must study defense-commercial dual-purpose technology and possible transfers from commercial technology to defense use." The drive for "socialist modernization" means acquiring new high-tech capabilities for the Chinese military, noted Ding: "Defense science, technology, and industry are the major material bases on which we can realize our army modernization.... "
William Norman Grigg 7/6/99 "…However, former Defense Secretary Perry's background was surprisingly similar in some respects [to Bernard Schwartz] As Kenneth Timmerman reported in the April 1996 issue of The American Spectator, before becoming Secretary of Defense, Perry had a long-standing relationship with General Ding Henggao, chairman of COSTIND. Perry's friendship with Ding was apparently struck during trips he had made to China that were sponsored by Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control. "General Ding is China's top weapons scientist, and he commands China's best spies," observed Timmerman. Thus, it is at best peculiar that Perry, the Cabinet-level steward of America's national defense, joined with Ding to create the U.S.-China Defense Conversion Commission in October 1994, which would help the Red Chinese acquire defense-related technologies and expertise. "Perry's coziness with the Chinese military" was frequently criticized during his tenure as Defense Secretary, observed Timmerman. "Taking advantage of the summer congressional recess, Perry arranged a discreet visit to the Pentagon's war room for General Xu Huizi, the same general who ordered the crackdown against pro-democracy students in Tiananmen Square in 1989." Perry also played host to General Chi Hoatian, the Red Chinese defense minister, in December 1996. Chi was the field commander who ordered the tanks to roll at Tiananmen. In remarks made at the honor cordon outside the Pentagon at the beginning of the general's visit, Perry referred to the unrepentant mass murderer as "my colleague, General Chi." It is perversely appropriate that this outrage took place at almost exactly the same time that Bill Clinton was considering the appointment of Bernard Schwartz to be Perry's replacement. Few have been more collegial than Schwartz in their relationships with Red China's murderous elite, and the hand-off from Perry to Schwartz would have gone off without a hitch…."
World Net Daily 3/11/99 Joseph Farah "…Even while serving as secretary of Defense, William Perry was deeply involved in business relationships that presented the most obvious conflicts of interest in our China policies. In 1994, Smith reveals, William Hambrecht, a major donor to the Clinton campaign and principal in the San Francisco investment firm of Hambrecht & Quist, profited directly from advanced military technology sales to the Chinese army. At the very same time, Hambrecht employed then-Defense Secretary Perry as an executive vice president and founder of H&Q Technology Partners. Interestingly, this double-agent Perry is, as we speak, in Taiwan trying to smooth things over as Beijing once again threatens to nuke or otherwise attack the island at some future date…."
http://www.investors.com 4/15/99 Brian Mitchell "...China has committed military and commercial espionage against the U.S. and poses an expansionistic threat to Taiwan and other neighbors. Yet the administration welcomed China's Prime Minister Zhu Rongji to Washington and still wants China to join the WTO.....''None of these former secretaries of state can truly say they're speaking as elder statesmen in the national interest, because they're on Beijing's payroll, directly or indirectly,'' said the senior Reagan administration official. Analysts find the dealings of former Defense Secretary William Perry even more troubling. Perry's ties to China date from his days in the Carter Pentagon. Later, in Clinton's Pentagon, he presided over the dismantling of controls on the transfer of sensitive military technology to China. ''He was man who invented the game. It wasn't happening before Perry, and he is single-handedly responsible for what's going on, after Clinton,'' said Ken Timmerman, director of the Middle East Data Project, who has written several articles on China's acquisition of military technology. Perry is now Clinton's special envoy to North Korea. He is also on the board of both United Technologies and Boeing Corp. Boeing's airplane sales to China now total $18.5 billion. Perry's close friend and colleague, Stanford University international studies Professor John Wilson Lewis, has partnered with a subsidiary of the People's Liberation Army to sell sophisticated telecom equipment to China. Timmerman says Perry helped Lewis get Pentagon permission for the sale. Perry continues to warn publicly that suspicion and criticism of China will hurt U.S.-China relations. ''I would like to see a moderation of the rhetoric that persists in referring to China as an enemy,'' he said recently in Hong Kong. ''If we treat China as an enemy, it will surely become one.'' ..."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...I have been investigating Chinese high-tech espionage activities in the United States since 1993, and discovered early on just how sensitive a subject this can be. As a congressional staffer working for California Democrat Tom Lantos, I requested licensing records of U.S. high-tech exports to China from the Department of Commerce. When Commerce finally delivered the several- thousand-page print-out to the Rayburn House Office building in late March 1993, I was prevented for three weeks from even looking it over, despite the fact that the information was not classified. ...They did not want the story to leak out of just how much dual- use technology U.S. companies had been allowed to sell to the Chinese military, for fear that would impede the U.S.-China high-tech pipeline. Unbeknownst to most people at the time was a plan devised by top Clinton administration appointees to lift export controls on a wide range of strategic technologies. The plan was first laid out in a 1992 National Academy of Sciences study authored by William Perry, Ashton Carter, and Mitchel Wallerstein, who all went on to top Pentagon jobs under Clinton. Calling export controls a "wasting asset," they argued that for U.S. high- tech firms to maintain a technological edge over their foreign competitors they needed to be allowed to export ever-more sophisticated equipment, so they could plow those profits into developing new technologies..... After the election, William Perry became deputy secretary of defense and went to work putting the plan into action within the bureaucracy. Ron Brown, as secretary of commerce, was tasked with selling the decontrols to corporate America and Congress as part of an administration-wide "Trade Promotion" package, aimed at creating jobs and "growing" U.S. exports. On September 30, 1993, Brown issued a landmark report, "Toward a National Export Strategy," which first made the argument--oft-repeated until the Loral-Hughes satellite scandals erupted last year--that each additional $1 billion in U.S. exports creates 20,000 jobs in the U.S..... In 1993 and 1994 the administration tried to rewrite the EAA to eliminate most controls, but Congress balked; so they simply made an end run around the law, and dismantled the controls through executive branch regulations. The administration's efforts reduced the voluminous licensing lists I had once received, and Defense Department officials now complain there are no more records of what has been shipped to the Chinese military--and thus no way to gauge the damage to U.S. national security. Like small-time hoods dreaming of the perfect crime, Clinton's "best and brightest" thought they had covered up all traces of their acts...."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...When I exposed the efforts of Defense Secretary William Perry to help the Chinese buy highly sensitive U.S. telecommunications gear over the objections of the National Security Agency ("Peking Pentagon," April 1996), Perry threatened to sue this magazine for defamation. Instead, he called prominent conservatives to his office in an attempt to organize a counter-attack against me. Meanwhile, I learned, photocopies of my article were being passed around gleefully behind Perry's back. ..."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...The U.S.-Sino defense exchange program was dreamed up by William Perry following the Taiwan Strait crisis in February 1996, as a means of increasing the comfort level of the Chinese (who had been made decidedly uncomfortable when two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups steamed off the Chinese coast as a warning to Peking to cease its intimidating missile strikes during the Taiwanese presidential election campaign). TAS has obtained a copy of this year's exchange program "gameplan." ..."
The American Spectator 5/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...Supercomputers are only one element in a deadly mix of high technologies released for sale to the Chinese by the Clinton administration since 1993. An internal memorandum written by Michael Maloof of the Pentagon's Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA), subpoenaed by the Cox committee, paints an astonishing picture of the cumulative impact of U.S. technology transfer to the Chinese military over the past five years. The combination of supercomputers, satellite sales, and advanced telecommunications switching technology since 1994 "have provided the Chinese military with a nationwide encrypted command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) network that will serve it well into the next century," Maloof warned his superiors. "Together, they provide the PLA with a communications infrastructure that it could not have developed on its own." Extensive manufacturing technologies were decontrolled along with the actual products U.S. companies were allowed to ship to China. Since 1993, the PLA has been importing massive amounts of equipment to manufacture fiber- optics cable, which allows for secure communications links impervious to electronic eavesdropping. And companies tied to former colleagues of then- Deputy Defense Secretary William Perry led the way in transferring encrypted Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) telephone switching equipment, now used by the PLA for its military communications network. "The decision to allow... ATM switching technology in 1994 occurred over the objection of DoD technical experts," Maloof wrote. "Despite initial NSA concerns, it was silent when the decision finally occurred." As I wrote in "Peking Pentagon" in April 1996, it appeared that William Perry personally intervened to get NSA to drop their objections to the sale of this technology, despite the fact that the Chinese buyer was a PLA-owned company....."
Softwar.com 4/27/99 Softwar.com (Charles Smith) "...In 1994, Chinese General Ding Henggao announced a new project to modernize the People's Liberation Army. In 1994 General Ding Henggao was the head of COSTIND (Chinese Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense). General Ding introduced the world to the red Army "16 Characters Slogan" or "military production first" project. The General's new project showcased a joint U.S./Chinese commission, co-chaired by Ding and U.S. Defense Secretary Dr. William Perry. According to an article published in Aviation Week and Space Technology, a Pentagon spokesman stated the Commission was "not going to be selling arms to China" (AW&ST page 62, March 21, 1994). ...According to documents forced from the Clinton administration in Federal Court, Perry had just returned from an October 1994 trip to Beijing. In October, 1994, Perry promised PLA General Ding a "Cray supercomputer to be used by the Chinese nuclear weapons establishment to help design newer and safer nukes." In addition, according to the Commerce Dept. documents, PLA Generals openly discussed with the Clinton officials a wide array of military technology including the main functions of the Army unit COSTIND, "1) Aerospace, 2) Aviation, 3) Electronics, 4) Ground Force Military Equipment, 5) Shipbuilding,[and] 6) Nuclear". .."
Softwar.com 4/27/99 Softwar.com (Charles Smith) "...PLA General Ding Henggao led a delegation of Chinese Army officers to Washington, D.C. in November, 1994. The mission to Washington included a closed meeting at the U.S. Commerce Dept. with Defense Secretary William Perry. Ding, of course, was not alone on his visit to Washington, D.C. The meeting at Commerce included some of the highest ranking PLA officers to travel outside of China. General Ding brought his trusted aide, and second in Command at COSTIND, Lt. General Huai Guomo. In addition, Ding brought Maj. General Fu Jiaping, and Maj. General Chen Kaizeng. Ding even brought one of the top spies in the Chinese Army, Major General Hou Gang, Deputy Director of the Intelligence Department of the PLA General Staff Headquarters. Nor was Perry alone on the American side at the D.C. Commerce Dept. meeting. The official U.S. government delegation included several familiar Pentagon faces such as Ken Bacon, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, and Major General David Mcilvoy from the office of the Joint-Chiefs of Staff. The meeting also included Commerce Deputy Undersecretary Barry Carter, Dr. Eden Wong from the office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant for White House Affairs, Margaret Sullivan. In addition, Perry was also assisted by his trusted friend, Dr. John Lewis. Perry appointed Lewis to the Defense Policy Board. Lewis, however, is listed at the 1994 PLA meeting as "Stanford University, Civilian Consultant to SECDEF." According to the Commerce documents, Dr. Lewis was a paid consultant for the Dept. of Defense and a "consultant" to Dr. William Perry. Ironically, PLA General Ding, PLA General Huai, Secretary Perry and Dr. Lewis also shared a joint business deal. In fact, their "joint" business sold advanced, secure, communications equipment to the Chinese Army.
Softwar.com 4/27/99 Softwar.com (Charles Smith) "...In 1994, Dr. Lewis, Dr. Perry and General Ding helped form a U.S./China joint venture called Galaxy New Technology that included the U.S. company SCM/Brooks Telecommunications. This venture led to the direct export of advanced, secure, fiber-optic communications systems to a Chinese Army unit. A 1996 report from the Department of Defense shows that Dr. Lewis was being paid three times for the same meeting in 1994. First, Lewis was paid by the Chinese Army as a member of the Galaxy New Technology project. Second, Lewis was paid by the Pentagon for serving on the U.S. Defense Policy Board. Finally, Lewis was paid by Secretary Perry as his personal defense contractor.....According to these documents, in 1994, Defense Secretary Perry personally pushed for the Galaxy New Technology deal and personally lobbyied against NSA objections. Perry hired one of the two key "matchmakers" of the Galaxy New Technology deal, Professor John Lewis from Stanford as his personal contractor. Perry brought Lewis to the meeting with General Ding and Lt. General Huai.
The Chinese connection to the Galaxy New Technology venture was a defector also working at Stanford. "Defector" Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials. Hua studied missile engineering in Russia and worked inside China's missile program for 24 years. In 1989, Hua fled China after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on student democracy demonstrators. In America, Hua went to work as a researcher at Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control. The Center's co-directors were William Perry and John Lewis. In 1992, Chinese Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) Lt. General Huai Guomo contacted Hua Di to start a joint venture called Galaxy New Technology. The very same Lt. General Huai who attended the November 1994 meeting with PLA General Ding, Defense Secretary Perry and Dr. Lewis. "Lewis and I were matchmakers," recalled Hua about Galaxy New Technology in 1996. "(General) Huai is my good friend." .....In late October 1998, it was announced that Hua Di had returned to China. Hua Di met with Chinese security officials in late 1997 and was assured that he would not be prosecuted. On December 31, 1997 Hua returned to China. On Jan. 6, 1998, Hua was arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials. Stanford officials and Hua's business partner, John Lewis, have written to the Chinese government appealing for Hua's release. The Clinton administration, Dr. Perry and the mainstream press remain strangely silent about imprisoned defector Hua Di. Hua Di passed false missile information to the west, obtained secure communications for the Chinese Army and penetrated into the Clinton White House through the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Hua Di served his party, and comrade General Ding. In the end, Hua arranged for his two employers, General Ding and William Perry, to profit in a deal to harden and secure Chinese military communications. Hua Di returned home to a hero's welcome and a fat bank account made on profits from the Galaxy New Technology deal. Hua Di was no fool - nor was he a dissident. Hua Di was a spy. One of many in a network of spies run by Chinese mastermind General Ding. In a single stroke, Dr. Perry and the Clinton administration sold Ding far more than his spies could ever steal in a decade of espionage. In the process, the Marxist General Ding and his American partners, Perry and Lewis included, also made a tidy profit...."
The Chinese connection to the Galaxy New Technology venture was a defector also working at Stanford. "Defector" Hua Di was born into a family of prominent Communist officials. Hua studied missile engineering in Russia and worked inside China's missile program for 24 years. In 1989, Hua fled China after the Tiananmen Square crackdown on student democracy demonstrators. In America, Hua went to work as a researcher at Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control. The Center's co-directors were William Perry and John Lewis. In 1992, Chinese Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) Lt. General Huai Guomo contacted Hua Di to start a joint venture called Galaxy New Technology. The very same Lt. General Huai who attended the November 1994 meeting with PLA General Ding, Defense Secretary Perry and Dr. Lewis. "Lewis and I were matchmakers," recalled Hua about Galaxy New Technology in 1996. "(General) Huai is my good friend." .....In late October 1998, it was announced that Hua Di had returned to China. Hua Di met with Chinese security officials in late 1997 and was assured that he would not be prosecuted. On December 31, 1997 Hua returned to China. On Jan. 6, 1998, Hua was arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials. Stanford officials and Hua's business partner, John Lewis, have written to the Chinese government appealing for Hua's release. The Clinton administration, Dr. Perry and the mainstream press remain strangely silent about imprisoned defector Hua Di. Hua Di passed false missile information to the west, obtained secure communications for the Chinese Army and penetrated into the Clinton White House through the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Hua Di served his party, and comrade General Ding. In the end, Hua arranged for his two employers, General Ding and William Perry, to profit in a deal to harden and secure Chinese military communications. Hua Di returned home to a hero's welcome and a fat bank account made on profits from the Galaxy New Technology deal. Hua Di was no fool - nor was he a dissident. Hua Di was a spy. One of many in a network of spies run by Chinese mastermind General Ding. In a single stroke, Dr. Perry and the Clinton administration sold Ding far more than his spies could ever steal in a decade of espionage. In the process, the Marxist General Ding and his American partners, Perry and Lewis included, also made a tidy profit
WorldNetDaily 5/11/99 Charles R Smith "...A 1997 Commerce e-mail to Frank Deliberti at the Commerce Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) from Robert Bannerman in Beijing states, "This list, called 'China's Defense-Industrial Trading Organizations' published by DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), was posted in several places in the BXA/OEE section I worked in a year ago." "I used the chart to discover that Yuanwang Group," continued Bannerman. "The importer that is alleged to have imported the Sun Computer shipped to the National Defense Technical Institute of China in Changsha was directly under the control of COSTIND. I keep a copy of this chart in my files." The Commerce Department knew computers were being sold directly to the Chinese army. The U.S. Commerce Department acted as a contact point for both the PLA buyers and the American computer manufacturers. The same PLA-owned Yuanwang Corp. that Commerce would push as an official contact in 1995 for peaceful "defense" conversion projects, acquired high-speed Sun computers for the Chinese army in 1997. According to another document from the Commerce Department, Defense Secretary Perry had promised Ding, "a Cray super-computer to be used directly by the Chinese weapons establishment to help design newer and safer nukes."
Stratfor 5/14/99 "...On May 10, 1999, the DOJ attorney representing the Commerce Dept. delivered a motion containing a complete explanation of the materials that are being withheld. In one case, the Commerce Dept. is claiming that "FIVE-pages questions and answers" from the Dept. of Defense must remain classified. "13. Five-page questions and answers regarding Hua Mei - no date Originating agency: Department of Defense (E44-E47). Exemptions: (b)(5). This document is being withheld under (b)(5) because was originated by the Department of Defense as part of the process of deciding how to respond to allegations about an export to China... As there is nothing on the document that indicates it was actually used for public discussions, its release would harm the decision making process by discouraging the full consideration of facts to decision makers." Clearly, the Commerce Dept. did not inspect the SOFTWAR lawsuit submitted in 1998. Not only was this document released to SOFTWAR in full in 1998 - The entire DOD document was provided by this reporter as evidence to the Court in the original lawsuit filed in November, 1998! In fact, the entire Dept. of Defense document has been on the SOFTWAR internet web site since September 1998 and is fully available for public viewing (http://www.softwar.net/dod.html). The evidence consists of a cover letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense dated Jan.29, 1996, FIVE-pages of questions and answers, and a three page attachment. The entire nine (9) page document, including the "FIVE" pages the Commerce Dept. is currently withholding, was returned in response to a FOIA against the Commerce Dept. in 1998..... The Commerce Dept. delivered to the Court an incomplete version of the DOD document, demonstrating they performed an incomplete search. The Commerce Dept. withheld a document that has been previously released, demonstrating that they are unable to perform a proper search. Finally, the Commerce Dept. withheld a document supplied by this reporter as evidence to the Court, demonstrating that they are unable to determine what material should or should not be withheld....."
Koenig's International News 5/18/99 Charles Smith "....According to a 1997 Commerce Dept. report, the Clinton administration gave the Chinese "fine images of rural China and Beijing as well as Siberian port cities, Seoul and Kadena Air Force Base on Okinawa." In 1997, U.S. Commerce Dept. officials at the American Embassy in Beijing wrote that the Chinese obtained satellite images in order to "help demonstrate that Tibet has enough arable land to feed itself.".... Dept. of Commerce documents shows the Chinese "remote Sensing Center" was supplied with "world class remote sensing data acquisition, processing, archive and distribution" equipment. The state-of-the-art satellite equipment was provided by HUGHES Corp. In 1995, the Hughes Corp. CEO was million dollar DNC donor Michael Armstrong. The U.S. space images were obtained from the satellite "remote sensing" station operated by a Chinese Army unit - the Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). In 1995, COSTIND was led by PLA General Ding Henggao. General Ding, a close friend of U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry, led several so-called "commercial" ventures with the Commerce Dept. to obtain advanced U.S. technology for the Chinese Army, including the joint Hughes/PLA remote sensing venture.... Clearly, the war to dominate Earth starts in space...."
Koenig's International News 5/18/99 Charles Smith "The modern space war includes satellites for highly accurate navigation and bombing. For example, the bombs that struck the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade were directed to the target using the GPS (Global Positioning System) satellite navigation system. In 1995, the Clinton administration approved the sale of the very same bombing/navigation technology directly to a company owned by the Chinese Air Force. The sale included a complete manufacturing facility and training for the Chinese workers.
WorldNetDaily 6/1/99 Charles Smith "...While the close working relationship between PLA Gen. Ding, Secretary Brown and Defense Secretary Perry may be missing from the Cox report -- it has not been missed in federal court. In a WorldNetDaily exclusive, this reporter has obtained two previously unreleased letters from Secretary of Defense William Perry. The letters were forced from the U.S. Commerce Department by Federal Judge Robert Payne who ordered them to be released to the public in 1999. One Jan. 31, 1995 letter is addressed to Ron Brown and the other letter is addressed to Gen. Ding Henggao. "Dear Ron," wrote Perry in his 1995 letter to Secretary Brown. "I recently received a letter from General Ding Henggao, the Minister of the Chinese Commission for Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). As you know, General Ding and I head the Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission that was established during my visit to the PRC this past October (1994)." I am most appreciative, Ron," wrote Defense Secretary Perry. "Of the support that the Department of Commerce is providing for this effort. Unlike our defense conversion projects with Russia, Ukraine, and other states in the former Soviet Union, there are no funds earmarked for our activities with China. Hence, we need to rely on already established channels and create informal ones to accomplish the task at hand." Perry's second letter of Jan. 31, 1995 is addressed directly to General Ding Henggao. "Dear General Ding," wrote Perry. "I have asked our Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Ronald Brown, for the support of his Department to ensure U.S. businesses are apprised of the opportunities that have been offered." "As you know, we have been working to develop a plan for air traffic control cooperation that meets the expectations of COSTIND, as well as the People's Liberation Army Air Force," wrote Perry to Gen. Ding. "I am confident that at the second meeting of the Joint Defense Conversion Commission, we will be able to receive reports detailing significant progress in all of our endeavors." In fact, Perry wrote his letter to the Chinese spy-master with the warmest of affections reserved for an old friend. "Best wishes in the coming year," wrote Perry. "And I look forward to our next meeting." The "informal channels" to "fund" the PLA operations required by Perry and the PLA placed Ron Brown in direct contact with Chinese military officers during the last few months of his life. According to the testimony of Brown confidant, Nolinda Hill, the Commerce secretary openly worried that the deals with the PLA were bordering on treason and posed a threat to his life. According to the GAO, the "air traffic control" that meets the expectations of "the People's Liberation Army Air Force" included a Presidential waiver from Bill Clinton. According to a June 1998 report to Congress, the GAO stated that "Waivers were also granted to permit the export of encryption equipment controlled on the Munitions List. One case involved a $4.3 million communications export to China's Air Force." The PLAAF can use the equipment supplied by Clinton's waiver for offensive operations against U.S. forces in Asia. The next PLAAF bombs that fall will do so with great accuracy, due mainly to the efforts of Gen. Ding and his puppets in Washington...."
Investor's Business Daily 6/3/99 Paul Sperry, John Berlau and Scott Wheeler "...In the mid-1990s, an obscure shop within Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico contracted with the U.S. Navy, and possibly the U.S. Air Force, to transfer blueprints and other technical data for arms-related exports onto compact disks for computers, Investor's Business Daily has learned. An IBD exclusive The shop, which is run by Steve K. Hue, was set up in 1995. It was from Los Alamos that China in recent years stole much of America's most vital nuclear-weapons secrets. Pentagon officials fear the lab's CD-ROM operation exposes conventional U.S. forces to wholesale Chinese espionage, which would pose a more immediate threat to national security..... Around that period, Los Alamos officials approached the export controls offices of the Air Force and Navy and made a bid to store on CD-ROM the thousands of license applications they get from defense contractors each year. The applications include hard copies of blueprints and technical specs and manuals for export equipment and technology used in fighter jets and battleships, among other arms. If leaked to China, the data ''could be more devastating than the nuclear stuff, which is less likely to be used,'' a senior Pentagon official said. China, which lacks a blue-water navy and long-range air power, is eager to grab such technology to help it project power in Asia, defense experts agree.....The Navy and Air Force were looking for better ways to store and access the documents as part of Vice President Al Gore's ''Reinventing Government'' goal. Then-Defense Secretary William Perry also encouraged ''outsourcing.'' And Los Alamos, with its state- of-the-art computers and reputation for vault-like secrecy at the time, was a compelling option..... But at the time, the Energy Department, which owns Los Alamos, did not tell the Pentagon - nor the Commerce or State Departments, which also handle licensing of sensitive exports -about the Chinese spying it uncovered at Los Alamos...... But a manager in Hue's group, Jim McDonald, says the Navy hasn't killed the project. It's merely transferring its contract to a private firm in Washington. And Hue is following the project to Washington, the manager says. In other words, Hue isn't really retiring. Nor is the project ''dead.'' The data Hue is handling are so classified that the Navy locks the CD copies it gets from Hue in a safe. Masters are kept at Los Alamos, the Pentagon source says..... The technical specs Hue has scanned include exports OK'd for allies - as well as exports denied. ''Even things we've said 'no' to the British on are in those CD-ROMs,'' the source said. More than two years of Air Force data and more than four years of Navy data are stored on the CDs, he says. ''They (Navy and Air Force) were shipping data to him (Hue) by the box load,'' he said..... ''There's a lot more detail (in the cases) than in anything we lost that's in the Cox report,'' the Pentagon official said. ..... The Pentagon official said he knew about the data storage contract ''for a few years.'' But he didn't think much of it until news broke this year of massive spying at Los Alamos.....Los Alamos' classified archive project with the Navy started around the same time a spy was suspected of stealing data on nuclear weapons technology at the lab. ''(Energy) didn't warn any other agency about the security leaks,'' the source said. So the Navy and Air Force ''walked into a goddamn trap.'' The source called Hue's archiving operation an ''oddball . . . cockeyed little shop in Los Alamos.'' ....In a 1996 letter to President Clinton, former Defense Secretary Perry laid out ''outsourcing'' goals for the department. In it, he also vowed: ''The department will not pursue outsourcing activities that compromise our core war-fighting missions.'' Citing Los Alamos leaks, the Pentagon official worries the CD project might have led to such compromises. ''We need to do a damage assessment,'' he said....... Intelligence sources say Chinese spies are still in the labs..."
Associated Press 6/9/99 George Gedda "...House International Relations Committee chairman Benjamin Gilman said Wednesday he is concerned that the Clinton administration is forging a new policy toward North Korea without adequate consultation with Congress. Gilman, R-N.Y., outlined his criticism in a statement after former Defense Secretary William Perry gave Gilman and other members of Congress an update on the North Korea policy review he initiated eight months ago at the request of President Clinton. Gilman said he was concerned that the administration has "actually completed its review and is moving forward with quiet diplomatic initiatives with North Korea'' without close consultation with the Congress...... As part of his review, Perry visited North Korea two weeks ago. He said immediately after the visit that he explored with North Korean officials the possibility of a "major expansion'' in U.S. relations with North Korea if U.S. and allied concerns about North Korea's missile and nuclear programs were addressed. Of particular concern is North Korea's development of long-range ballistic missiles. Perry said he traveled to Pyongyang as a presidential envoy and not as a negotiator. "It will take some time for the DPRK (North Korea) to further reflect on the views I expressed and for us to reflect on our visit,'' he said at the time....."
Koenig's International News 6/10/99 Charles Smith "...In 1997, Commerce export enforcement officials in Beijing could not identify Chinese Army owned companies....In 1996, American computer maker SUN Computer Corp. exported a super-computer directly to the Chinese Army. According to the Cox report, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) explained that the actual buyer of the computer was the "Yuanwang Corporation" and that Sun was aware of "this corporation's PRC military ties." According to a 1997 e-mail from Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) officer Mark Bayuk, a chart provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was used to "discover that Yuanwang Group, the importer that is alleged to have imported the Sun Computer shipped to the National Defense Technical Institute of China in Changsha, was directly under the control of COSTIND."..... While export control officials were scrambling to find some information on PLA operations - the Commerce Dept. sales division, under Ron Brown, was well informed. There was a published list of Chinese Army companies and it was provided by one of the top Generals in the PLA. In 1995, Secretary Perry informed Commerce Secretary Ron Brown that his PLA contact was "General Ding Henggao" of COSTIND. "Dear Ron," wrote Perry in his 1995 letter to Secretary Brown. "I recently received a letter from General Ding Henggao, the Minister of the Chinese Commission for Science Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). As you know, General Ding and I head the Sino-American Joint Defense Conversion Commission that was established during my visit to the PRC this past October (1994)." "General Ding's staff has prepared a list of 49 potential projects... We have provided the list to Barry Carter, who is a member of the Commission. Your Bureau of Export Administration is working to make information available to concerned U.S. businesses."..."
Koenig's International News 6/10/99 Charles Smith "...According to Defense Secretary Perry, the U.S. contact for PLA General Ding was Barry Carter, Commerce Deputy Undersecretary of Export Administration. According to Federal Election Commission records, Barry Carter is a DNC donor and currently a Professor of Law at Georgetown University. In 1994, Carter worked at the Commerce Dept. under Ron Brown. Barry Carter exchanged correspondence with several major China-Gate players including PLA Lt. General Huai Guomo, PLA Major General Deng Yousheng, Ken Kay, a lobbyist for Sun Computers, and Eden Woon of the Washington State China Relations Council. The 1995 PLA list given to Carter is part of a series of letters between the Commerce Dept., various Chinese Army officers and anxious U.S. vendors. The 1995 list provided to Carter included "China YuanWang (Group)" and several other well know Chinese Army owned companies such as "NORINCO", "China National Nuclear", "China State Shipbuilding" and "China Aerospace." Carter also included his own personal touch to the list, by providing the phone, fax and address for his PLA contact in Beijing, "Lieutenant Colonel Wang Zhongchao", and his contact at the Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., "Colonel Xu Cunyong." Carter provided the list of PLA companies and contacts to Eden Woon, donor to U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Executive Director of the Washington State China Relations Council (WSCRC) and Director of the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce..... In December 1995, Eden Woon and the WSCRC hosted a delegation of Chinese Army representatives from PLA owned companies. Woon took them on a tour of the Washington state companies anxious to do business with the Chinese Army. The 1995 delegation to Washington state included "Feng Hui, Staff officer" of the COSTIND "Foreign Affairs Dep't." Feng Hui is better known as Major Feng Hui of the Chinese Army. Major Feng was accompanied by other officers from the PLA unit COSTIND, and a host of engineering specialists from various PLA owned companies, including "Chengdu Aircraft plant", the "Jiangnan Shipyard" and "No. 614 Institute", a PLA institute staffed by weapons experts. There is a clear reason why Major Feng trusted Eden Woon to help the Chinese Army do business in Seattle and beyond. Woon's radical views of U.S./Sino relations do not include a free Taiwan. In 1997, Woon and the Washington State China Relations Council sponsored a conference that included U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA). On October 14, 1997, at the close of the conference, the participants issued a report that states, "The U.S. should ensure that Taiwan understands that if conflicts arise (especially if apparently provoked by Taiwan), it cannot necessarily count on the U.S. coming to the rescue." ..."
Worldnetdaily 6/22/99 Charles Smith "...The Chinese are not alone in "conspiracy" theories. Nolanda Hill testified under oath that her lover and business partner, Ron Brown, feared for his life because of his dealings with the Chinese army. It is clear now that after the August 1994 meeting with Ding, DOD Secretary Perry ordered Brown to engage the PLA in "commercial" activities -- an order which is documented in a January 1995 letter to Brown from Perry. Perry also wrote Ding, informing him that Brown would assist the Chinese army in the "Defense Conversion" project. ..."
Worldnetdaily 6/22/99 Charles Smith "...During the first four years of the Clinton administration, People's Liberation Army Gen. Ding Henggao, along with his top two PLA assistants, Lt. Gen. Huai Guomo and Lt. Gen. Shen Rougjun, raided U.S. technology on a scale never before imagined..... Some of these fantastic exploits against the Clinton administration are documented in the Cox report, dealing with the theft of nose cone technology from Hughes -- largely Shen's handiwork. Likewise, some of Huai's handiwork can be found in a 1996 General Accounting Office report on the transfer of an advanced AT&T fiber-optic network to a PLA-owned company called Galaxy New Technology. However, few details on the direct relationship between their commander, Gen. Ding and top Clinton officials are covered in the Western press. Some of these lesser-publicized facts include the fact that in 1994 Bill Clinton began a program to transfer American military technology directly to the PLA. One such documented transfer began in an August 1994 meeting between the PLA warlords and Clinton administration officials in Beijing. The Chinese army side of the August 1994 meeting included top PLA officers such as Ding and Huai, who were accompanied by Gen. Deng Yousheng and Maj. Gen. Hou Gang, the deputy director of the Intelligence Department, Headquarters of General Staff of the PLA. The August 1994 PLA meeting also included an exclusive club of U.S. academia, selected by the Clinton administration to join a "U.S./Chinese Defense Conversion Commission," then run by Defense Secretary Dr. William Perry and Gen. Ding. Some of the other U.S. invitees included Commerce Deputy Undersecretary Dr. Barry Carter, a former law professor from Georgetown University, Dr. Eden Woon, the Executive Secretary for DOD Secretary Perry, and Dr. John Lewis, listed as a "Stanford University Civilian Consultant to SecDef."
WorldNetDaily 7/13/99 Charles Smith "… Another key document previously withheld from public view is a 1995 letter from Defense Secretary William Perry to General Ding Henggao of COSTIND. "On behalf of the United States Department of Defense," wrote Secretary Perry in July 1995. "I extend my regard to the officers and soldiers of the People's Liberation Army's Commission on Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense on the 46th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China." "Advancing the military relationship between our two nations remains an objective which we agree serves the long-term interests of peace and stability the Asia-Pacific Region," wrote Perry. "In the area of air traffic control. We have accomplished Step 5 of the Eight Point Air Traffic Control Initiative, and are prepared to carry our Step 6 by sending a delegation to China at any mutually agreed upon time in the future. Upon completion of Step 6, we would welcome a combined civil-military air traffic control delegation from China to the United States which will mark Step 7 of the Eight Point Plan." "Let me close by again conveying my respects to you on your National Day," wrote Perry. "And by reiterating my support for our bilateral military relationship."… Clearly, the Commerce Dept.'s vain attempt in 1998 to dispute the fact COSTIND was not a Chinese Army unit was another White House spin effort that failed. COSTIND, to Defense Secretary Perry, was indeed a military unit, commanded by General Ding and manned by "officers and soldiers" of the PLA…."
The American Spectator 8/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...The Chinese Communist government got its first big break in gaining access to U.S. technology previously denied for export when former Carter administration official William Perry returned to government as deputy secretary of defense in 1993. As TAS revealed three years ago ("Peking Pentagon. Bill Perry: Too Tight with the Enemy?" April 1996), Perry personally overruled the objections of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in approving the export of a buried fiber-optics Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) telecommunications network to Hua Mei (Galaxy New Technology), and China Milky Way, front companies owned and controlled by COSTIND.... ..."The Hua Mei deal was where it all began," said a former U.S. intelligence officer who spoke to TAS on condition of anonymity for himself and his company. "When one of our clients asked us to check Hua Mei out and we discovered COSTIND was behind it, we told them there was no way they would ever get U.S. government or CoCom (Coordinating Committe on Export Controls) approval to export. The technology was extremely sensitive, and the Chinese end-user was a known government collection agency. COSTIND has always been on the watch list."
The American Spectator 8/99 Kenneth R. Timmerman "...Despite this initial reaction, the former intelligence officer met with Chinese officials in Hong Kong in October 1993 to learn more. "When I brought up the problem of export approvals, they just laughed," he recalls. "They boasted of their relationship to Perry and to John Lewis," a colleague of Perry's from Stanford who became the point man for the project once Perry joined the Clinton administration. The consultant recommended that his client decline the deal because of the sensitive nature of the technology. But that didn't deter the Chinese, who simply turned to other suppliers. In the end, Bill Perry was true to his word, and the Chinese were able to get U.S. export approval. "If they had gone ahead with their original plan, which was to wire 54 Chinese cities with this type of network and interconnect them," the former intelligence officer said, "they would have shut the NSA out of China."..."
National Review 8/9/99 Mark Lagon "...How did we get to this point? It's important to remember who provoked whom. In July 1995 and March 1996, China conducted missile tests close to Taiwan during the island's first significant democratic elections. After administration officials unwisely suggested to the press that the U.S. maintained "strategic ambiguity" about whether it would assist Taiwan if the island were attacked, President Clinton sent two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait to put an end to the tests, which were effectively blockading the island's main ports. The carrier deployment might have suggested the benefits of firmness-but the administration subsequently sought to appease Beijing by urging Taiwan not to be provocative. A delegation of former Clinton officials -- including William Perry and Gen. John Shalikashvili -- took this message to Taiwan in January 1998...."
Los Angeles Times 8/13/99 Jim Mann "...Lifting the U.S. trade embargo against North Korea was one of the elements in the broad package of proposals put forward earlier this year by Perry, the former defense secretary whom Clinton appointed to conduct a formal review of North Korea policy. Perry visited the North Korean capital, Pyongyang, in spring as a presidential envoy. Perry's approach--the details of which have not been made public--was to offer the Pyongyang regime an array of incentives in exchange for steps by North Korea aimed at reducing military tensions with South Korea, Japan and the United States. Last spring, U.S. officials explained that the concept behind Perry's approach was to bring about what they called a "fundamental change" in North Korea's relations with the United States and its allies. They said they hoped to break the pattern of recent years in which U.S. officials admitted they were drifting "from crisis to crisis" in their dealings with North Korea...."
Reuters 9/7/99 "….North Korea, which has worried its neighbors by claiming new territorial waters and test-firing missiles, said after a first round of talks with the United States aimed at reducing tension in the region that their success depended on Washington. "The result of the talks depends on the will of the U.S.,'' Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-Gwan told reporters outside the U.S. embassy in the German capital after meeting U.S. officials for more than three hours. Speaking through an interpreter, Kim said the atmosphere of the talks was good "and we were very serious.'' ….Former Defense Secretary William Perry, who has been in charge of coordinating Washington's North Korean policy, has offered normal relations and an end to sanctions if Pyongyang meets U.S. demands to stop developing and exporting missiles.
CNN 9/16/99 Wolf Blizter AP "...President Bill Clinton may announce as early as Friday that he's easing long-standing economic sanctions against communist North Korea. Administration officials tell CNN the decision follows a commitment from North Korea over the weekend in Berlin to halt testing of long-range missiles while talks with the U.S. continue. The president's national security adviser, Samuel Berger, has recommended that the United States ease the sanctions as a gesture to encourage further progress in the nuclear talks with North Korea. A similar recommendation came from former Defense Secretary William Perry who has been the U.S. special envoy to North Korea...... An administration official said Wednesday that Perry had urged the pursuit of normal relations with North Korea at a "markedly faster pace" so long as Pyongyang forgoes long-range missile and nuclear weapons development programs. The official disclosed Perry's recommendations as Perry briefed a House panel on a report he delivered recently to Clinton on North Korea policy. If North Korea cooperates on U.S. security concerns, Perry recommended that the United States ease "appropriate sanctions" against North Korea and establish diplomatic relations. He also urged that Japan and South Korea take similar steps. Word of Perry's recommendations came just days after North Korea agreed to impose a conditional freeze on testing a long-range missile that analysts believe could be capable of reaching Alaska or Hawaii. North Korean officials said the freeze will remain in effect so long as negotiations with the United States continued....."
Fox News Online 9/17/99 "...President Clinton eased strict trade, banking and travel restrictions against North Korea Friday, in return for its conditional pledge to refrain from long-range missile testing, under an agreement reached during talks last week in Berlin. The move is the most significant gesture toward the communist government since the end of the Korean War in 1953. "The United States is taking this action in order to pursue improved relations with North Korea," the Clinton administration said in a statement. "It is our understanding that North Korea will continue to refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind as both sides move toward normal relations." The decision will allow "most consumer goods to be available for export to North Korea and will allow the importation of most North Korean-origin goods into the United States," White House press secretary Joe Lockhart said. Moreover, it will permit the transfer of commercial and personal funds between the two countries and allow commercial air and sea transportation for passengers and cargo..... The sanctions relaxation being announced by Clinton is the most significant gesture toward North Korea in 46 years, including a modest trade opening that took effect in January 1995. Perry made his recommendation in a report to Clinton based on an 11-month review of the issue. Outlining a worst-case scenario, Perry said if North Korea acquired nuclear weapons and continued development of long-range missiles, the relative stability of U.S. deterrence would be undermined. Perry also wrote that in the event of a second Korean war, the allies would be able to win but the "destruction would be catastrophic. We cannot allow the deterrence to weaken." In exchange for the Pyongyang government's 1994 promise to freeze its development program, a consortium of foreign countries agreed to replace the North's plutonium-producing reactors with light-water reactors....."
AP via Newsday.com 10/12/99 George Gedda ".....North Korea would be able to produce a ``significant number'' of nuclear weapons each year if it renounced a nuclear freeze it agreed to in 1994, according to an official report released today. The report, prepared by former Defense Secretary William Perry, also said that that in the event of an outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, the intensity of the combat ``would be unparalleled in U.S. experience'' since the Korea War of 1950-53. Perry's report was released one year after he assumed his duties a special adviser to President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on North Korea policy. Some key recommendations by Perry were implemented last month in advance of the report's release. After North Korea pledged to forgo testing of long-range missiles, Clinton eased trade, banking and travel restrictions against that country, the most significant gestures toward Pyongyang in almost half a century. The report said a North Korean move to restart its nuclear program at Yongbyon, frozen since 1994, would be its ``quickest and surest path'' to acquisition of nuclear weapons. Without the 1994 Agreed Framework, as the bilateral agreement is known, ``it is estimated that the North could reprocess enough plutonium to produce a significant number of nuclear weapons per year, the study said. ...."
Reuters 10/12/99 ".....Former Defense Secretary William Perry, in a long-awaited policy review, recommended Tuesday that the United States and its Asian allies try to coexist with the Marxist rulers in Pyongyang rather than undermine them or promote internal reform. The strategy is in sharp contrast with the way Washington handles what it calls rogue or pariah states - states such as Iraq, Libya and Cuba - and reflects the gravity of the military threat which North Korea could pose. Perry said the United States should instead gradually eliminate sanctions and reduce pressures North Korea sees as threatening, in exchange for assurances that North Korea does not have a nuclear weapons program and will not test, deploy, produce or export long-range missiles, the report said. The State Department released an unclassified version of the report Tuesday but the broad thrust of its contents has been common knowledge for months. The United States has already acted on Perry's recommendations. It eased economic sanctions in September after Pyongyang agreed to suspend its next long-range missile test. Perry, who spent 10 months reviewing North Korea policy at the request of President Clinton, concluded that an attempt to hasten the demise of the North Korean government would take too long and had no guarantee of success. Such a policy would raise the risk of a destructive war on the Korean peninsula and would give the secretive Stalinist state time to proceed with its weapons programs, he said. ....."
WASHINGTON TIMES 10/19/99 Wesley Pruden "....President Kim Dae-jung sees evidence that North Korea -- armed, belligerent, starving, isolated and once described as "the most dangerous place on earth" -- is changing for the better under pressure from the United States and its allies. "This kind of pressure from the world community [is] contributing to the deterrence of their attempt for a military conflict," he told editors of The Washington Times in an interview at the Blue House, the South Korean executive mansion.... "Right now, North Korea is trying to get in contact with the United States and Japan, and especially the United States. That is their posture. I think that is a sign they are changing." .....The president dampened concerns, raised in Congress in the wake of the Perry Report, that offering concessions to North Korean demands is giving in to "blackmail." Repeated concessions to North Korea to persuade it to abandon destructive behavior, in this view, encourages more destructive behavior. The Perry Report suggests a "two-track strategy," with diplomacy and concession on the first track, followed by a second track if the first track does not work. The declassified version of the report does not offer details of the second track....."
Special Report with Brit Hume (Fox News Network) 6/2/99 "....LEITNER: Right. Right. And it was a collegial body of 16 nations that sat together and were able to actually veto sales of each other' s in terms of threatening products to threatening locations. One of the primary goals of the Clinton administration, as it turned out, was to destroy the regime called COCOM.
HUME: Well, wasn't that in part because of the belief that the cold war was over and it was no longer needed, and that it was a time to stimulate trade? I mean...
LEITNER: Well, there was a belief that it -- there certainly was a belief pre-dating the end of the cold war that it was no longer needed by the people who came in with the Clinton administration....
HUME: So it wasn't pro-China so much as it was pro-trade.
LEITNER: For the most part.
HUME: So in addition to whatever they were able to take from the labs in terms of technological knowledge, this was equipment they' d been able to simply buy and have sent to their shores, correct?
LEITNER: Correct, including an entire factory, let's say, from Columbus, Ohio, that made the C-17 -- large parts of the C-17 bomber, the " Peacekeeper," the MX missile, parts of the B-1 bomber that were simply transferred lock, stock and barrel to -- to China.
HUME: And was there -- was the responsibility for deciding whether this should be done or not moved outside the Pentagon? Was it taken -- was it taken away from you personally?
LEITNER: Well, probably the greatest amount of change that took place in the administration was the weakening of the Pentagon in the export control process. The Pentagon basically, under -- under the current regime basically took itself out of the process. It became a very weak player. Very often it wound up siding with the Commerce Department against -- and it left the State Department, of all people, on the -- anchoring the conservative end of the continuum, which was a terrible shock, particularly to the State Department, that suddenly they became the voice for national security because DoD, in large part, abrogated its mission.
HUME: Now, was this under -- this was under -- under Secretary -- well, Cohen wasn't there...
LEITNER: Well, under Perry.
HUME: Yeah, Perry.
LEITNER: Perry was the big...
HUME: Well, was he an advocate for this, or was he not aware of it, or what was going on?
LEITNER: Well, Perry was a very, very strong advocate for -- not only for China and in establishing preferential treatment for China in all things, including military matters, but also was an ideological opponent for the concept of export controls. Even when he was in the Pentagon originally, as the deputy director -- well, the director for defense research and engineering, years ago under the Carter administration, he was an opponent of the concept of export control. He's a long-term free trader....."
The Washington Times 10/28/99 Bill Gertz "….. The intelligence reports are unwelcome news for the Clinton administration, which eased economic sanctions against North Korea last month as part of a new conciliatory policy drawn up by former Defense Secretary William Perry. Mr. Perry, in a report, urged continued engagement with North Korea with the goal of normalizing relations. His report said the United States should eliminate sanctions against North Korea in exchange for assurances that North Korea will not make nuclear weapons and will not test, deploy, produce or export long-range missiles. The Perry policy-review team stated in its report that "the urgent focus of U.S. policy toward the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] must be to end its nuclear weapons and long-range missile-related activities." One official said the recent intelligence reports are a clear sign the new policy is not working. "So much for the Perry approach," the official said….."
THE WASHINGTON TIMES Toni Marshall Bill Gertz 11/4/99 "….House Republicans, in a looming showdown with President Clinton over North Korea, warned yesterday that the communist state is secretly attempting to develop nuclear-armed missiles capable of hitting the United States. "There is significant evidence that nuclear weapons development is continuing," said a 75-page report by a Republican-led advisory committee. The report cited North Korea's recent development of a multi-stage rocket that is capable of reaching the United States, adding that the missile could deliver "chemical, biological and possibly nuclear weapons." The report came in response to recommendations by former Defense Secretary William Perry, who in a recent policy review urged the Clinton administration to work with North Korea's rulers instead of trying to undermine them or promote internal change. On Mr. Perry's recommendation, the president eased economic sanctions against Pyongyang in September after it agreed to suspend long-range ballistic missile tests……"There is no abatement in missile development, and furthermore, there is still ongoing work on the development of the nuclear warheads themselves," said Mr. Cox. ….. A House national security aide said the most likely source for know-how on nuclear warheads is China. "We know there is an association with China, and China has access to special warheads so it is likely the North Koreans have access to that technology." ….."
Worldnetdaily 11/16/99 Chrles Smith "…. In 1998, the U.S. Commerce Department denied a Freedom of Information request for "any exports" to the "CAAC, the China Civil Aviation Authority," which the Clinton administration portrays as the friendly civilian equal to the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Yet, according to the Commerce Department, documents on CAAC are so secret that "such information (may) not be disclosed unless its release is determined to be in the national interest." …… The FAA documents show the Commerce Department actively participated and encouraged military technology transfers to China. The transfers, according to the FAA documents, started in 1994 when Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and Defense Secretary William Perry formed a joint "Defense" commission with Chinese Gen. Ding Henggao. ….."
wordarchive.com Dan Jacobson 1/1/99 "…… Immediately after the [Brown] crash, the businesses that had executives representing them on the trip were informed that there were no survivors, and the White House implied the same by statements to the media. But through the legal actions of Judicial Watch, a previously undisclosed log from the Department of Commerce has recently been uncovered which shows that Ira Sokowitz, a Department of Commerce official, had notified the White House, some 40 minutes after the wreckage was discovered, that there were two survivors. One of those survivors is known to be Tech. Sgt. Shelly Kelly, who died from a broken neck in transit to a hospital in Dubrovnik. It is still not known who the other survivor was.
wordarchive.com Dan Jacobson 1/1/99 "…… This log also reveals that shortly after notification of the existence of two survivors, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott relayed a "strong request" that a TV crew from a station in Dubrovnik "not film at the crash site." The request was granted. The State Department has apparently offered no explanation as to why this request was made. Another unusual official action after the crash was the departure from USAF policies which require an initial consideration that the causes of all plane crashes are undetermined until an investigation is concluded. The White House and the Pentagon both rushed to the judgment, long before an investigation was carried out, that the crash was an accident. Secretary of Defense William Perry informed the press a day after the crash that "it was a classic sort of accident." There was no evidence at that time for Secretary Perry to make such a claim.
Washington Post 12/15/99 "…..But the Cox report presented "no evidence or foundation for these allegations other than recounting the existence of a 'walk-in' agent with some data on one system," wrote Michael M. May, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation. …..In challenging the Cox commission, May and his colleagues acknowledge that they have seen only the public version of its report. "We realize that not all of the report was declassified, and thus some of the factual justification for the report's conclusions may be classified," May wrote. Although there have been earlier critiques of the Cox report, the Stanford panel's is the most detailed. It accuses the Cox commission of broad mistakes, such as caricaturing the complicated Chinese political system, and petty ones, such as mixing up kilometers and miles when discussing the range of a Chinese missile……. For example, the scholars challenged as a "basic error in understanding" the Cox commission's finding that "the main aim for the [Chinese] civilian economy is to support the building of modern military weapons and to support the aims of the PLA [Chinese army]." The basis for that assertion, China's so-called Sixteen Character policy, in fact refers to conversion of military-owned industries to civilian product lines whose profits "can be used to support less profitable military product lines during peacetime," they said…… The panel's expert on Chinese governance and policy was Alastair Iain Johnston, a Harvard professor who is a visiting scholar at Stanford. The nuclear weapons section of its report was by Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky, former director of the Stanford High Energy Physics Laboratory; the Chinese arms control section was by Marco Di Capua, a Lawrence Livermore physicist who served at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 1993 to 1997; and the section on China's acquisition of U.S. missile technology was by Lewis R. Franklin, a career intelligence expert on Sino-Soviet missile and space research who is a visiting scholar at Stanford……"
From the Center for International Security and Arms Control website ".... In 1990 the Center for International Security and Arms Control, under the direction of William Perry, initiated the Corporate Affiliates Program to provide opportunities for corproate leaders to participate in substantive discussions of issues in international security and U.S. defense policy. In the post cold war world issues of international business are inextricably related to those of politics and security, and this necessitates an ongoing dialog among security specialists, government officials, and business leaders....."
Freeper Jolly 12/15/99: Cox Report's comments onthe Stanford Study.
Freeper Jolly 12/15/99 "…Xiong's trip has been delayed until next year. He will probably come some time in January. …"
Freeper tallhappy observes 12/15/99 "….Is there a connection between the Stanford people that wrote the super computer report (stating that the computers were easily available globally and that delaying selling them to China would only hurt the computer industry -oh sure) and the people who have written the criticism of the COX REPORT? Is there a connection? It's the same people!! It is the same group at Stanford, The Center for International Security and Cooperation. It's William Perry's group. The computer publication is available there as well. That is : High Performance Computing, National Security Applications, and Export Control Policy at the Close of the 20th Century (Table of Contents-Chapter 3; Chapter 4-Glossary) (PDF) by Seymour Goodman, Peter Wolcott, and Patrick Homer I haven't looked at it. It must be big because it is broken down in to two parts.Their url for recent publications. Here are the two parts.
Freeper tallhappy 12/15/99 "…Here is the link to get the actual report from these Stanford "experts". It is a 100 page pdf (Adobe Acrobat) file.http://www.stanford.edu/group/CISAC/coxfinal3.pdf …."
Air Force Magazine 1/2000 Bill Gertz "…. Soon, the US will be within range, and the missiles will be on the world market. North Korea has embarked on a broad buildup of its ballistic missile force and is on the verge of fielding an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile capable of reaching the United States. ….. "It is now believed that two types of North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles can strike the continental United States with weapons of mass destruction," said Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.), chairman of the House International Relations Committee and head of a special advisory panel on North Korea. "For the first time in our history, we are within missile range of an arguably irrational rogue regime. Regrettably, we cannot defend against that threat." The problem of North Korean missiles is made worse by the fact that Pyongyang has become a wholesaler of missiles and related technology and materials. In the words of one US defense official: "They are becoming The Home Depot for missile sales around the world." …."
Air Force Magazine 1/2000 Bill Gertz "…. In another recent report, the Air Force's National Air Intelligence Center at WrightPatterson AFB, Ohio, described North Korea's missile program as extensive. "North Korea has ambitious ballistic missile development programs and has exported missile technology to other countries, including Iran and Pakistan," the unclassified report said. "The North Koreans have already flight-tested their No Dong MRBs [Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles], and the Taepo Dong 1 MRBM booster was used in an attempt to orbit a satellite in August 1998." The test showed the two-stage booster "apparently performed successfully," the report said…… North Korea has moved quickly to a high position on the intelligence community's strategic missile threat list, ranking a notch below Russia and China. A National Intelligence Estimate--a consensus view of more than 10 US intelligence organizations--was made public in September. It warned of new dangers from North Korea's missile program. "We project that during the next 15 years the United States most likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and possibly from Iraq," the report said. The report notes that North Korea is the driver in the spread of missiles….."
Air Force Magazine 1/2000 Bill Gertz "…. The Clinton Administration has sought to highlight the positive elements of its policy toward North Korea, which was the focus of a major review by former Defense Secretary William J. Perry. Perry reported his findings to the President in September and called for continued engagement with the communist government in Pyongyang with the goal of normalizing relations that have been hostile since the end of the Korean War…..The Perry report stated that "the urgent focus of US policy toward the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or North Korea] must be to end its nuclear weapons and long-range missilerelated activities." As part of the new policy, President Clinton lifted some economic sanctions against North Korea, and in response Pyongyang announced it would "not launch a missile"--the Taepo Dong 2--during talks with the United States. "Pledges are important," said State Department spokesman James B. Foley of the North Korean testing moratorium. "Actions are equally or even more important, but I am not aware that we have reason to disbelieve the pledge." Within days of making the announcement, however, North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency made clear that the testing moratorium would not stop the weapons buildup. "The DPRK has built up its defense power very expensively," the agency said. "The Korean people have strengthened the defense capabilities to the maximum [by] fastening their belts." Indeed, widespread famine has killed thousands in North Korea. In 1996, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il called for a crackdown on cannibalism after three cases were reported, one US intelligence report said….."
Air Force Magazine 1/2000 Bill Gertz "….Robert D. Walpole, the CIA's national intelligence officer for strategic and nuclear programs, stated in Congressional testimony that North Korea has joined Russia and China as one of the very few nations capable of striking the United States with a strategic missile. "After Russia and China, North Korea is the most likely to develop ICBMs capable of threatening the United States during the next 15 years," Walpole said. North Korea shocked Asia and the world in August 1998 when it test fired its first three-stage Taepo Dong 1 over the Sea of Japan and into the Pacific Ocean…… The real danger, he said, is in a longer range Taepo Dong 2 that US intelligence agencies have been closely watching. The TD 2 was set for launch last summer according to CIA officials. It was delayed under frantic US diplomatic pressure and appeals to China to intervene with North Korea to put off the test. "A two-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a several hundredkilogram payload to Alaska and Hawaii and a lighter payload to the western half of the United States," Walpole warned. "A three-stage Taepo Dong 2 could deliver a several hundredkilogram payload anywhere in the United States. North Korea is much more likely to weaponize the more capable Taepo Dong 2 than the Taepo Dong 1 as an ICBM." A senior US intelligence official who briefed reporters on the CIA missile threat report said that North Korea's long-range missile program will only be slowed, not stopped, by diplomatic efforts……"
Air Force Magazine 1/2000 Bill Gertz "…. In fact, the US Intelligence Community has concluded that the development of the Taepo Dong 2 is continuing, despite the pledge by North Korea not to conduct a flight test. USAF's National Air Intelligence Center, the community's premier missile monitoring center, reported that Pyongyang is "continuing development of the Taepo Dong," said one official who has seen the report. "They are still improving the TD 2 and proceeding with development," said the official. "In fact, their level of confidence in the TD 2 may be high enough to have it available [for use] without any flight test." ….."
Air Force Magazine 1/2000 Bill Gertz "…. Worries do not end with the Taepo Dong. North Korea also has developed a new 620-mile-range No Dong missile. The No Dong was flight-tested only once but is believed by military officials to be deployed and to pose a direct threat to troops not only in South Korea but at bases in Japan as well……. The Congressional panel headed by former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, however, appeared more candid. The panel's report issued in July 1998 states: "The commission judges that the No Dong was operationally deployed long before the US government recognized that fact. There is ample evidence that North Korea has created a sizable missile production infrastructure, and therefore it is highly likely that considerable numbers of No Dongs have been produced." Because of the Intelligence Community's failure to assess both the scope and pace of the No Dong development, the Rumsfeld commission warned that "the United States may have very little warning prior to deployment of the Taepo Dong 2"--the missile that can target the United States. ….The North Koreans also have exported the No Dong to Pakistan and Iran. The No Dongs have been, as one official put it, "repainted" and named the Ghauri and Shahab 3 missiles. "Obviously, North Korea has them, and Pakistan has the No Dong derivatives as a Ghauri," the official said. "The Shahab 3 is based on it as well with some other foreign assistance. I don't expect it to stop there. ... I expect over time we're going to see more countries emerge with them." …..Pentagon intelligence agencies reported in the fall that North Korea offered to Sudan an entire factory for assembling Scud missiles, like those produced in North Korea. Also, North Korea recently supplied 10 tons of aluminum powder obtained from China to Syria, another intelligence report stated. The aluminum powder is being used by the agency of the Syrian government involved in building weapons of mass destruction and missiles, said an official who has seen the report sent to senior US policy-makers. One official said the recent intelligence reports are a clear sign the new policy is not working. "So much for the Perry approach," this official said….."
San Diego Union-Tribune 3/20/00 Stephen Green "…….It's known among defense devotees as the "Last Supper" -- a gathering of the leaders of America's military-industrial complex for an invitation-only dinner at the Pentagon. On that spring evening in 1993, then-Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Perry had bad news for executives of the nation's largest military contractors. Their big money-making days during the Cold War were over. Today, the "Last Supper" prophesy has come true in the form of a shrinking military-industrial base -- a phenomenon defense officials say could have profound consequences for national security. Fewer firms serving the Pentagon means diminished competition and less incentive to develop the kind of cutting-edge combat technologies that have helped make the United States the world's dominant military power. "The industrial base is like a nonuniformed branch of the military. Without it, the uniformed branches can become impotent," said Lawrence F. Skibbie, president of the National Defense Industrial Association. The association represents some 900 military contractors -- from aerospace giants to widget makers...."War fighters need high quality, innovative and affordable products, so you need a robust and competitive industry," said Jeffrey P. Bialos, deputy undersecretary of defense for industrial affairs……"
World Net Daily 4/5/00 Charles Smith "….The Chinese Ministry of Security Services arrested Chinese defector Hua Di in January 1998. It was reported that Hua Di was sentenced to 15 years in prison for passing missile secrets to America. According to the New York Times "News" service, the Beijing High People's Court has decided to over-turn Hua Di's conviction. ……… In December 1997, I tried to contact Chinese missile expert Hua Di at Stanford University in California. In 1996, he had given Aviation Week and Space Technology detailed information on the Chinese Dong Feng-15 missile, the weapon China used during the 1996 Taiwan crisis. Hua had published nothing really new about the DF-15 but I wanted his personal comments as the "official source." Curiously, Hua Di would not grant an interview. In fact, immediately after my call, Hua Di suddenly decided to return to China……."
World Net Daily 4/5/00 Charles Smith "….Hua Di came from a family of prominent Communist officials. He studied missiles in Russia and worked in China's missile program for 24 years. In 1984, Hua went to work for the China International Trust and Investment Co. (CITIC) a firm part-owned by the Chinese army. Hua joined the Stanford University study center after he fled China during the Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989. In late 1997, Hua Di flew to Hong Kong where he met with Chinese security officials and was assured that he would not be prosecuted. On Dec. 31, 1997, Hua returned to China. Later in 1998, the official Chinese press announced that Hua had been arrested and charged with passing state secrets to U.S. officials. …….."
World Net Daily 4/5/00 Charles Smith "…. In the process of looking for Mr. Hua, I also discovered Dr. John W. Lewis, a Stanford professor who collaborated with Hua in writing books on Chinese missiles. Lewis has since provided congressional testimony on missile systems…….. Hua Di's real role inside America, however, remains unpublished. In 1994, Dr. Lewis of Stanford and Hua Di were in business with the Chinese army. Hua Di and Dr. Lewis joined with Chinese Gen. Nie Li, wife of Chinese warlord Gen. Ding Henggao, entering into a joint venture called Galaxy New Technology. ……… In 1994, Dr. Lewis was officially listed on the U.S. Defense Department payroll as Defense Secretary William Perry's personal "consultant." Dr. Lewis traveled to Beijing with Secretary Perry to meet with Ding and his subordinate, Gen. Huai Guomo, as a consultant to Secretary Perry. At the same time, Dr. Lewis also worked for Ding's wife, Nie, in the Galaxy New Technology joint venture. ………. Hua never answered how much he was paid for his "advice" from the joint venture set up by Dr. Lewis and Madam Gen. Nie. Hua left America before congressional and law enforcement investigators could question him about his role in the fiber-optic deal. ….. But the Hua Di story does not end inside the Clinton administration. In 1999, George W. Bush selected Condoleezza Rice as his foreign policy advisor. Ms. Rice was deeply involved with Hua Di and Dr. Lewis. ….."
World Net Daily 4/5/00 Charles Smith "….In 1996, Ms. Rice, as provost at Stanford University, investigated Dr. John Lewis and the Hua Mei project. "We'll follow what is a normal process under these circumstances. It's not all that unusual that issues arise concerning conflict of interest," said Ms. Rice at the time. Yet, nothing ever became of the Stanford investigation. Ms. Rice has made no comment on the investigation. Today, Stanford officials and Ms. Rice continue to maintain the fiction that Hua Di was not a spy and nothing happened. Dr. Lewis, Dr. Perry and Ms. Rice have all refused repeated requests for an interview. ........., Hua Di also served his masters in Beijing by passing false information to the west. In 1992, Hua Di claimed the new Dong Feng-25 missile (Dong Feng, as it happens, translates as "East Wind") was too expensive to be deployed. Hua documented that the DF-25 is a mobile two-stage missile capable of hurling a conventional 4,000-pound warhead over 1,000 miles. However, Hua also documented its failure. According to the co-author of "Red Dragon Rising," William Triplett, in August 1999 Clinton administration officials were shocked by Chinese communist press announcements declaring the DF-25 to be fully operational and tipped with multiple nuclear warheads. Triplett's book has put the White House on the defensive, trying to explain their acceptance of the Chinese defector and his DF-25 disinformation. ……"
China Times Interactive via FAS website "Taiwan Crisis" 5/28/00 "…..Former United States Defense Secretary William Perry confirmed on Friday that he will lead a delegation to visit Taiwan and mainland China in mid-June to increase communication between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This mode of communication between Taipei, Washington, and Beijing, commonly referred to as the "track II" channel of dialogue, is aimed at reducing the risk of a cross-strait military confrontation and is an alternative to the current semi-official contacts between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation and mainland China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait. ……"
Center for Security Policy 8/10/00 "……There is good news and bad news about the op.ed. article published in today's Washington Post by former Clinton-Gore Secretary of Defense William Perry and his former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili. …… In important respects, their assessment of the question at hand -- namely, has the reduction in the size and capability of the U.S. military over the past decade been excessive, leading to a condition where it "cannot adequately protect American national interests?" -- is highly misleading, transparently politicized and, since the authors should know better, seemingly intentionally disingenuous. ………. In the final analysis, it may well be that, as two of the leading architects of the hollow military Mr. Clinton is bequeathing to his successor, Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili cannot objectively discuss their handiwork……"http://Timmerman2000.com 7/24/00 Kenneth R. Timmerman "……..For the first time in history American cities and its people are at risk from a nuclear first strike from Communist China, not just a retaliatory second strike. This is a far cry from Bill Clinton's boast to have built a world in which "no more nuclear missiles" are pointed at American cities………. The Cox report, which confirmed many of the stories I first reported in the American Spectator, also shows that U.S. technology approved for export to China by the Clinton administration has helped the Chinese military build a new encrypted communications network for command and control. Those sales were championed by then Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Perry, who over-ruled the objections of the National Security Agency and his own Defense Technology Security Administration. (Readers will find two complete chapters on Mr. Perry and his troubling relationship to Communist China in this book). Later, by welcoming large Chinese military delegations to our military exercises in the Pacific - another Perry initiative - the U.S. demonstrated to the Chinese how to exploit this technology to their advantage on the battlefield……."